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Abstract 
The established approach to safety management has failed to handle socio-technical 
systems that have become more complex. The main argument is this approach is based 
on assumptions that systems are protected against accidents by barriers (well-trained 
people, redundant mechanisms and safety devices, and procedures and safe systems of 
work). Complex systems, such as maintenance, are actually labour intensive; 
maintenance staff often works under pressure to finish tasks as rapidly as possible. They 
continuously adapt and make adjustments using available resources, time, knowledge, 
and competence to achieve success. Thus, they are accidents prone. Human factors 
inherent to maintenance accidents are most times difficult to identify. Research in this 
area in the oil and gas industry in maintenance management is limited in comparison to 
the aviation and nuclear sectors. Therefore, it has been suggested to overcome this lack 
by exploring the maintenance system and identifying appropriate methods and tools that 
lead a system to safety excellence. Resilience engineering (RE) approach has been found 
the suitable solution. Moreover, four system abilities (cornerstones of RE: ability to 
respond, to monitor, to anticipate, and to learn) have been identified to characterise the 
resilience of a system; if these abilities are known and increased, it will make the system 
As High Resilient As Possible (AHRAP). However, there is a need to bridge between 
RE theory and practice. Particularly, a tool that measures these abilities lacks in the oil 
and gas industry, specifically within the maintenance system.  
In doing so, a framework based on a Gap Analysis (GA) was outlined. A tool, the 
MAintenance System Resilience Assessment Tool- MASRAT, was developed to assess 
current system resilience and identify strategies for improvement to achieve safety 
excellence. The maintenance system of SONATRACH was explored by the analysis of 
the system documentation and processes, interviews with maintenance staff, 
questionnaires, field observations, storytelling, and functional analysis. MASRAT has 
been validated by means of congruency and principal components analysis, PCA 
(content validity), and Cronbach’s alpha (reliability). An expert panel testing was carried 
out to test its usability.  
The exploration of the system came up with a snapshot of daily activities as well as a 
better understanding of the maintenance system. The study identified the most 
xvi 
 
significant human factors (resources, time pressure, and supervision/coordination) and 
their probable impact on plant safety. The elements of the system were found tightly 
coupled, hence the system complex. Stories describing the continuous adaptations of 
people to achieve assigned objectives were collected. On the other hand, MASRAT was 
validated. All items were rated above 0.75 in congruency test. The results of PCA for 
the three selected factors confirmed the items may be clustered after extraction into four 
components which interpretation represents the four cornerstones of RE.  The analysis 
showed MASRAT is reproducible. Cronbach’s alpha results were found higher than 
what is required (0.7). MASRAT was found usable by maintenance expert panel. It was 
used to measure the maintenance department resilience. Strategies that may lead the 
system from current maturity level to excellence were identified. Eventually, 
recommendations were made to management to be implemented both at corporate and 
department levels. For the first time, the maintenance department resilience of petroleum 
assets was measured to fill in the gap between RE theory and practice. Besides, this can 
be of benefit to the petroleum industry by a better knowledge of the maintenance 
working environment and human factors impact on safety and by profiles determination 
and improvement strategies identification. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The availability of personnel and equipment is extremely important to achieve production 
objectives. Maintenance activities are characterised by the nature of work, the types (corrective 
activities that are performed after the failures have occurred and preventive ones that are 
performed before a failure happens which could be respectively a trip in a pump or changing a 
bear), and their associated tasks and steps (preparation and work completion). Furthermore, the 
systems of work such as procedures and conditions of work, the places where the activities are 
performed as well as organisational aspects may have adverse effects on people’s health and 
safety, the environment, and operation costs.  Such activities are actually labour intensive and 
maintenance staff often works under pressure to finish tasks as rapidly as possible, and they 
sometimes lack the necessary knowledge to perform certain tasks as required (Ameziane et al., 
2011). Thus, they are accidents prone.  
The job, the organisation, and the individual are the three interacting aspects, called human 
factors that influence human behaviour at work and can affect health and safety as defined by 
HSE (2005). About 80 % (Reason, 1990) of industrial accidents are a result of human factors, 
a majority of which are maintenance related and occur mainly during the execution phase where 
corrective maintenance causes more accidents (Idhammar, 2004; Grusenmeyer, 2005; Giraud 
et al, 2008; Okoh and Haugen, 2014). 
Two fundamental ways explain the human “contribution” to accident occurrences: first, it is 
seen either as a “human error”, that is the “cause” of mishaps or as a symptom of a deeper 
problem within the organisation (Dekker, 2004); people at the bottom of the pile are generally 
blamed for such occurrences (Reason and Hobbs, 2004). Second, it is explained by a variability 
of the performance of the system (Hollnagel, 2004). Further details are given in Chapter 3, 
section 3.3. 
Human factors inherent in maintenance related accidents are difficult to identify. Research in 
this area within the oil and gas industry in maintenance management is limited due to a lack of 
credible data (Ray et al, 2000; Burton et al., 2004; Grusenmeyer, 2005; Giraud et al., 2008; 
Kanki and Hobbs, 2008). Therefore, the need to explore the maintenance working environment 
and assess the inherent conditions of maintenance human factors is of great importance. 
- 2 - 
 
Accident causation models evolved from the simple linear (or sequential model, Heinrich’s 
domino model), via complex linear (or epidemiological model, Reason’s Swiss cheese model) 
to the non-linear (or systemic model) according to Hollnagel (2006). Traditional risk 
assessment techniques are good for technical failures in non-complex systems, but they fail to 
handle complex socio-technical systems (Hollnagel, 2010a; Leveson, 2011; Macchi, 2011). 
They may be used in combination with more powerful techniques such as systemic techniques 
that are based on resilience engineering precepts.   
1.2. Resilience Engineering 
Complex socio-technical systems are characterised by the unavailability of complete 
knowledge (Hollnagel, 2010a) which allows full system description due to continuous changing 
parameters (see section 3.4).  In such systems, organisations are often working under pressure. 
Since the future is uncertain and unknown, organisations search to preventing negative 
outcomes (what can go wrong) to take place by early detection and correction as well as 
highlighting opportunities (what can go right) to take benefit from them. They face situations 
requiring the management of unexpected events. To achieve success, they must adapt their 
functioning and make correct adjustments. They have to rely on the capability of humans to 
make these adjustments that fill in the gap between “what should be done” and “what could be 
done” using available resources, time, knowledge, and competence. Actually, adjustments may 
lead to success or to increase of risks. The reliability of such systems is because “people are 
flexible and adaptive, rather than because the systems have been perfectly thought out and 
designed” (Hollnagel, 2010a p. 55). The performance of the system is, therefore, variable where 
the performance of the human part of the system is the main source of variability and this 
variability must be seen as an asset rather than a threat, something that is useful but also 
inevitable (Hollnagel, 2010a). Therefore, safety must be achieved by controlling performance 
variability rather than constraining it (Hollnagel, 2010b). 
In resilience concepts and precepts book, Leveson defines resilience as “the ability of systems 
to prevent or adapt to changing conditions in order to maintain (control over) a system 
property” (Leveson et al., 2006 p. 95), where safety and risk are the property in question. For 
Leveson et al. (2006), safety is achieved when the system or organization avoids failures and 
losses, as well as responding appropriately after the fact, hence when the system is resilient. 
For Fairbanks et al (2014, p. 376) a system is “resilient if it can adjust its functioning before, 
during, or following events (changes, disturbances, or opportunities) and thereby sustain 
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required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”. For Hollnagel (2010a), 
a resilient system is also safe.  
The aim of Resilience Engineering (the approach that makes a system more resilient, see section 
3.3 for more details) is not only to prevent things from going wrong, but also to ensure that 
things go right, that is to facilitate normal outcomes. In other words, enhancing the abilities that 
make things go right will reduce the possibility that they go wrong. Resilience engineering has 
been found the solution to complex socio-technical systems and safety must be managed by 
resilience engineering. Resilience engineering is a developing approach (Hollnagel et al., 2009). 
Therefore, there is a need to fill in the gap between theory and practice. This requires the 
development of tools to complement existing ones. 
Currently, the well-known accident causation models which can be used as risk assessment 
methods as well, based on resilience engineering precepts and system theory, yet in 
development, are: the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model 
(Leveson, 2004), and the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), (Hollnagel, 2004).  
Instead of explaining accidents as a result of a break in a linear chain of events, they view 
accidents as a consequence of a failure to maintain safety constraints as performance changes 
(STAMP) or unexpected combinations of normal performance variability of the system that 
resonate to produce the undesirable events (FRAM). 
1.2.1. The STAMP Model 
The STAMP accident causation model as well as the corresponding risk assessment method 
STAMP-based Hazard Analysis (STPA) has been developed in Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).  STAMP has been mainly used in space and aviation industries. The 
underlying theoretical foundation of STAMP is a result of system and control theory rather than 
component reliability theory. It assumes that accidents occur when component failures, external 
disturbances, and/or dysfunctional interactions among systems or system components 
(including hardware, software, humans, and organizational components) are not adequately 
handled by the system design, the system operators, and management because of inadequate 
application of constraints at all levels of a socio-technical system (Hardy, 2011; Leveson, 2004; 
Dulac et al, 2005; Johnson and Halloway, 2003).  
According to Alvarenga et al (2014), STAMP is a combination of two models namely 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) model and Forrester’s model developed in 1961. The 
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Rasmussen and Svedung model is an application to risk management of Rasmussen model that 
was developed in 1997 to explain accident occurrences in complex socio-technical system. 
Actually, Rasmussen model is composed of several hierarchical control levels from legislators 
to operation staff through plant management (Qureshi, 2008). The Forrester model is based on 
concepts of process control system theory applied by Forrester in business dynamics involving 
economic processes (Alvarenga et al 2014). STAMP uses the mathematical model for system 
dynamics to describe the processes occurring in the structure of each level (Alvarenga et al 
2014). Figure 1.1 shows the STAMP model as adapted by Leveson (2004). 
 
Figure 1-1 : General form of a model of socio-technical control (Leveson, 2004) 
Systems are characterised by a dynamic balance state; accidents, therefore, stem from systems 
reaching imbalance –hazardous- state and inappropriate control (Leveson, 2004). For Leveson 
(2004), systems are viewed as hierarchical structures where each level imposes constraints on 
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the activity of the level below it. Safety-related constraints specify those relationships among 
system variables that constitute the balanced state of the system (Leveson, 2004).  
Basically, STAMP considers constraints instead of events to explain accident occurrences. 
Accidents may happen if constrains are not controlled or identified (Dulac and Leveson, 2004). 
STAMP treats safety as a control problem rather than a failure one (Ishimatsu et al, 2010). 
Control is not seen here as a coercion like in military system control, it is used rather to control 
the dynamic behaviour of a process. The need to control a system is emphasised by Bossel 
(2007) in terms of economic (costs of production), safety (safety instrumented systems), 
performance (production), and reliability (redundancy) controls. The STAMP model is built 
from three fundamental concepts that give rise to a classification of control flaws that can lead 
to accidents namely, constraints, hierarchical levels of control, and process models. Feedback 
loops of information and control maintain systems in a state of dynamic equilibrium. (Leveson, 
2004) 
This brief presentation of STAMP calls for some comments. In STAMP, based on systems 
theory and control theory, safety is viewed as a control problem (Hardy, 2011). According to 
this approach, there is a need to have controls that keep all constraints imposed. What matters 
here is how control is perceived with regard to the human part of the socio-technical system.  
The human performance is the most variable one in such systems. Control is performed by 
means of procedures, plans, a set of guidelines or instructions, a program, regulations, etc. All 
these means may play actually an important role to achieve safety; yet, do people react to the 
dynamic changes that exist within the system by complying to the letter with procedures, 
instructions, and so forth? They rather adapt their functioning to any situation in order to make 
the correct adjustments that allow achieving goals. 
To achieve safety in industrial assets, all kinds of performance variability are constrained (rules, 
procedures, strict training, etc.) in order to avoid malfunctions or failures. This cannot be 
attained since systems are intractable (Hollnagel, 2010a). The solution lies within the human 
abilities to adapt and make correct adjustments as stated previously. 
On the other hand, one can apply the control theory to a socio-technical system? Systems theory 
has been developed after World War II to face the increasing importance of system complexity 
particularly in the military domain. In such a theory, systems are viewed as interrelated elements 
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that maintain a dynamic balance by means of feedback loops of control and information (Hardy, 
2011). In control theory, the course of action is maintained by means of these feedback loops. 
In STAMP, accidents are seen as a consequence of dysfunctional interactions between 
components rather than resulting from chain components failures events and safety is viewed 
as a control problem rather a failure one (Hardy, 2011). When a system is studied by means of 
STAMP model, dynamic simulation and modelling software are used such as Stella and Vensim 
(Hardy, 2011) to characterise the evolution of the studied system along time. According to 
Hardy (2011), the analyst must have a perfect knowledge of the elements that constitute the 
system as well as the interactions between its components. For Hardy (2011), the use of such 
software that are capable of representing the behaviour of a dynamically linear system, are 
extremely effective to analyse and predict a dynamic behaviour of a technical system which 
can be deterministic and predictable; a technical system has a bimodal functioning 
(success/failure) which can be predicted by means of reliability tools. As a result, STAMP is 
very suitable and adequate to risk assessing a system or analysing an accident for any technical 
system. However, this is not the case for socio-technical systems. When the human part of the 
system is taken into account to performing a quantitative analysis using this model, it might not 
be valid since software cannot predict the behaviour of a socio-technical system; software are 
based on linear differential equations but unfortunately the interactions of systems components 
are not linear in complex socio-technical systems. The same reproach is made to human 
reliability analysis. HRA tries to apply reliability theory that is suitable for technical systems 
but that is not valid for socio-technical ones. People have the ability to change the course of 
action of any situation. 
1.2.2. The FRAM Method 
The FRAM is a qualitative accident method as well as a risk assessment one that characterizes 
socio-technical systems by the functions they perform rather than by how they are structured 
(Hollnagel, 2012b). In FRAM method, performance variability of a system is seen as a source 
of successes as well as of failures. The main difference between the FRAM and STAMP lies 
within the fact that the FRAM uses a functional approach, whereas STAMP uses a structural 
one. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method, FRAM is an opportunity to explore how 
work is actually performed in the real world by studying how functions become coupled 
(Hollnagel, 2012b). In “FRAM: the functional resonance analysis method book”, Hollnagel 
(2012b) explained the principles underlying this method. It is focused on the fact that the FRAM 
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addresses what is (or has been) actually performed and not what is (or was) assumed to be, 
leading to say that functions refer to activities rather than tasks. It has been particularly 
emphasised in the case of doing a risk assessment for instance, that describing tasks leads to 
speak about errors, violations, non-compliance with reference to work as imagined. On the other 
hand, if activities (work as performed) are described, performance variability is considered 
instead (see Chapter 3, section 3.3). According to Hollnagel (2012b), functions must be 
regarded as goals-means relations that is, a representation of means that are necessary to achieve 
goals. Functions may describe what a person or a group of people specifically does to achieve 
a specific goal, or what an organisation does, or what a technological system does itself or in 
interaction with humans (Hollnagel, 2012b). FRAM describes how functions may resonate and 
create hazards leading to an accident (Hollnagel 2004). The method can be used to analyse and 
predict any functional resonance. The FRAM was designed first as a model for accident 
modelling and complex system analysis (Hollnagel, 2004). It becomes over time an analysis 
method both prior to or following an accident and system monitoring as well. 
According to Hollnagel (2010a), FRAM is based on four principles.  
 First, the principle of equivalence of successes and failures: successes and failures are 
the result of organisations, groups and individuals’ performance adaptations to cope 
with complexity. 
 Second, the principle of approximate adjustments: complex socio-technical systems are 
by necessity underspecified and only partly predictable. System performance is adjusted 
to meet existing conditions; therefore, performance variability is both normal and 
necessary 
 Third, the principle of emergence: variability of multiple functions may combine in 
unexpected ways, leading to disproportionately large consequences. 
 Forth, the principle of functional resonance: the variability of a number of functions 
may resonate, so that the variability of some functions may exceed normal limits, the 
consequence of which may be an accident. 
Hollnagel (2010a) outlined the steps of the method. After the definition of the purpose of 
modelling and describing the scenario to be analysed, step 1 consists of the identification of 
essential system functions and characterisation of each function by six basic parameters as 
shown in figure 1.2 (I: input; O: output; R: resources; P: preconditions; C: control; T: time). 
Step 2 characterizes the (context dependent) potential variability. Step 3 defines the functional 
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resonance based on possible dependencies/couplings among functions and the potential for 
functional variability. By following the six parameters of step 2, the output of one function may 
be an input to another function, or produce a resource, etc. The combination of these links with 
the characterisation of the variability is then used to specify the different impacts. Step 4 
identifies barriers for variability (damping factors). In addition to barriers, the FRAM specifies 
performance monitoring of variability through the development of performance indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2 : The FRAM functional unit, module (Hollnagel, 2010a) 
 
The FRAM is still under development, particularly the determination of the potential for 
variability by the development of a way to measure the variability of the performance. 
1.2.3. The Four Cornerstones of Resilience Engineering 
Four system abilities that make an organisation resilient have been identified. A resilient 
organisation is one that is able to increase these four abilities. This may be achieved by (1) 
monitoring the system’s environment as well as the surrounding environment, (2) responding 
properly to threats/opportunities, (3) anticipating any developments, and (4) learning from past 
experiences: these are the four cornerstones of resilience engineering (Hollnagel, 2009b) that 
need to be measured in order to know system’s resilience and increase it. A tool based on such 
precepts is therefore of great importance. 
1.3. SONATRACH Overview 
SONATRACH is an Algerian state-owned oil and gas producer and refiner. Its activities cover 
all branches of oil and gas industry that includes exploration, production, pipeline transportation 
of oil and gas, refining, petrochemical, gas liquefaction, polymers, and marketing of 
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hydrocarbons as well as petroleum by-products. The company also stepped up investments in 
power generation, new and renewable energies, water desalination, and mining exploration and 
exploitation. With a turnover approximately $56.1 billion in 2010, it is ranked first company in 
Africa and twelfth in the world. It is also fourth world LNG exporter, third world LPG exporter 
and fifth World Natural gas exporter (SONATRACH, 2012). 
In addition to its economic and social role, SONATRACH contributes in helping needy people 
and promoting scientific, cultural and sporting activities. It is also committed to reducing the 
negative impact of its activities on its employees and the neighbouring populations as well as 
on the environment particularly by reducing the emission of greenhouse effect gas and any other 
polluter in the Atmosphere.  
SONATRACH facilities are old but many of them are being revamped. The maintenance 
system in place has been established first time in the 1970’s. This system has never been 
evaluated. Furthermore, each branch of activity (upstream, downstream, and transportation) has 
acquired a computerised maintenance management system (CMMS) that is unfortunately 
underutilised and can be used only by the maintenance departments of the branch in question.   
Maintenance personnel are motivated, but many of them are close to retirement. Factors such 
as lack or poor supervision/coordination, equipment issues, the absence of or unworkable 
procedures, and time pressure/fatigue, inadequate training characterise the system. In addition, 
the organisation culture is production driven. As can be seen, there are many opportunities that 
are worth exploring. 
1.4. Research Problem and Rationale for the Study 
After accidents such as the Three Mile Island in 1979, Bhopal in1984, Chernobyl in 1986, piper 
alpha in 1988, Toulouse in 2001, Skikda in 2004 and Houston in 2005, organisational and 
human factors have been highlighted as playing an important part in accident occurrences and 
new theories were born. The need to improve organisational culture has been emphasised. 
Traditional risk assessment techniques such as FMECA, HAZOP, etc. (section 2.3) focus on a 
single initiating event, one event- “cause” of deviations. They are based on the system 
breakdown into meaningful elements, generally components or events and require a full 
description of the system that is not valid for socio-technical systems that have become more 
complex, intractable. They generally show limited examination of human and organisational 
- 10 - 
 
contribution (Wells, 1997; Kletz, 1999; NASA, 2002a; NASA, 2002b; Hollnagel, 2010a; 
Leveson, 2011; Macchi, 2011). Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) was born to address these 
limitations by incorporating human factors. HRA was used as an extension of probabilistic 
safety assessment (PSA) where the impacts of human actions are taken into account (Hollnagel, 
2005a). Dougherty (1990) critically analysed HRA methods and demonstrated they were not 
accurate. HRA applies the principles of technical components reliability to the failures of 
human actions by attempting to calculate the probability of “human error” (HEP). This is not 
valid; the concept of “human error” is discussed deeply in Chapter 3, section 3.3.  
Because conventional accidents causation models and techniques for prevention of future 
undesirable events often fail to handle complex safety critical systems, more powerful 
techniques based on a systemic approach are needed to achieve excellence. Instead of focussing 
only on why accidents happen, it is worth orienting the work toward understanding also why 
things go right within systems. The solution lies within the use of non-linear methods/models 
based on systems theory and resilience engineering precepts. The FRAM method and STAMP 
model are examples of risk assessment and hazard identification techniques as well as accident 
investigation models that are used to find out what could be the combinations of conditions, 
events, and actions within the system that may lead to (or have led to) an undesired event and/or 
a successful one considering the performance of the system. Moreover, the FRAM method 
allows exploring any given system.  
Since a resilient system is also safe, measuring system’s resilience is, therefore, an important 
objective and developing a tool that performs this measurement is of great importance. 
However, there is a need to bridge between the theory of resilience engineering and the practice 
within the oil and gas industry. A more powerful tool is needed to address not only the daily 
activities but one that could be used as a continuous improvement management tool as well. 
Such a tool lacks in the oil and gas industry particularly in SONATRACH organisation, 
specifically within the maintenance system as maintenance activities have been shown to be 
accidents prone and that the maintenance working environment of oil and gas assets needs to 
be explored to overcome the lack of data as it has been highlighted in section 1.1.  
As a result, the research questions are:  
 “What strategy can be developed to enable the optimisation of human factors in 
maintenance and achieve safety excellence?”  
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 “What can be the tool that may be used to implement such a strategy and lead the 
maintenance system of SONATRACH to achieve safety excellence?” 
Once data are available, most significant human factors can be identified, resilience of the 
maintenance system assessed, and damping factors designed, implemented and maintained so 
that the system as a whole builds a culture of continuous improvement. 
1.5. Aim and Objectives 
1.5.1. Aim 
The aim of this research work is to develop an approach based on resilience engineering to 
achieve safety excellence in maintenance within the Algerian National Oil and Gas Company. 
1.5.2. Objectives 
There are four objectives to achieve the aim of this research: 
 Undertake an extended literature review of safety management, “human error” concept, 
accidents causation models, resilience engineering, impacts of maintenance activities in 
different industries, and human factors in the maintenance of complex socio-technical 
systems,  
 Explore the maintenance working environment of SONATRACH by identifying the 
critical human factors and its characteristics 
 Identify a strategy based on resilience engineering to achieve safety excellence in the 
maintenance system of SONATRACH 
 Outline, test and validate a tool that measures the resilience of Oil and Gas maintenance 
systems 
1.6. Thesis Layout 
This Chapter has been devoted to introducing the research problem and the rationale for the 
current study. First, the maintenance working environment and the failure of traditional 
approaches to handling complex socio-technical systems and the potential of resilience 
engineering to tackle such systems were highlighted. Then, an overview of SONATRACH, the 
Algerian state-owned oil and gas producer and refiner and its maintenance system were 
presented. 
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This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part includes Chapters 2 and 3. It provides an 
extended literature review and theoretical background covering key important issues of this 
research work that have been tackled by some researchers. In Chapter 2, the different 
approaches to the management of safety are exposed. It covers the impact of maintenance 
activities on safety and the human factors in the maintenance of assets within high hazards 
industries as well. Chapter 3 addresses the concept of “human error” and the need for a proactive 
management of safety by resilience engineering. More specifically, it explores deeply the 
systemic approach to managing safety through resilience engineering. Eventually, a summary 
of the literature review outlines the missing aspects and the necessary improvements so that 
domains of interests of this research are delimited. The second part is about the research 
strategy. Chapter 4 tackles the development of the methodology, data collection and analysis. 
The third part includes Chapters 5 to 8. It is about the development, testing, and validation of 
the developed tool. Chapter 5 explores the maintenance system of oil and gas assets. Chapter 6 
presents the development and validation of the Maintenance Resilience Assessment Tool, 
MASRAT. Chapter 7 deals with the expert panel testing of MASRAT. Chapter 8 summarises 
and reflects on the general findings. Finally, the main conclusions and recommendations are 
drawn from these findings. 
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 THE MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY 
2.1. Introduction 
The management of safety is receiving more importance than ever. Despite the huge efforts 
devoted to stopping accident occurrences by all sectors of industries, people continue to be hurt, 
even killed. This Chapter gives an overview of the management of safety with a particular focus 
on maintenance activities. Section 2.2 addresses the evolution of the approach to managing 
safety. First, some important definitions of the key words related to the aim of this thesis are 
given. Then, the traditional approach is introduced. A critical review of the conventional 
techniques of safety management and accident causation models is carried out and the 
limitations of such an approach are outlined. Afterwards, the organisational approach is 
introduced. Section 2.3 deals with the management of safety in the maintenance of industrial 
assets. The impacts of maintenance activities on plant safety are first addressed. This is followed 
by the human factors in the maintenance of assets. Section 2.4 highlights the limitations of the 
traditional approach to safety management. 
2.2. The Conventional Safety Management Approach 
2.2.1. Definitions  
There is a growing concern within companies with regard to the management of safety since 
the latter is seen as the absence of ‘undesired events’, the accidents. There are actually three 
motivational factors to preventing accident occurrences: ethical/moral, financial, and legal 
factors. In the following, definitions of the most important concepts dealt with in this thesis 
including safety, safe, risk, human factors, systems, and maintenance are given. 
2.2.1.1. Safety and Hazard 
The origin of the words safety and safe (Merriam Webster) comes from the old French 
respectively sauveté and sauf (uninjured, unharmed), and from the Latin. salvus (uninjured, 
healthy).  Hazard originates from French “hasard", from Spanish  
“azar”, and from Arabic “az-zahr” chance (Oxford dictionary). Danger is a situation and a 
hazard is anything that has the potential to cause harm. Harm is defined in Safety aspects—
Guidelines for Their Inclusion in Standards by ISO guide (2012, p1) as “injury or damage to 
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the health of people, or damage to property or the environment”. For Leveson (2011, p467), 
safety is “freedom from accidents (loss events)”. Hollnagel (2008a, p3) defined safety as “a 
state in which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained 
at or below, an acceptable level”.  In line with resilience engineering approach, a definition of 
safety is given at the end of this section.  
2.2.1.2. Risk and Risk Management 
Risk is traditionally defined by “the chance, high or low, that somebody could be harmed by 
hazards, together with an indication of how serious the harm could be” (HSE, 2014, p3). An 
equation combining the likelihood of the occurrence of harm and the severity of the 
consequences of that harm allow determining a certain risk level. A more general definition of 
risk is given by ISO (2009a). The standard defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives 
where an effect is considered as a positive and/or negative deviation from what is expected. 
Tolerable risk is one that is accepted “in a given context based on the current values of society” 
(ISO guide, 2012, p.2). As it is known, hazards cannot be removed completely, the acceptability 
of risk should be therefore added in the definition of safety; hence, ISO guide (2012, p.1) 
defined safety as “freedom from unacceptable risk”. 
Leveson (1995) introduced factors that may affect the two components of risk called risk 
factors. Leveson (2011, p.467) defined risk factors as “factors leading to an accident, including 
both hazards and the conditions or states of the environment associated with that hazard leading 
to an accident”. Examples of factors include the appearance of new hazards and the increasing 
complexity, exposure, energy, automation, centralization, scale, and pace of technological 
change. The components of risk are, therefore (figure 2.3): hazard level (hazard severity and 
hazard likelihood), hazard exposure, and the likelihood of hazard leading to an accident. For 
Leveson (2011, p.467), a risk level that is “a function of the hazard level combined with (1) the 
likelihood of the hazard leading to an accident and (2) hazard exposure or duration” is then 
calculated.  
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Figure 1-3: Components of risk (Leveson, 2011) 
 
Most of the definitions of risks “involve the notion of an adverse outcome or a potential negative 
impact that arises from some present process or future event” (Hollnagel, 2008b, p.33). The 
problem lying within the traditional definition of risk given above is that it can be applied only 
for very simple cases where the probability and the severity of the outcomes are well known 
and easily estimated. In nowadays systems, it is quite impossible to know such values precisely.   
The process of managing risk (ISO guide, 2012) consists of two major steps including (1) risk 
assessment (risk analysis and risk evaluation) and (2) risk reduction (figure 2.2). In other words, 
managing risks that is reducing risk to a tolerable level, is, therefore finding ways which allow 
avoiding such negative outcomes. Risk management is seen as “the coordinated activities to 
direct and control an organization with regard to risk” (ISO, 2009a, p4). The process of risk 
management is defined as “a systematic application of management policies, procedures and 
practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and 
identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, and reviewing risk” (ISO, 2009a, p5). 
The process follows the framework given in figure 2.3.  
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Figure 1-4: The iterative process of risk management (ISO guide, 2012) 
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Figure 1-5 Risk management process (ISO, 2009a) 
 
As can be seen, consultation and communication are part of the process. They take place during 
all the stages of the process, both with external and internal stakeholders. This is to ensure 
accountability and understanding are well settled among all those concerned with the process 
as well as it is a basis on which decisions are made. Setting the scene by establishing the context 
allows organisations define objectives, parameters, scope, and risk criteria for all processes. 
After that, the risk assessment process (risk identification, analysis, and evaluation) takes place. 
This is followed by risk treatment. Monitoring and review show a continuous improvement way 
of addressing the issues. 
2.2.1.3. Human Factors 
The development and use of aeroplanes during World War I and World War II led to the birth 
of what is called human factors engineering/ergonomics. Increasing technology requirements 
where design influences human performance, the military necessity, as well as adequate 
methods for selecting and training qualified pilots motivated the development of this scientific 
discipline (Meister, 1999; Dekker, 2004; Hollnagel et al., 2009). 
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Simply defined, human factors is “a science that deals with designing and arranging things so 
that people can use them easily and safely” (Merriam dictionary) or “anything that affects an 
individual’s performance” as stated by the Leadership Management Quality (LMQ, 2011). The 
official definition of ergonomics or human factors adopted by the International Ergonomics 
Association Council (IEA, 2000) is “the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding 
of interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies 
theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and 
overall system performance”. 
For the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2005, p.5) human factors “refer to environmental, 
organisational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics which influence 
behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and safety”. Simply said, it is the interaction 
of the job, the individual, and the organisation and their impacts on people’s health and safety. 
According to the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2001), human factors is 
the term used to describe the interaction of individuals with each other, with facilities and 
equipment, and with management systems. The culture of the people involved as well as the 
working environment influence this interaction. 
These definitions show that the efforts are oriented toward dealing only with negative aspects 
that is the unwanted outcomes or things that can go wrong where safety efforts have generally 
focused on. The focus should be on the two sides on the coin, things that go wrong as well as 
things that go right. The performance of the human part of the system is considered as the main 
source of variability as discussed in section 1.2. Accordingly, the adopted definition of human 
factors in this thesis is the interaction of the individual, the organisation, and the job and their 
impacts, negative as well as positive, on system performance. 
2.2.1.4. Systems 
For business dictionary, a system is “an organised, purposeful structure that consists of 
interrelated and interdependent elements”. These elements influence each other in a continuous 
way to maintain their activity and the existence of the system so that system goals are achieved. 
Simply said, it is a set of interrelated and interdependent parts acting together to achieve 
objectives. Such a definition emphasises how the parts of the system are linked or put together 
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that makes the principle of decomposition of the system understand its functions very obvious 
and natural (Hollnagel, 2012a) since it has a reference to its structure.   
Another way to define a system is by looking at how it functions rather than by what 
components compose this system and how they are put together. For Hollnagel (2012a, p6.) a 
system is “a set of coupled and mutually dependent functions”. This implies that the study of 
the system performance begins by the definition of all the functions. 
Technical systems are characterised by the possibility to decompose the system in question such 
as a pump or a compressor to meaningful components. Such systems have a bimodal 
functioning (fail or succeed) that is not valid for humans; as such, a probability of failure can 
be calculated. Databases can be found and used particularly in probabilistic safety assessment 
techniques. Failures of parts or all of the system may be predicted. Condition based maintenance 
(or predictive maintenance) for instance deals with the prediction of probable failure by tracking 
parameters such as vibration.  
Socio-technical systems include not only technical systems but also the humans that interact 
with these systems. According to the Large Scale Complex IT Systems, LSCITS (n.d.), in the 
“socio-technical system engineering handbook” of Saint-Andrews University, the socio-
technical system concept emerged after World War II in Tavistock Institute. The research in 
this institute found that “the social aspects were also important, particularly the ways that 
individuals and teams co-operated and collaborated to use the available technologies” (LSCITS, 
n.d., p.6-7). Such systems are complex because they are difficult to understand hence difficult 
to predict and control, technology intensive, and complete knowledge is not available 
(Sussman, 2010; Hollnagel, 2012a; Ladyman et al., 2013). This is due to the fact that parameters 
continuously change not because of the number of the parameters to deal with (Hollnagel 
(2012a). Hollnagel (2008a) introduced the notion of tractability/intractability and replaced 
complexity by intractability. For Hollnagel (2012a), systems are either tractable or intractable. 
Hollnagel (2008a) differentiated between the two systems by the possibility to make a full 
description of the system or not. Intractable systems are characterised by elaborate descriptions 
with many details, high rate of change, principles of functioning partly known, and 
heterogeneous processes (Hollnagel, 2012a). Table 2.1 gives the main differences between 
tractable and intractable systems. 
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Table 1-1 : Tractable and intractable systems (Hollnagel, 2012a) 
 Tractable system Intractable system 
 
Number of details Descriptions are simple with 
few details 
Descriptions are elaborate with 
many details 
Rate of change Low: in particular, the system 
does not change while being 
described 
High: the system changes 
before a description can be 
completed 
Comprehensibility Principles of functioning are 
known 
Principles of functioning are 
partly unknown 
Characteristics of processes Homogeneous and regular Heterogeneous and possibly 
irregular 
 
Because socio-technical systems are intractable, work cannot be specified exhaustively in 
advance, as organisations (as well as the people in them) are in a state of constant flux (Macchi, 
2011, p.32). 
2.2.1.5. Safety and Risk in Resilience Engineering 
Defining safety as a state of absence of accidents means that safety is defined by its opposite 
that is, lack of safety (Hollnagel, 2012a). This implies that normal states (where things are going 
right) are out of any focus or concern. When studying these cases (absence of accidents), any 
system is characterised by situations where both failures and successes within the system exist 
together.  
Actually, systems evolve in situations characterised by lacks (knowledge, competence, 
resources, and time) according to Hollnagel (2010a). Therefore, systems adapt/adjust their 
functioning to attain designed goals by anticipating any disturbances and/or opportunities; this 
makes the performance of the system variable. It may lead to the drift toward hazardous 
situations and then the unwanted events (failure occurs) or may lead to successes. Studying the 
intrinsic ability of the system to manage its performance variability through the four 
cornerstones of resilience engineering (section 1.4) allows identifying, consolidating, 
enhancing, and boosting the situations where successes are prevalent as well as it permits 
preventing the drift toward hazardous states by implementing dumping factors and barriers. 
The traditional approach has been mainly concerned with the negative or undesired outcomes. 
According to Hollnagel et al. (2009), Resilience Engineering aims at not only preventing things 
from going wrong but also to ensuring that things go right. In other words, it focuses on all the 
probable outcomes. Hollnagel (2010a) gave a range of event outcomes and their associated 
frequency (figure 2.4) 
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Figure 1-6 Frequency of event outcomes (Hollnagel, 2009a) 
 
As can be seen, the traditional approach focuses on the outcomes that are at the bottom that is, 
from disasters to mishaps, whereas Resilience Engineering addresses all of them, particularly 
those in green colour (areas of serendipity depend on fate, as it is known).  
Since organisations adapt/adjust their functioning to achieve goals, safety should be seen as a 
state where the performance variability produced by a system under conditions that are variable, 
prevents the drift towards a hazardous situation. From this definition, it comes that (1) 
performance variability deals with what can go wrong/right, (2) produced means something the 
system does, and (3) prevents the drift indicates that it doesn’t allow the system to go beyond 
certain margins that may lead to negative outcomes. In other words, the systems always 
succeed. It is clearly meant that such conditions include both opportunities and threats and that 
the performance in question may be a success or a failure. 
Learning from the past, monitoring its performance and the performance of the environment, 
responding to opportunities/threats, and anticipating the future is what is required to manage 
safety effectively (Hollnagel, 2008a). This is developed later on in section 3.3. 
For Hollnagel (2012a), the risk is the likelihood that people do not succeed; in other words, the 
drift toward hazardous cases occurs. Accordingly, when this state is determined a priori, it is a 
step of a process of risk assessment and when it is identified a posteriori, it is a step of an 
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accident investigation. Therefore, the search is for succeeding under all these conditions (when 
things go right as well as when they go wrong). 
2.2.1.6. Maintenance  
British Standards Institution (1993) defined maintenance as “the combination of all technical 
and associated administrative actions intended to retain an item or system in, or restore it to, a 
state in which it can perform its required function”. 
Maintenance activities can have a direct or indirect impact on workplace safety. Such activities 
are characterized by the nature of work (electrical, mechanical, instrumentation, etc.), the type 
(corrective, preventive, etc.), and their associated tasks and steps (planning, execution, testing, 
etc.). Furthermore, the systems and conditions of work, the places where the activities are 
performed as well as the organisational culture may have adverse effects on people’s health and 
safety, the environment, and operation costs (Ameziane et al, 2011).  
Maintenance has a tremendous impact on a company’s profitability (Wireman, 2003). It 
contributes to profitability through for example extended life of assets, improved reliability and 
availability (Lofsten, 1999). Maintenance is either positive where it is managed as a business 
function or negative where it is considered as a necessary evil, or a non-core business function 
(Wireman, 2003). Smith (2003) defines world-class maintenance organisations as organisations 
where proactive maintenance stands for more than 85 % of all maintenance activities. Thus, 
maintenance activities should provide the required reliability and availability at optimal costs 
to ensure health and safety of people while avoiding negative impact on the environment.  
Since machines become more complex, maintenance tasks are characterised by a high degree 
of uncertainty putting the stress on maintenance workers to manage highly hazards, unforeseen 
or unexpected situations that have highlighted a growing need for more skilled personnel 
(Vicente, 1999; Ray et al, 2000; Grusenmeyer, 2005). Therefore, the competency of 
maintenance personnel should be proved in a continuous improvement way. 
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2.2.2. The Traditional Approach to the Management of Safety 
2.2.2.1. Risk Assessment Techniques 
Controlling risks requires adequate identification of hazards and effective assessment of the 
risk associated with these hazards. According to Stranks (2006), assessment is crucial to 
effective control. This implies a complete knowledge of the system that is assessed. 
To apply this process, various risk assessment techniques are used. In ISO (2009b), the 
international organization gives an overview of the techniques that could be applied during this 
process as well as when they are strongly recommended and when they are not. There are many 
ways to classify risk assessment techniques. One is dividing the techniques into the use of 
inductive or deductive reasoning. When the approach is inductive, the analysis begins with a 
failure or a combination of failures and then it induces forwards the consequences of this failure 
or a combination of failures on the system or its environment (from causes to consequences). 
The main inductive techniques are Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), etc. Conversely, when the approach is deductive, the system is supposed to have failed 
and the analysis attempts to find the causes likely to lead to such a failure. One of the main 
techniques is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Risk assessment techniques may also be classified 
into three major families that is comparative, fundamental, and failure logic families. The 
comparative methods are those that compare what exists with what should be. Examples include 
safety-auditing, checklists. The fundamental methods are for instance HAZOP, FMECA, and 
Hazard Identification (HAZID). FTA, ETA, and cause-consequence diagrams represent the last 
one that uses Boolean algebra. The hazardous situations as well as the unwanted events, their 
causes and consequences can be identified methodologically by means of the techniques given 
above. They can be presented in the form of tables (PHA, FMEA, HAZOP, etc.) or in a pictorial 
form (FTA, ETA, etc.). They can be used as a means of communication to decision makers on 
the risks incurred by the company’s activities or facilities. The techniques may complement 
each other. 
These methods have shown limitations (Wells, 1997; Kletz, 1999; NASA, 2002a; NASA, 
2002b; Hollnagel, 2010a; Leveson, 2011; Macchi, 2011) since they focus on a single initiating 
event, one event-cause of deviations. They are based on the system breakdown into meaningful 
elements, generally components or events that is not valid for socio-technical systems. They 
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generally depend on the analyst with respect to the choice of the initiating event as well as 
where to stop the analysis. The analyst focuses on equipment failures. These techniques 
generally show limited examination of human and organisational contribution. On the other 
hand, the use of simplified mathematics in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) or Probabilistic 
Safety Analysis (PSA) means that initiating events are exclusive. For instance, for another 
sequence of events, there is a need for a new diagram or tree (Hollnagel, 2010a and Leveson, 
2011). By focusing on failure events, PRA usually omits design errors and unsafe management 
decisions and may lead to overly optimistic estimation of risk since the probability of 
occurrence of an event under an “and” gate is the multiplication of the probabilities of all the 
events under this gate in addition to the omissions cited previously (Leveson, 2011). They do 
not consider the interaction of all system components as well as systemic factors.  
The main limitations of the most popular techniques are summed up in table 2.2 (Wells, 1997; 
Kletz, 1999; NASA, 2002a; NASA, 2002b; Hollnagel, 2010a; Leveson, 2011; Macchi, 2011). 
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Table 1-2 : Main limitations of some traditional risk assessment techniques 
The technique The main limitations 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, 
PHA 
 
It always needs additional analysis and follow-up since it is 
performed at early stages 
Since it relies on expert judgement, the quality of the results of 
the analysis is dependent on these experts 
Failure Mode Effects 
Analysis, FMEA or Failure 
Mode Effects and Criticality 
Analysis, FMECA 
 
The examination of only one single initiating event 
The limited focus on human and organisational factors 
The limited examination of external influences such as 
environmental conditions for instance  
The non-suitability for software systems 
The difficulty to obtain failure probabilities 
The time consuming issue for complex systems 
The difficulty to determine when to stop an analysis 
Hazard and operability 
technique, HAZOP 
 
Its limitations lie in the fact that it studies only one single failure 
each time, it is time consuming, and does not analyse human 
contribution 
Fault tree analysis, FTA 
 
It examines only one single failure/accident. To analyse other 
failures, we must develop other fault trees. 
The level of details depends on the analyst 
The statistical data used to predict the uncertain future may not 
apply every time 
There is little or not at all focus on human and organisational 
factors 
Initiating events at a given level under a gate must be 
independent from one to another  
Event tree analysis, ETA 
 
It examines only one single initiating event 
There is an overly optimistic estimate of risk since some 
elements in the tree may be overlooked: common components 
for instance if there is a negative occurrence such as no loss is 
ignited after a release of a flammable material. 
There is little or not at all focus on human and organisational 
factors 
The mathematics used are less sophisticated than for the FTA 
Cause-consequence analysis and 
Bow-tie 
These techniques are a combination of fault trees and event trees; 
therefore, their description as well as their advantages and 
limitations are those of fault trees and event trees 
 
Despite these limitations, these techniques are good for technical failures in non-complex 
systems. They may be used in combination with more powerful techniques that is, systemic 
techniques. 
To address some limitations given above regarding human factors, Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) was born in the early sixties (Swan, 1990). HRA tried to incorporate human factors in 
PRA and take into account human error where the use of barriers in design could not be 
transposed to human intervention (Hollnagel, 2010a and Macchi, 2011).  The estimation of 
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Human Error Probability (HEP) and hardware failure were done the same way (as in PRA) by 
looking at failure rates. Dougherty (1990) critically analysed HRA methods and highlighted the 
shortcomings. In particular, Dougherty (1990) demonstrated the non-accuracy of HRA. 
Dougherty (1990) and Hollnagel (1998) distinguished two generations of HRA: the first 
focusing on a quantitative estimate of human error and the second changing to put a stress more 
on working conditions. 
According to Hollnagel (2010c), these traditional techniques require the possibility to 
characterise what goes on inside the system to be risk assessed and for safety to be managed, 
as well as to give a sufficiently clear description of it: the human-machine system must be 
tractable. For Hollnagel (2010c), unfortunately, most socio-technical systems are intractable. 
Yet, socio-technical systems become so complex that it is difficult to describe them entirely, 
thoroughly. Therefore, these techniques are still limited. Hollnagel (2010c) came up with two 
theories, the W and the Z theories that will be examined in Chapter 3.  
To conclude, systems have become very complex and socio-techniques by the introduction of 
information systems such as Distributed Control Systems (DCS), Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for instance. Consequently, this kind of techniques cannot be 
used to provide reliable results; hence, techniques that are more powerful are required. In 
addition to the limitations given in table 2.2 above, the external factors (environment, weather, 
human and organisational factors, etc.) are rarely taken into account or not at all. Besides, the 
estimation of risk is generally subjective including the probability estimates (Leveson, 2011and 
Macchi, 2011). 
2.2.2.2. Accident Causation Models 
For Hollnagel (2006), accident causation models evolved from the simple linear or sequential 
model (accidents are the culmination of a series of events or circumstances which occur in a 
specific and recognisable order), via complex linear or epidemiological model (accidents result 
from a combination of active failures and latent conditions), to non-linear or systemic model 
(accidents result from unexpected combinations –resonance- of variability of normal 
performance). Heinrich’s domino model, Reason’s Swiss cheese model, and the systemic 
model (Leveson, 2004; Hollnagel, 2004), respectively, represent the three types. Conventional 
event-chain models explain an accident as a linear sequence of events one leading to another 
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making the accident happen. Breaking the chain before an accident happens and looking for the 
“root causes” is, therefore, the solution to prevent its occurrence.  
The important limitations lie in the subjective choice of “initiating events” and other events to 
include as well as the subjective identification of chaining conditions (Leveson, 2011). These 
models often fail to handle complex safety critical systems where accidents can emerge not 
from few components only, but from the interactions between system components. They fail to 
explain human, system and software errors as well (Leveson, 2004; Hollnagel, 2004). Dealing 
only with one simple system constitutive element each time, they cannot address the dynamic 
aspect of the system, particularly the drifting toward a state of increasing risk, leading to 
accident occurrence. According to Qureshi (2008), these models describe an accident process 
as a simple cause-effect chain of events whereas systemic accident models describe it as a 
complex and interconnected network of events. 
2.2.3. The Organisational Approach to Accidents 
After major accidents that have been cited in Chapter 1, organisational factors have been 
highlighted as playing an important part in accident occurrences and new theories were born. 
There have been then two organisational approaches to safety- two general competing schools 
of thought according to Marais et al (2004). Sagan (1993) characterised them as one presenting 
an optimistic view “the high-reliability organisation”, HRO, and another one presenting a much 
more pessimistic prediction “the normal accident theory”, NAT.   
Perrow (1999) considered system accidents as normal accidents. For Perrow (1999), these 
accidents that are caused by multiple and unexpected interactions of failures, are inevitable or 
normal for high-risk systems such as nuclear facilities which are both complex and tightly 
coupled.  Woods et al (2010, p.62) stated that ...Normal accident theory predicts that the more 
tightly coupled and complex a system is, the more prone it is to suffering a “normal” accident. 
La Porte and Consolini (1991) characterised some organizations as “highly reliable” based on 
their high safety records over long periods. Highly reliable organisations are hazardous systems 
that produce “nearly accident-free performance” or achieve failure-free operations (La Porte, 
1996) over a long period of time that is, organizations that have not failed, resulting in 
catastrophic consequences on the order of tens of thousands of times (Roberts, 1990).  
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Adjusting the system performance has also been a concern of such organisations. Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2007) recognised that HRO’s are resilient organisations since they manage the 
unexpected (resilience is addressed in Chapter 3, section 3.3). They identified five principles 
split into two categories (anticipation and containment) that might lead organisations to become 
highly reliable. These principles are summed up in table 2.3 below. 
Table 1-3: Principles leading to high reliability (adapted from Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) 
Category Principle Meaning 
Anticipation 
 
(1) Preoccupation with 
failure 
Everything that makes the system perform under 
standard is immediately treated as a symptom and 
steps are taken in order to avoid accumulation, 
hence adverse outcomes by encouraging reporting 
(2) Reluctance to 
oversimplification 
Every simplification that may reduce perceptions 
(e.g. risks and hazards) is avoided and encouraging 
at the same time diversity of opinions 
(3) Sensitivity to 
operations 
Every event that may affect the front-line of the 
organisation is under focus. This enables personnel 
to make adjustments since the organisation sees 
accidents are not the result of a single active 
“error” 
Containment 
(4) Commitment to 
resilience 
The organisation is able to recover from “errors” 
by correcting them before they cause more 
damage. It recognises the learning opportunities 
and the importance of learning 
(5) Deference to 
expertise  
The organisation appreciates expertise through 
decentralisation of decisions where expertise and 
specific knowledge exist 
 
This shows progress as it highlights the aspects of anticipation, adjustments and commitment 
to resilience but still lacks important ones; they focus on failures and “errors” instead of 
focusing on how work is performed in order to increase system performance. Nevertheless, 
these approaches “have made important contributions to theory although both of them limit the 
progress that can be made toward achieving highly safe systems by too narrowly defining the 
problem and the potential solutions” (Leveson et al, 2009, p.246). 
2.3. The Management of Safety in the Maintenance of Industrial Assets  
2.3.1. The Impact of Maintenance Activities on Plant Safety 
The public expects organisations dealing with hazardous domain including nuclear, aviation, 
and oil and gas, to function reliably and anticipate risks created by either technology, 
organisational structures or practices (Reiman and Oedewald, 2006). Maintenance activities are 
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labour intensive, thus prone to generating “errors”; the concept of “human errors” is discussed 
in section 3.2, Chapter 3 in more details. For Reason and Hobbs (2004), maintenance errors 
have been among the principal causes of many major accidents in a wide range of technologies. 
In high hazard domain, maintenance staff work under conditions that are accidents prone; they 
are often under pressure to finish work as rapidly as possible, and sometimes lack the necessary 
knowledge to perform certain tasks as required. This is particularly accentuated where reactive 
maintenance is dominant and where organisations have blame and production driven culture. 
Unsafe conditions of work (e.g. confined space, pressurised vessels, and isolated equipment) 
and bad work practices (e.g. poor permit to work systems, complicated work procedures and 
instructions) are some of the contributing factors of major accident hazards. In addition, 
maintenance activities are often outsourced to service companies with different perception of 
safety. 
44 % of fatal accidents reported in 2000 were maintenance activities related accidents, among 
these, 31.8 % (57) implied machinery and working equipment (Grusenmeyer, 2005). Corrective 
maintenance causes more accidents (Grusenmeyer, 2005) and a strong relation exists between 
this maintenance type and accidents/incidents (Idhammar, 2004). To illustrate, 50 % of major 
accidents in aviation involved maintenance deficiencies according to Hobbs and Williamson 
(2003). Hobbs and Williamson (2003, p. 187) concluded critical incident interviews with airline 
maintenance personnel by the fact that “error factors included not only technical problems, such 
as poor procedures and inadequate trade knowledge, but also nontechnical issues, such as time 
pressure, communication breakdowns, inadequate supervision, and the physical environment”.  
A study by Boeing and US air transport association from 82 to 91 concluded that 15 % of 
accidents are due to maintenance “errors” (Rankin et al, 1997). In a report studying the oil and 
gas sector for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Burton et al. (2004, p.23) stated that 
“approximately 20% of maintenance-related incidents are because of poor positioning/posture 
during the execution of a task and a further 38% are due to, ‘poor practice’. This arises from a 
combination of a ‘Failure to follow procedures/ industry practice’ and ‘Poor preparation/ 
completion of tasks’”.  
It is worth noting that there is a lack of updated data regarding studies of the impact of 
maintenance activities on safety. Grusenmeyer (2005) observed the lack of studies in this 
domain; unfortunately, the lack of data still exists in the literature and this is confirmed in a 
- 30 - 
 
recent work carried out by Dhillon (2014) where the majority of examples are tracked to the 
seventies and eighties. Okoh and Haugen (2014) have carried out the most recent works. Okoh 
and Haugen (2014) studied reports and databases respectively from the US Chemical Safety 
Board (CSB) and the Bureau for Analysis of Industrial Risks and Pollution. Okoh and Haugen 
(2014) concluded that from 2000 to 2011, 53 % of accidents are maintenance related in the 
USA and 38 % in Europe. Table 2.4 gives an overview of some available records found in the 
literature.  
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Table 1-4 : Maintenance accidents related 
Records Reference  
44 % of fatal accidents (179 from 407) reported in 2000 were 
maintenance activities related accidents. Among these, 31.8 % 
(57) implied machinery and working equipment. 
Grusenmeyer, 2005 
OSHA Recordkeeping overview estimated that 122 fatalities, 
2,840 lost workday injuries, and 31,900 non-lost workday 
injuries per year due to accidents involving equipment 
maintenance or repair 
Ray et al, 2000 
During the period from 1982 to 1985, 30 % of accidents among 
2146 incidents in the chemical industry were maintenance 
related. It is estimated that 125 persons are injured or even 
killed per year due to maintenance activities 
Health and Safety 
Executive, 1987 
A safety incident was 28 % more likely when maintenance work 
was reactive versus planned and scheduled before execution. 
 
Idhammar, 2004 
A study by Boeing and US air transport association from 82 to 
91 concluded that 15 % of accidents are due to maintenance 
errors 
Rankin et al, 1997 
30 to 40 % were linked to maintenance activities Hale et al, 1998 
 
40.4 % of 109 fatal accidents were linked to maintenance 
activities in confined space entries from 1983 to 1993 
NIOSH, 1994 
Between 1990 and 2001, there were 1275 fatal accidents in 
Quebec, 13 % (163) were related to maintenance activities and 
45.9 % of the tasks involved concerned repair and fixing 
activities. According to this study, 51 % of people affected were 
maintenance personnel whereas 35.5 % were operators, and for 
81 % there was an energy isolation problem involved (lock out 
issue) 
Giraud et al, 2008 
6 % of accidents were linked to maintenance activities from 
1992 to 2001 
ARIA, 2000 in Giraud et 
al, 2008 
20 % of deathly accidents in France in 1997 and a bit more than 
20 % in 1998 were linked to maintenance activities 
Agence, 1998 in Giraud 
et al, 2008 
The occupational health occurrence in maintenance are 8 to 10 
time more than the average in France 
AFIM, 2004 in Giraud 
et al, 2008 
30 % of accidents were linked to maintenance activities in the 
chemical industry in the UK between 1982 and 1985 
Underwood, 1992 in 
Dhillon, 2014 
Between 55 and 65 %, human-performance-related problems 
surveyed in the area of power generation were concerned with 
maintenance activities 
Reason, 1997 (in 
Dhillon, 2014) 
The major incident/accident reports of nuclear power plants in 
Korea indicate that about 20 % of the total events occur due to 
human error 
25 % of unexpected shutdowns in Korean nuclear power plants 
were due to human errors, out of which more than 80 % of 
human errors were resulted from usual testing and maintenance 
tasks 
Heo and Park, 2009 (in 
Dhillon, 2014) 
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Various research works have been carried out within the industry with respect to safety and 
maintenance. According to Reason (1990), about 80 to 90% of industrial accidents are a result 
of human factors, majority of which are maintenance related (Ray et al, 2000; Hobbs and 
Williamson, 2003; Idhammar, 2004; Grusenmeyer, 2005; Giraud et al, 2008) and occur mainly 
during the execution phase (Grusenmeyer, 2005). The impact of human factors in the 
maintenance of assets is briefly discussed in the following section.  
2.3.2. The Human Factors in the Maintenance of Industrial Assets 
The job, the organisation, and the individual are the three aspects, termed human factors that 
influence human behaviour at work and can affect health and safety (HSE, 2005). As discussed 
in the previous section, there is a significant impact of maintenance activities on accident 
occurrences because of human factors. Human factors inherent in such accidents are difficult 
to identify in most cases. Therefore, there is a need to analyse the link between maintenance 
activities and occupational health and safety to determine ways to overcome the lack of data 
and assess the inherent conditions of maintenance human factors. The negative contribution of 
the human part of a system is generally highlighted to explain the occurrence of accidents. 
According to Reason and Hobbs (2004), people, generally those who are at the bottom of the 
pile are blamed for these occurrences. Human factors in the maintenance of assets in various 
industries are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.3.2.1. The Aviation Industry 
The aviation industry is a leading industry with respect to the amount of work carried out in the 
field of human factors and maintenance. The aviation organisational culture with particular 
emphasis on the human and organisational factors as well as safety climate in the maintenance 
of aircrafts have been largely examined. 
Maintenance “error” has been found to be one of the major causes of aircraft accidents (Rankin 
et al, 1997). The increasing number of maintenance and inspection “errors” in the aviation 
industry initiated and prioritised the need for human factors related research (Taylor, 2000b; 
Reason and Hobbs, 2004). From the taxonomies of “human errors” (Reason, 1990), Hobbs and 
Williamson (2003) associated “errors” with contributing factors that led to accidents in aircraft 
maintenance. Hobbs and Williamson (2003, p.188) explained that “...accident prevention 
strategies can be targeted at key factors that contribute to error, human error probabilities can 
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be estimated with greater accuracy, and organizational safety performance can be monitored by 
evaluating the relative prevalence of conditions that are known to promote errors”. In managing 
maintenance “errors” book, Reason & Hobbs (2004) presented twelve principles of “error” 
management depending on what they called the four P’s which are Philosophy (counting for 
double comparing with the others), Policy, Procedures, and Practices. These principles include 
the universality and inevitability of “human error”, the usefulness of “errors” (errors are not 
intrinsically bad), changing the conditions under which humans work instead of the human 
conditions, worst mistakes can be made by best people. The “human error” concept has been 
found elusive and should be replaced by the performance variability concept (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.2). 
Surveys and questionnaires have been used to study safety/organisational culture and human 
factors. In fact, there is a debate in the scientific community about the concept of safety culture 
that is, using safety culture or organisational culture. Safety is something an organisation 
“does”; hence, it should be included in its culture.  
Not until the accident of an Aloha Airlines in 1988, any mistake made by a mechanic was 
addressed by blaming that person since it was considered a matter of individual failure 
(Patankar and Taylor, 2008). Following the investigation of this accident, “human error” 
received a great focus that led the aviation to put in place a training program called the 
Maintenance Resources Management. The recommendations started the shift toward the 
identification and resolution of the contributing factors within the system that enabled “error” 
occurrences, hence addressing the systemic failures (Patankar and Taylor, 2008). Taylor 
(2000b), described maintenance resource management (MRM) as the part of the maintenance 
human factors which addresses the issues of management, organisation, communication, 
problem solving, and decision making. It addresses “error” correction and avoidance in the 
stressful and complex environment of commercial aviation. The MRM was adapted from the 
Cockpit (Crew) Resources Management (CRM). There have been four generations training 
programs (Patankar and Taylor, 2001) that have addressed awareness contents:  
 The dirty dozen elements (lack of communication, complacency, lack of knowledge, 
distraction, lack of teamwork, fatigue, lack of resources, pressure, lack of assertiveness, 
stress, lack of awareness, and norms),  
 Accident case analysis (based on chains of events, already discussed in Chapter 2),  
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 Organisational specific problems that should be corrected immediately (for example 
shift turnovers or lost time injury, LTI), and  
 Interactive exercises (for example team-working values).  
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) jointly funded a research program to evaluate the effectiveness of 
MRM training program over ten years (Taylor, 2000a). The Maintenance Resource 
Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ) was used to perform this 
evaluation during this period. Participants to MRM training completed a self-report 
questionnaire consisting of 25 questions using a five-point Likert rate during each survey. The 
MRM/TOQ survey revealed a high degree of participants’ enthusiasm for MRM training. The 
results showed also participants’ intent to do something positive about individual attitude. The 
report, unfortunately, observed a “gradual diminution over time of participants’ perception of 
management’s safety practices and goals setting/sharing” (Taylor, 2000b, p.90). At the same 
time, there has been no noticeable change in organisational behaviour. 
Taylor and Thomas (2003) used the MRM/TOQ to measure what they regarded as two 
fundamental parameters in aviation maintenance: professionalism and trust. Patankar (2003) 
constructed a questionnaire called the Organizational Safety Culture Questionnaire that 
included questions from the MRM/TOQ along with items from questionnaires developed 
outside the maintenance environment. Patankar (2003) identified four factors as having 
particular relevance to the safety goals of aviation organizations; namely the emphasis on 
compliance with standard operating procedures, the collective commitment to safety, the 
individual sense of responsibility toward safety, and the high level of employee-management 
trust. 
Patankar & Taylor (2008) studied the MRM training program again. Their findings include:  
 The programs are effective to raise awareness about human performance limitations,  
 The two key parameters that allow improving safety in aviation maintenance are 
individual professionalism and interpersonal trust, and  
 The return on investment (ROI) of such programs is good.  
As stated previously in this section, these programs had initially a positive effect on 
performance that actually lasted short; it might be due to the lack of management support and 
co-workers. Such programs based on changing people behaviours might be good to some 
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extent. The question is whether it is more important to change individuals’ behaviour or to 
understand and change the conditions under which those individuals work. 
In addition to MRM programs and related tool MRM/TOQ, McDonald et al (2000), proposed 
a self-regulatory model to examine how organisations manage safety highlighting particularly 
the human and organisational factors in the maintenance of aircrafts. The model explored the 
different aspects of safety culture and safety management systems. The research techniques 
used were an analysis of documentation and qualitative interviews, surveys of safety climate 
and attitudes, expected response to incidents, and compliance with task procedures.  
Gill and Shergill (2004) assessed employees’ perceptions of safety management and safety 
culture in the maintenance activities by means of a wide survey data. Designed to study the 
individual perception and opinions of safety management within the organisation, the survey 
tool did not take into account the important role of the human part of the system which 
represented less than 10 % of statements devoted to the individual. 
Evans et al (2007) identified a consistent set of safety climate factors from the literature review 
and consultation with the industry’s safety experts to provide a basis for benchmarking within 
the aviation industry. 
Chang and Wang (2010) examined the significance of human risk factors in the activities of 
aircraft maintenance technicians. Chang and Wang (2010) developed expert questions, and 
modified Hawks’ human factors model SHELL (Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware) 
to characterise the risk factor by adding the O dimension (organisation). For each dimension, 
risk factors from the existing literature and maintenance experts from Taiwan aviation (77 
preliminary factors for the 06 dimensions) were selected. A questionnaire was distributed to 
determine the importance of these factors. Forty-six were found important. A second 
questionnaire revealed that 09 factors ranked first with regard to the 06 dimensions. To illustrate 
the direction of this study in the discussion of the results for the liveware dimension (L), safety 
attitude was seen as the most significant factor. The results of this survey showed that airline 
companies might be interested in proposing risk management strategies based on the nine 
significant factors so that “human error” are minimised under limited resources conditions 
(Chang and Wang, 2010). Again, the strategy is directed toward minimising “human error”, a 
concept considered elusive in this thesis (see Chapter 3). Chang and Wang (2010) considered 
personnel who believed that safety standards would make the company more competitive as 
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professional with positive attitude whereas those who felt that such rules would impede 
operations and reduce efficiency in this highly competitive business as employees who had a 
negative attitude. To illustrate, Chang and Wang (2010) used an example of a previous survey 
carried out by Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in 1997 where 69 % of personnel 
surveyed felt that it was sometimes necessary to bend the rules to get the job done. This is 
actually a conservative opinion vis-à-vis the human element that has an influence on the 
performance of the system. In resilience engineering, the variability of the performance of a 
system is an asset rather than a threat (see Chapter 3, section 3.3).  
In order to overcome the lack of data and take a snapshot of daily activities, Hobbs and Tada 
(2006) developed a maintenance environment questionnaire designed to collect information on 
maintenance human factors. MEQ is presented in Chapter 5; it has been used to explore the 
maintenance working environment of SONATRACH, and eventually critically reviewed. 
Particular hazards have been also tackled. Neitzel et al, (2008), addressed falls and described 
rates of non-compliance with the requirements of fall hazard prevention in commercial aircraft 
maintenance activities. 
Herrera et al, (2009), carried out an investigation led by the Accident Investigation Board 
Norway, AIBN to examine how Norwegian aviation safety had been affected due to major 
organisational changes. They determined the status of safety through an evaluation of safety in 
the management of maintenance. They described a method that assesses how safety has been 
maintained in the maintenance organisations of the airlines while there have been concurrent 
ongoing internal and external organisational changes. 
Most of the examples discussed above adopted an approach based on “human errors” concept 
and a strategy constructed on the search to find and minimise these “errors”. This concept is 
discussed in more details in Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
2.3.2.2. The Nuclear Industry 
The Three Miles Island (TMI) and Chernobyl accidents highlighted the need to better 
understanding inherent human factors and improving training and procedures and promoting 
worldwide the concept of safety culture (Manna, 2007). According to Dhillon (2014), 
maintenance is an important activity which significant budget represents a large part of the total 
amount of money spent on power generation. The interest in human factors related issues was 
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relatively new in comparison with the aviation (aerospace) industry. In nuclear power plants, 
the cost of maintenance activity has been found potentially very high because damage may 
decrease equipment/system life significantly and may harm humans seriously (Dhillon, 2014). 
The orientation was therefore directed toward “human errors” occurrences prevention that had 
received increasing attention in NPP’s (Dhillon, 2014). As can be seen in the examples 
presented in this section, majority of them are oriented toward ways and techniques devoted to 
find and reduce “human errors” since the latter have caused and continue to generate accidents 
according to the different authors cited in the following. 
For the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA (2005), there is an increasing use of 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) in the nuclear facilities while the deterministic approach 
has been used for many years. It is broadly utilised to address human factors and manage safety 
risks (PSA has been reviewed in section 2.2.2). IAEA (2001) proposed a risk management tool 
for improving Nuclear Power Plants (NPP’s) performance. It consisted of a four-step systematic 
approach framework outlined as follows: (1) identification of possible risks, (2) identification 
of techniques or strategies to manage those risks, (3) implementation of chosen techniques or 
strategies, and (4) monitoring of solutions and feedback provision. According to the report 
issued by IAEA (2005), the appropriate technique that should be used was Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA), not only to managing nuclear safety risks but to improving operational and 
financial performance as well.  
He et al (2007) carried out another application of PSA in a pilot study. A pilot risk-informed 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis application for maintenance risk management to assess and 
manage plant risk was presented, technical issues stemming from traditional PSA outlined, and 
a risk matrix and a computerised risk monitor developed (He et al (2007). 
Hulsmans and De Gelder (2004) used PSA as a tool to analyse how an operational event might 
have developed adversely; in other words, PSA was used as a probabilistic accident precursor 
analysis and a complement to the root cause analysis approach. Hulsmans and De Gelder (2004) 
called this process a PSA-based event analysis (PSAEA). 
Vaurio (2009) described how PSA could be used to reduce “errors” and improve human factors 
and pointed out a certain lack of consensus in human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies.  
Like the aviation industry, maintenance human “errors” have been extensively addressed. In an 
attempt to characterise “human errors” leading to unplanned reactor trips in Korean nuclear 
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power plants, Kim et al (2009) used James Reason’s basic error types (Reason, 1990) with a 
slight modification of the error types into ‘planning failure’, ‘execution failure’, and ‘rule 
violation’. The approach was oriented toward the management of “human error” by studying 
the two phases (planned and execution) of maintenance activities. Kim et al (2009) concluded 
by highlighting the difficulty in identifying a priori “human errors” due to a planning failure. 
Kim et al (2009) suggested the search for a more detailed and systematic approach comprising 
a structured method or computational tools to identify the potentials for “human error”. This 
may be actually an interesting change (move) but still necessitates more progress to get out of 
the concept of “human error”. Following Kim et al (2009) work, Kim and Park (2012) 
introduced procedures to “human error” analysis by focusing on the recurrent error forms and 
then identifying factors that influence work context or performance. 
According to Khalaquzzaman et al, (2010), in the nuclear industry, a spurious trip frequency is 
considered as an important parameter that affects plant safety and plant economics. A modelling 
approach for the quantification of nuclear reactor spurious trip rate (STR) by means of fault tree 
considering maintenance “human errors” was presented. Khalaquzzaman et al (2010) set a 
number for human error probability (HEP); they had not considered the results impractical 
estimation despite the absence of sufficient human failure data, based on plant operation and 
maintenance experiences. 
To remedy unexpected reactor shutdowns, Gyunyoung and Jinkyun (2010) developed a four 
component framework to estimate the qualitative and quantitative consequences of “human 
errors” that might occur during maintenance tasks. This set included (1) the human-error 
analyser, (2) the frequency estimator, (3) the risk estimator, and (4) the derate estimator. 
Gyunyoung and Jinkyun (2010) determined minimal cut-sets using Fault Tree Analysis and 
turbine simulation and estimated electrical power loss using derate estimator.   
Jones and Thomas (2009) presented two methods to calculate the loss of life expectancy to 
achieve improvements in nuclear safety that a safety measure brings about by means of the J-
value framework (J stands for judgement). These two methods were: (1) an equivalent, 
prolonged radiation exposure to represent the effects of the accident occurring once per year 
over the given period of operation and (2) the loss of life expectancy brought about by a single 
accident occurring during the given period of operation. The latter was seen slightly more 
conservative than the first, and somewhat more accurate. 
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By means of an organisational questionnaire, Reiman and Oedewald (2006) carried out a case 
study in a nuclear power plant (NPP) maintenance unit. Reiman and Oedewald (2006) 
characterised, assessed the organisational culture, and illustrated cultural conceptions prevalent 
in the maintenance system in question and how these practices, tools, and work organisation 
influence each other.  
2.3.2.3. The Oil and Gas Industry 
Despite the accident records cited earlier, researches in the area of human factors in 
maintenance management within the oil and gas sector are limited due to lack of credible data 
(Ray et al, 2000; Burton et al., 2004; Grusenmeyer, 2005; Giraud et al, 2008; Kanki and Hobbs, 
2008). The vulnerable accident reporting systems (Gordon et al, 2005) as well as an uncovering 
of maintenance functions during accident investigations (Reiman and Oedewald, 2006) are 
among the major contributors to this lack. This is may be due to low management priority, lack 
of sophisticated analytical tool, etc. (Ray et al, 2000). 
Burton et al (2004) also highlighted the limited research in the area of human factors in 
maintenance management within the oil and gas sector in VECTRA report for the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) as guidance dealing with human factors to select appropriate 
maintenance strategies for safety in offshore oil and gas industry. The report noted a lack of 
research with regard to safety and maintenance in the oil and gas industry. The document was 
based on the analysis of Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations (RIDDOR) reports and semi-formal interviews. The report came up with a 
question-set as guidance for settling down appropriate maintenance strategies for safety in 
offshore oil and gas industry. The human factors issues identified from the literature include 
for instance learning from experience, communication, supervision, competency, etc. However, 
the report followed an approach based on the conventional view of safety management 
(critically reviewed in section 2.2.2 and 2.4) and the search for “human errors” (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.2).   
Recently, Antonovsky et al (2014) carried out a study to identify the most frequently occurring 
human factors contributing to maintenance-related failures by means of structured interviews 
based on the Human Factor Investigation Tool (HFIT). The most contributing factors found, 
were assumption (79% of cases), design and maintenance (71%), and communication (66%). 
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The main asset is to benchmark between high hazards domain prior to adopting the way the 
organisational culture is investigated in these industries. The Oil and Gas sector can learn from 
the experiences of the above industries to enhance its safety performances by adapting 
frameworks encompassing best practices. These include the use of tools that have shown good 
results such as risk assessment techniques, training toolkits as well as the way organisational 
cultures are assessed in these industries. Despite the limitations shown previously, these 
techniques are good for technical failures in non-complex systems. They may be used in 
combination with more powerful techniques that is, systemic techniques. 
2.4. The limitations of the conventional approach  
The conventional approach to safety management uses risk assessment techniques to manage 
safety that have limitations, particularly the fact that they deal only with a single failure at time 
which can be suitable for well described equipment failure for instance. Besides, to prevent 
something negative happening again, barriers are implemented. Such barriers result from the 
recommendations of risk assessments or accident/incident investigation, which in both cases is 
a reaction to something since the former is based on data taken from history (responding or 
reacting to a situation), and the latter is definitely reactive since it is based on something that 
has already occurred. This is not true for complex socio-technical systems where things usually 
occur or change quickly, where people have to be aware and stay receptive to the possibility of 
failure, and where demands and resources are often unpredictable (Hollnagel, 2012b). 
The conventional approach deals only with adverse outcomes that is, things that went (or may 
go) wrong. It takes only account of threats whereas it has to take account of both opportunities 
and threats. It does not show the dynamic variability of the system performance to compose 
with available resources to be as efficient as possible which means system making trade-offs 
between efficiency and thoroughness to achieve assigned objectives where people do something 
reasonably precise and correct, rather than spend all their time evaluating the best possible 
option (Hollnagel, 2010a; Macchi, 2011). 
It has also been shown in this Chapter that human factors in maintenance have an important 
impact on safety. At the same time, there is a lack of updated data. Most of the studies presented 
in this Chapter that are based on the traditional approach to the management of safety have dealt 
with failures identification and human factors contributors to failures. They have focussed on 
violations of workplace procedures as the root cause of failures and the search for human 
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malfunctions. All these works contribute to the research with respect to maintenance activities 
and safety. Unfortunately, some limitations are worth exploring.  
In the traditional approach, systems are assumed well designed and safe. If any adverse outcome 
(majority of the examples given in this Chapter deal only with negative outcomes) occurs, the 
search is for any deficient performance or “error” that have led to a degradation within the 
system. In other words, if a system presents good safety records (the system in question is 
considered safe), the human performance (the only element of the system which performance 
is variable in comparison to the organisation and machinery; see Macchi, 2011) is constrained 
to remain under the “safe system boundaries”; these boundaries are delimited by rules, 
procedures, instructions, etc. In order to understand accident occurrences, the search is directed 
toward describing qualitatively and quantitatively deviation from performance standards. This 
is acceptable and well done for components failures using indices such as Mean Time Between 
Failures (MTBF), or probability of component failures, or probability of component failures on 
demand. Unfortunately, this has also been translated and applied to human performance (the 
human functioning is not bimodal i.e. success/failure, see Hollnagel, 2010a). As a result, 
recommendations that have been issued from risk assessments as well as accident investigations 
have also been based on this way of reasoning. Generally, the recommendations have been 
directed toward the limitation of the human intervention by more automation and/or the 
introduction of more program training, procedures, regulations, etc.  
From the examples given above, system performance has been only described in terms of 
failures, “errors”, etc. Many examples of personnel actions that have ended in negative 
outcomes have been provided but nothing about any single positive action has been reported. 
In everyday activities, particularly when the maintenance system is reactive and when 
organisational culture is production driven, time is a very important resource. Personnel are 
always under pressure to finish work as rapidly as possible; hence, they do not have sufficient 
time to be as thorough as expected. Therefore, trade-offs are made (Hollnagel, 2010a), generally 
efficiency is prevalent. Consequently, people make adjustments, shortcuts, adapt their 
functioning; this makes the system performance vary which is a normal functioning otherwise 
work will not be accomplished and goals not achieved. It appears in a life cycle of an asset that 
individuals generally have contributed positively rather than in a destructive way, using their 
knowledge (or lack of), their expertise, the resources (or lack of) they have in hand (resources 
is used in this case very broadly that is, from available personnel to spare parts through time), 
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to achieve goals. They always adapt to changes, disturbances, unexpected events, and take 
benefits of opportunities.  
Safety is managed proactively by a priori intervention that is before any adverse effect occurs 
by making the adjustments before something happens rather than after (Hollnagel, 2012b). 
According to Hollnagel (2012b), there are advantages assuredly lying behind this statement. 
The most important one is that responses can be given in time, or may be ahead of time. By 
responding earlier enough, the system requires less effort because it prevents the effects to 
develop and spread (Macchi, 2011; Hollnagel, 2012b). Systems will not be able to do so if they 
cannot monitor effectively the situation by means of suitable leading indicators that require a 
culture of learning from past experiences, learning the right lessons (Hollnagel, 2012b). To 
complete the picture, the ability of the system to know what to expect that is to anticipate should 
be proven too. 
On the other hand, negative situations such as accidents (things that go wrong) represent a very 
small part in the life cycle of systems whereas the majority of cases represent things that go 
right (see Chapter 3, section 3.3). This means the former represent an exception rather than the 
rule. Moreover, for a given complex socio-technical system, designers cannot provide a full set 
of procedures, work instructions, or guidelines that answer every single situation (or variation) 
within the system. Consequently, the system performance varies to match the conditions of 
work and the variability that leads to things that go wrong/right is mainly due to the human 
intervention. In addition, it is also worth focusing on what makes the performance of a system 
succeed rather than focussing only on why it fails. In other words, looking at both things that 
have gone (or go) right and wrong will ensure that things will go right continuously. Resilience 
engineering deals with such an approach. Therefore, managing safety proactively is achieved 
by managing safety by resilience engineering. This is developed in more details in Chapter 3. 
An obvious direction is to bridge the theoretical research with the practice within the oil and 
gas industries.  
2.5. Chapter Summary 
In this Chapter, an overview of the management of safety was given. Some important 
definitions of the key words related to the aim of this thesis were introduced. Limitations of the 
traditional definitions of risk designed to be applied only for very simple cases where the 
probability and the severity of the outcomes are well known and easily estimated were shown. 
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As a result, a definition of safety based on resilience engineering precepts has been proposed. 
A critical review of the conventional approach to the management of safety was carried out and 
the main limitations of traditional risk assessment techniques and accident causation models 
were highlighted. These limitations lie within the fact that they do not consider the interaction 
of the elements of the system. Besides, the external factors (environment, weather, human and 
organisational factors, etc.) are taken into account very little or not at all. Moreover, the 
estimation of risk is generally subjective including the probability estimates. Therefore, this 
kind of techniques cannot be used to provide reliable results for socio-technical systems that 
have become very complex; hence, techniques that are more powerful are required. The 
contribution of the organisational approach to safety management and its limits was introduced.  
In addition, the impact of maintenance activities on plant safety was addressed. These activities 
were found labour intensive, thus prone to generating accidents. As revealed in this Chapter, 
accident records due to maintenance are very high and human factors have a significant impact 
on these occurrences. Despite the difficulty to address these impacts, it has been found that 
nuclear as well as aviation industry have devoted huge efforts to tackle these issues in 
comparison to the oil and gas sector. However, the works presented in this Chapter are based 
on the conventional approach to safety management that are mainly based on the search of 
failures and/or “human errors” that have been critically discussed. Only lacks have been 
reported as if there have been only negative behaviour or simply positive actions are judged 
normal, people are paid to perform such actions. 
It has been highlighted that in nowadays systems, safety should be managed proactively based 
on resilience engineering approach by a priori intervention focusing also on what makes the 
performance of a system succeed rather than focussing only on why it fails.  In the next Chapter, 
this approach is introduced.  
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 RESILIENCE ENGINEERING 
3.1. Introduction  
As explained in Chapter 2, conventional risk assessment techniques as well as accident 
causation models fail to handle complex socio-technical systems since the latter are intractable. 
For such systems, conditions of work continuously change resulting in the intervention of the 
human element of the system to adapt/adjust current conditions so that corporate goals are 
achieved. Consequently, successes or failures may happen.   
To date, the majority of research in safety has focused on explaining why accidents happen and 
what should be done to avoid their recurrence; the focus has been therefore on component 
failures and/or “human error”. In this way, significant efforts have been devoted towards 
reducing accident rates and avoiding recurrence. These efforts may be incomplete without 
analysing properly such occurrences (Ullah et al., 2000). Moreover, the best way to tackle 
accident prevention is also to highlight what the system did so that accidents did not happen 
instead of focussing only on accidents that occurred. Resilience engineering answers such a 
question (Hollnagel, 2012a).  
In this Chapter, resilience engineering concepts and precepts are reviewed. First, the concept of 
human error is discussed. This is followed by a section devoted entirely to resilience 
engineering from why performance varies, to the concepts and precepts of this approach. This 
section is ended by the introduction of a new concept that is As High Resilient As Possible, 
AHRAP. Eventually, a Chapter summary is given. 
3.2. The Concept of “Human Error” 
3.2.1. Definitions 
“Human error” is defined in the dictionary as an error that is typical of humans rather than 
machines (Collins), or the making of an error as a natural result of being human (dictionary 
reference).  Simply said, it is an error made by a human. Error is defined as something that is 
not correct: a wrong action or statement (Merriam-Webster), or a mistake, especially one that 
causes problems or affects the result of something (Oxford dictionary). A mistake is defined in 
the same dictionary as an action or an opinion that is not correct, or that produces a result that 
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you did not want. Sanders and Mc Cormick (1993) define “Human error” as an inappropriate 
or undesirable human decision or behaviour that reduces, or has the potential for reducing, 
effectiveness, safety, or system performance. For Reason (1997), “human error” is the failure 
of planned actions to achieve their desired ends, without the intervention of some unforeseeable 
events. 
3.2.2. The Evolution of the “Human Error” Concept 
“Human error” is a term used in daily language. It is often a conclusion of an accident/incident 
investigation that expresses inappropriate or undesirable action or decision made by people that 
led to an unwanted outcome. According to Hollnagel (2005b), at least, there are three different 
denotations of “human error”. It can mean either the cause of something, the event itself (the 
action), or the outcome of the action; even if the use of the term “human error” is limited to 
denote “error as event”, the notion of an action gone wrong is a serious oversimplification. 
Amalberti (1996) classified actions as follows: 
 Those that are correctly carried out where the actual outcome matches the intended 
outcome 
 Those for which there is a perception of having been carried out incorrectly in some 
way, but where the discrepancy is detected and corrected 
 Those that are incorrectly carried out and where recovery is possible 
 Those that are incorrectly carried out and where the discrepancy is ignored 
 Those that are incorrectly carried out and which are not detected at the 
time and therefore not recovered 
From the first time it appeared in the safety jargon, there has been a lot of works to model this 
concept. It actually began in the military domain in missile development systems where 
identification and classification of “human errors” were established along with hardware 
reliability approaches according to a report released by EUROCONTROL (2002). The 
development of the research in the field of “human error” grew after major accidents such as 
Three-Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl, the Bhopal poisonous gas release, the Challenger 
explosion, and the Piper Alpha oil platform fire (EUROCONTROL, 2002).  
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To address the limitations of traditional risk assessment techniques, particularly after the TMI 
accident, the nuclear industry imposed the introduction of “human error” analysis (see Chapter 
2). 
3.2.3. The Use of the Concept 
The following two examples allow discussing the use of the “human error” concept: 
 An engineer was obliged to whelm a valve to let production flow continues. 
 Operators use steel wire to close a valve in the pipeline connected to the flare system 
In the first example, a production engineer found himself/herself without spare parts when there 
a trip in the automatic valve located in the line of crude oil production occurred. He/she 
unsuccessfully spent hours by phone seeking for spare parts hundreds of kilometres around the 
plant. He/she decided to whelm in order to let production flow continue. Approximately the 
same situation happened in another location where operators used steel wire to close or open 
an automatic valve in the pipeline connected to the flare system. When there was a need to 
direct fluids toward the flare system, they removed the wire and put it again after the operation 
was finished. 
No one looked after these people since production continued to flow. Nobody wants accidents 
to happen. However, if something bad happens, people will then be blamed for not following 
the procedures.  Generally, the reports after accident investigation point out that “root causes” 
are either “human error” and/or equipment failures.  
Many authors (Rasmussen, 1999; Reason and Hobbs, 2004; Hollnagel, 2005b; Woods, 2006) 
have noticed that people have often been blamed for the occurrence of accidents. The authors 
have claimed that:  
 These people are generally those who are at the bottom of the pile, or  
 The “root cause” reflects the interests of stakeholders, or  
 It is easier to stop the search for causes when a human or group who have acted so that 
a bad outcome occurs are found, or  
 It is subjective and guided by the toolbox of the analyst.  
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The “theory of bad apple” has then been applied. Decisions have been made to remove the 
persons from practice; or the call has been made for more training, procedures, policies, and 
even more automation.  
In fact, people often tend to simplify things because it is easy to understand, moreover, it is easy 
to “sell”. According to Hollnagel (2005b), the search for a cause is a case of expediency as 
much as of logic. As stated earlier (section 3.2.2), there are three ways to view the use of 
“human error”. Whatever the way this concept is used, there would be always connotations. 
But is the use of this concept that has a connotation of seeking to blame people appropriate?  
3.2.4. The Variability of Performance as an Alternative to the Concept of “Human 
Error” 
For Hollnagel (2005b), time is close to saying that the concept of “human error” has ceased to 
be meaningful. This concept may be seen as a constraint to the flexibility of the system. Actions 
that may lead to great successes may be inhibited if systems are not flexible enough. Actually, 
individuals, as well as organisations, always do what they see appropriate to achieve corporate 
goals notwithstanding sabotage of course.  
As explained in the previous sections, the concept of “human error” concerns individuals. In 
the oil and gas industry alike other complex socio-technical systems, there are many more 
details to consider such as incomplete modes of operation, tight couplings among functions, 
changes within systems faster than their description so that these systems are underspecified 
hence intractable (Hollnagel, 2012b). Actually, individuals, as well as organisations, work 
under pressure using what they have in hand to achieve corporate goals. They perform work 
under conditions characterised by a lack of resources, competence, knowledge, and time. For 
this reason, they adjust/adapt their functioning to match current demands, resources, and 
constraints. For Hollnagel (2012b), these adjustments/adaptations are at the heart of successful 
performance. However, it is worth noting that this may lead to positive outcomes as well as to 
negative ones. The performance of these systems is, therefore, variable. The performance 
variability should be therefore considered as an asset rather than a threat and this variability is 
behind successes as well as failures. According to Hollnagel (2012b), instead of searching 
models and theories for “human error”, there is a need to develop models and theories for human 
performance variability. Performance variability is discussed in more details in section 3.3. 
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To conclude, the concept of performance variability is a great opportunity to be an alternative 
to the concept of “human error”. Therefore, it is time to make the shift from the old way of 
thinking that consists of attempting to understand how systems perform in the real world based 
on the search of probability of failures, taxonomy of “human errors”, etc. to the new one that 
consists of understanding why performance varies. Performance variability is normal, 
inevitable and necessary (Hollnagel, 2010a). It is the underlying condition without which 
success cannot happen. This is developed in more details in the next section. 
3.3. Resilience Engineering 
Majority of accidents are usually preceded by behaviours that make the system drift toward 
states of increasing risk (Hollnagel, 2006). They result not simply from component failure 
(which is treated as a symptom of the problems) but from inadequate control of safety related 
constraints on the development, design, construction, and operation of the socio-technical 
system (Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2011). Consequently, there is a need to find better ways to 
tackle accident prevention by focusing on what the system did so that accidents did not happen. 
A number of questions are therefore raised. Are existing techniques appropriate? Hence, are 
new approaches to managing safety proactively needed? The answer to these questions is given 
in the next section. The search for more powerful techniques founded on resilience engineering 
is the concern. 
The database of WEB of SCIENCE was searched to find the number of articles that dealt with 
resilience during the last five years. 30327 were found out of which 1196 were related to science 
technology domain. When the keyword “engineering” is added, the search yielded 403 articles 
out of which 380 were related to science technology domain from 2010 to mid- 2014. It is worth 
noting that there could be confusion between the search for engineering resilience and resilience 
engineering (see 3.3.1). Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of publications related to resilience 
engineering from 1985. It can be seen from this figure that the number of publications increased 
during the last five years (48 publications in 2010 to 66 publications in mid-2014) whereas there 
were only 13 publications in 2005, 1 in 1990, and 0 in 1985. This implies an increasing interest 
in this area of research that appears from 2000 on.  
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Figure 1-7 : Evolution of resilience engineering publications 
 
This section investigates resilience and resilience engineering precepts/concepts in order to 
provide the background that will be used in this thesis. 
3.3.1. Evolution of the Use of Resilience 
The term resilience was introduced in physics to characterise materials that can adapt to changes 
or withstand some conditions such as certain types of wood that do not break when they are 
subjected to large loads. The first use of the term resilience was in physics.  “On the Transverse 
Strength and Resilience of Timber” paper published in the Philosophical Magazine, Tredgold 
(1818) explained the property of certain woods such as timber to accommodate to high loads 
without cracking by the concept of resilience. The concept of resilience was used by Mallet 
(1856) as a means to measure and compare the different strengths of materials by developing 
the “resilience modulus”; this led to measure the ability of materials to withstand severe 
conditions and predict the elasticity of a material; it allowed determining the force that could 
be applied before it breaks.  
The use of resilience saw the bird of two measures respectively the ecological resilience 
(Holling, 1973) and the engineering resilience (Pimm, 1984). Holling (1973) used resilience to 
explain the ability of an ecosystem to absorb changes and persist. Holling defined resilience as 
“a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, 
and parameters, and still persist” (Holling, 1973, p. 17). Pimm (1984) used resilience to evaluate 
the ability of an ecosystem to turn back to its initial state after it was moved away by a 
perturbation and defined the measure as the speed at which a system returns to its original shape. 
As can be seen, Pimm (1984) used resilience to show the stability of an ecosystem that is the 
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existence of an equilibrium state from where the system moves away and always turns back 
with a certain ease (or difficulty) and celerity (or slowness).  
The use of resilience was transposed to the human sciences too. In psychology, it characterises 
the individual management of stress and strain. This shows that features of resilience are 
actually embedded in the survival instinct of human being; in nowadays complex socio-
technical systems, the human part of such systems is the essential one.  
Besides, it is worth noting that some governments and non-governmental organisations have 
rewritten certain laws according to this concept and introduced others. To illustrate, examples 
are given in the following:  
 The UK government (e.g. the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004). Resilience was defined 
as the ability of assets, networks and systems to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and / or 
rapidly recover from a disruptive event (UK cabinet office, 2010) 
 The US Department Homeland Security Steering Committee (2008). The committee 
defined resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from or successfully adapt to 
adversity or a change in conditions.  In addition, the US released in 2009 a standard 
called the standard Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness and Continuity 
Management Systems (ASIS SPC.1-2009) which aim was to provide a comprehensive 
management framework to anticipate, prevent if possible, and prepare for and respond 
to a disruptive incident. 
 The UN framework of Hyogo “Building the resilience of nations and communities to 
disasters” (UN/ISDR, 2005). In the conference report, the UN report defined resilience 
as the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This might be determined by the degree to which the social 
system would be capable of organising itself to increase this capacity for learning from 
past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures. 
The adaptability of systems has also been emphasised (see Adger et al, 2005 and Folke et al, 
2010). 
In this thesis, safety management within complex socio-technical systems is addressed based 
on the resilience engineering concept. The concept of resilience engineering has been 
introduced to deal with such systems during the last decade. The use of resilience evolved from 
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the consideration of situations of threats, risks or stress only to reducing the focus on these 
aspects to end currently with the emphasis on both threats and opportunities. This is developed 
in more details in the following section. 
3.3.2. Resilience Definitions 
Relevant definitions with respect to the scope of this thesis have been searched in the literature. 
Among findings, some have been found of interest to discuss and comment on. According to 
the “online etymology dictionary”, resilience was first used in 1620 as an act of rebounding; 
the word is derived from Latin resilire i.e. to rebound whereas its elasticity meaning was 
introduced in 1824. Other dictionaries define resilience as:  
 “The ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape; elasticity or the capacity 
to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness” (Oxford dictionary)  
 “The ability to become strong, healthy, or successful again after something bad happens 
or the ability of something to return to its original shape after it has been pulled, 
stretched, pressed, bent, etc”. (Merriam-Webster),  
 “The power or ability to return to the original form, position, etc., after being bent, 
compressed, or stretched; elasticity, the ability to recover readily from illness, 
depression, adversity, or the like; buoyancy, and the physical property of a material that 
can return to its original shape or position after deformation that does not exceed its 
elastic limit” (the free dictionary).  
According to Jackson (2010), it has been agreed in the resilience community that the words 
“resilience” and “resiliency” are used in the same way. However, there is a difference between 
resilience and resilience engineering; actually, resilience concerns the ability (or abilities) of a 
system whereas resilience engineering deals with the approach that makes a system resilient 
(see the definitions given below). Citing Westrum (2006), Jackson (2010) highlighted three 
aspects that are considered as sources of resilience and constitute the resilience of a system that 
is, accident avoidance, survival, and recovery. Jackson (2010) explained these aspects by the 
ability of a system to (1) prevent something bad to happen, (2) prevent something bad from 
becoming even worse, and (3) recover from something bad before it becomes even worse than 
before. Used this way, resilience would only take account of bad/adverse outcomes. Actually, 
the human intervention would make these outcomes count for very little allowing in major cases 
the system to perform positively. Thus, the following additions should accompany the three 
aspects. Instead of dealing only with accident avoidance, it is worth adding continuation that is 
- 52 - 
 
taking benefit of opportunities. Along with survival, organisations should establish a continuous 
improvement way of management. Eventually, organisations should build healthy systems 
rather than focusing only on how to recover from any adverse outcome. Adverse/negative 
outcomes represent actually rare occurrences as it is explored in this section.  
Fairbanks et al (2014) definition (see Chapter 1, section 1.2) shows an important evolution: the 
term opportunities is added bringing a correction and a move from dealing only with threats to 
address both threats and opportunities. Fairbanks et al (2014) defined a brittle system as the 
opposite of a resilient one. It is characterised by the inability to accommodate even minor 
disturbance (Fairbanks et al, 2014). 
As explained earlier in the evolution of the use of resilience, many definitions have been 
introduced. In addition to those given above, the relevant ones are summarised in appendix 1 
taking into account the system feature addressed and what the system faces. 
All these definitions present resilience as a set of abilities, capabilities, or capacities of a system 
to face changes, disturbances, stress, new situations, unanticipated dangers, changing 
conditions, harmful influences, major mishap, adversity, the unexpected, deviation, or simply 
something bad. They actually all refer to an ability to face some threats, changes, or unexpected 
situations expecting as a result a positive outcome (recover, regain a stable state, maintain, 
persist, achieve goals, etc.). These abilities must be linked to a ready organisation to cope with 
such situations; the organisation is prepared to respond and sustain its functioning to achieve 
goals by adapting/adjusting to the dynamic movement of the environment. This in fine may 
make the system learn from what happened.  
Only one definition is explicit about the ability of a system to face both negative events and 
opportunities (see Fairbanks et al, 2014). This definition shows the evolution of the approach 
that underlies resilience perspective. This section develops such an approach based on 
performance variability of a system. 
Following what was stated previously, resilience deals with how systems perform, that is 
achieving corporate goals, being safe, reducing costs, etc. Resilience can be seen therefore as 
the intrinsic ability of a system to cope successfully with the variability of its performance under 
expected and unexpected conditions. In this definition, resilience is concerned by system’s 
ability; it acknowledges the existence of performance variability and the successful actions 
carried out to face whatever events. For Hollnagel (2009a, p.97), “performance variability is 
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the reason why things most of the time go right, as well as the reason why things sometimes go 
wrong”. Consequently, for a system, dealing successfully with its performance variability 
means continuing to function in order to achieve designed goals under varying conditions. It 
comes that any system must search to be As High Resilient As Possible (AHRAP). This is 
further discussed in the following sections. 
3.3.3. Why Does System Performance Vary? 
3.3.3.1. System Under-specification 
Nowadays systems have become more complex and their performance varies according to the 
situation. This is because they are intractable. Clarke (2000) defined intractable systems as 
underspecified systems where details may be missing or unavailable. This under-specification 
is either due to the need to consider many more details, or incompletely known modes of 
operations, or tight couplings among functions, or because systems change faster than they can 
be described (Hollnagel, 2012a). This is may be due to the combination of these factors 
altogether. 
Current conditions of work are dramatically different from the conditions that existed from the 
1960’s until 1980’s; particularly systems are more dependent on information technology than 
ever and lack the detailed specification required to accomplish work as imagined. Accordingly, 
the management systems that have been developed based on assumptions considered reasonable 
for that conditions are not valid for nowadays systems that have become more complex and 
socio-technique where situations are underspecified. If any issue was raised, the problem was 
isolated and a technical solution was looked up by acting upon the technological part by more 
automation or more safety devices considered nicer and cleaner than the socio-technical one.  
Among these assumptions, Hollnagel et al (2013) cited: (1) well designed and correctly 
maintained systems, (2) comprehensive, complete and correct procedures in place, (3) 
operators’ behaviour as expected and trained, and (4) every contingency is foreseen at design 
and a solution is provided. Moreover, methods such as those dealing with human factors, object 
of this research, have actually been based on the principles that systems and particularly the 
relationship between the human part and the other elements of the system can be known and 
described thoroughly. This is not the case for socio-technical systems, these systems are 
underspecified and intractable (Hollnagel, 2006). Actually, system elements/components are 
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interdependent of each other and cannot be isolated (see the example discussed in Chapter 5, 
exploring maintenance environment).  
 
3.3.3.2. System Conditions of Work 
Working under pressure, lacking important elements (e.g. time, knowledge, resources, and 
competence), and dealing with complexity requires human performance to be adaptive to meet 
the changes systems face in everyday activities by doing local adjustments or adaptations. The 
adjustments that are approximate imply the variability of the system’s performance be 
inevitable and necessary (Hollnagel, 2010a). Moreover, it may lead to unpredictable results in 
both directions that is, hazardous or positive ones.  
Lack of time implies a reactive culture of the system. The latter is always under pressure to 
achieve production goals for instance. It responds as a fire fighter to fix broken components. 
There is no time to think strategy, develop vulnerability models, analyse trends from system 
performance monitoring and surrounding environment monitoring, detect opportunities and 
take benefit of them, etc.  
Lack of knowledge implies the absence of expertise to think the unthinkable, to go beyond what 
is known in order to anticipate threats as well as opportunities (e.g. developing strategic plans 
for the future) by searching what may actually help perform such actions. Even though a system 
is not reactive but is rather proactive and possesses the required expertise, the necessary 
resources that make the system able to respond to threats/opportunities must be available; in 
addition, systems must know beforehand how these resources will be used and when.  
As a result, trade-offs are daily made in order to achieve goals and people make adjustments 
that are actually approximate. 
3.3.3.3. Trade-Offs 
People face real conditions at the bottom of the pile and generally behave as fire fighters 
(reactive) trying to be more efficient than thorough; they work continuously under pressure. 
Accordingly, at all levels, particularly engineers/front-line managers lack the necessary time to 
think strategy and to apply what they learned in the universities to improve work performance 
for example in maintenance departments. In other words, learning from past experiences, 
developing vulnerability models to anticipate future uncertainties, improving costs of 
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maintenance activities among others have become secondary interests, letting equipment 
availability at all costs the primary objective. 
Trade-offs are always made in daily activities; that is either being thorough and complete or 
being efficient thus carrying out activities as rapidly as possible. Hollnagel calls this Efficiency 
Thoroughness Trade-Offs (Hollnagel, 2009a). In ETTO, thoroughness can be seen through the 
analysis of daily activities that go right which lead the system to be more efficient when actions 
are needed. The following example illustrate the trade-offs made continuously at the shop floor. 
Managers face the choice to shut down an oil/gas field in order to intervene (following the 
procedure thoroughly and loosing days of production) or to make the decision not to follow the 
procedure and find out a way to solve the problem without stopping the work (see examples 
given in Chapters 5 and 7). 
3.3.3.4. Explaining System Performance Variability 
To explain performance variability, Hollnagel (2010a) came up with two theories, the W and Z 
theories. The W theory stipulates that certain conditions (well-designed systems, complete and 
correct procedures provided, and well trained people behaving as expected) must be met so that 
systems work properly. The efforts to manage safety are generally directed to implementing 
barriers of all kinds (see Swiss cheese model of accidents) because accidents are attributed to 
technology, human “errors”, and/or organisational failures. This leads to the perception 
(Macchi, 2011) that every resource allocated to safety is in competition with production goals 
(obviously, trade-off safety-production is in favour of production) and to restrict the opportunity 
of organisational learning, if this culture exists, to negative events only. 
In daily life examples, things go (have gone) right because of the human intervention that makes 
(has made) the correct adjustments/adaptations and not because systems have been well- 
thought/designed and people have been well trained and have performed their work as 
imagined. To respond to actual conditions, individuals take decisions and make required 
adjustments they judge appropriate to meet demands and achieve objectives. The cup is mid-
full or mid-empty. Trying to understand why things go (have gone) right to increase the number 
of those that go right, is more productive than focusing only on things that go (have gone) 
wrong. Comparing work as imagined and work as performed allows assuredly understanding 
why adjustments/adaptations succeed; it is therefore important to find indicators that monitor 
such performance. As explained in the maintenance system of the Company (Chapter 5), tasks 
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are regularly performed by adapting current conditions (procedures, tools, etc.) that generally 
result in successes and rarely in accidents. 
Hollnagel (2010c) sorted out the main sources of performance variability. Performance varies 
because of psychological factors (that may affect perception, vigilance, ingenuity, creativity, 
etc.), organisational factors (such as meeting performance demands, stretching resources, etc.), 
social factors (such as meeting oneself, colleagues, or managers’ expectations, etc.), and 
contextual factors (such as workplace environment). To achieve safety, all kinds of performance 
variability are constrained (rules, procedures, strict training, etc.) in order to avoid malfunctions 
or failures. This cannot be attained since systems are intractable (Hollnagel, 2010a). The 
solution lies within the capability of the humans to make the correct adjustments to fill in the 
gap between “what should be done” and “what could be done” using available resources. Since 
adjustments/adaptations made by the human element in particular are omnipresent within 
complex socio-technical systems, the performance of such systems is variable. Performance 
variability explains successes through the dynamic processes of adjustments/adaptations to 
achieve goals. However, it can also lead to undesired outcomes.  
Management commitment is among the important themes that make an organisation resilient 
(Hollnagel, 2008a). This is to say that from top management to the shop floor, the role of 
performance variability must be recognised, the conditions that led to this variability 
understood, and the performance variability must be regarded as an asset. Failures actually are 
an expression of everyday performance variability as well as successes. 
On the other hand, the occurrence of any negative outcome cannot be described by means of a 
decomposition of a linear chain of cause-effect tracking backward a potential “root cause” that 
is generally decided by the analyst. Consequently, building techniques/methods of risk 
assessment or designing models of accidents investigation based on principles of bimodality 
and/or causality that are in contradiction respectively with the principles of performance 
variability and emergence is not appropriate. 
According to Hollnagel (2010a), accident investigation and risk assessment techniques should 
be based on the Z theory where systems work because the following conditions are met: 
 People learn to identify and overcome design flaws and functional glitches 
 People can recognise the actual demands and adapt their performance accordingly 
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 When procedures must be applied, people can interpret and apply them to match the 
conditions 
 Finally, people can detect and correct when something goes wrong or when it is about 
to go wrong, and hence intervene before the situation seriously worsens 
The reliability of such systems is because people are flexible and adaptive, rather than because 
the systems have been perfectly thought out and designed (Hollnagel, 2010a). 
According to the Efficiency–Thoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO) principle introduced by 
Hollnagel (2009a), people tend to be efficient rather than thorough doing something reasonably 
precise and correct rather than spending all their time to evaluate the best possible option 
(Macchi, 2011). This can be achieved through the description and measurement of system 
abilities that may lead to success or failure. 
3.3.3.5. System Abilities 
A system can be characterised by abilities that let it perform daily work (what an organisation 
does) to achieve objectives. The set of all these abilities defines a resilient system. Because 
safety is treated as a core value, not a commodity that can be counted, Hollnagel (2010b) stated 
that a resilient organisation is also safe. To be resilient, an organisation must be able: (1) to 
respond to threats/opportunities that is, know what to do, (2) to flexibly monitor that is, know 
what to look for, (3) to anticipate any development that is, know what to expect, and (4) to learn 
that is, know to learn from past experiences (Hollnagel, 2010b). It is worth adding the ability 
to transform the system from current state to another facing all kind of resistance particularly 
the resistance to change. Current system state will produce inevitably its end if it continues to 
follow the same way of thinking i.e. the same culture. This may be characterised by lack of 
resilience or a tendency to brittle. The solution resides therefore in its ability of transformation 
to build resilience from a given level to a more resilient one. As explained by Hollnagel and 
Woods (2005), the system actually makes trade-offs between all these capabilities to achieve 
designed goals.  
Filling the gap of knowledge should be directed toward taking benefit of performance 
adjustments/adaptations by learning from them. That is, the learning process should take place 
around both positive and negative outcomes. The majority of adaptations/adjustments are 
actually successful (Hollnagel, 2009b), see section 3.3.4 related to the AHRAP concept. Since 
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nowadays systems have become more complex, the need for such adjustments/adaptations is a 
great opportunity to grasp to understand system performance. According to Hollnagel (2014), 
risks can be understood only if the operational environment is sought, bearing in mind that all 
outcomes result from performance variability of systems, particularly the performance of the 
human element. 
3.3.3.6. Functional Resonance 
Hollnagel (2004, 2012b) introduced the concept of functional resonance to explain the non-
linear interrelation between nowadays system elements to show that in such systems events do 
neither happen one after another nor have cause-effects relationship between them. Rather, 
systems evolve in a complex dynamic environment where its performance is always variable 
(see previous sections) leading usually to successes and rarely to failures; successes are the flip 
side of failures. The latter are stemming from inappropriate or insufficient 
adjustments/adaptations of system components to the changing environment. They should 
therefore be described using functional resonance in order to explain what could happen in such 
systems. 
Resonance is used in physical phenomena to explain the oscillation of a system with larger 
amplitude when for instance intensity of electrical current is in phase with the voltage. In 
resilience engineering approach, functions refer to activities; they describe something a system 
element does and/or the interaction between the human part of the system and the others. For 
Hollnagel (2012b), the approximate adjustments that are carried out by the human part of the 
system, are made in response –and anticipation- of what others do individually or collectively; 
functional resonance can be therefore defined as “the detectable signal that emerges from the 
unintended interaction of the everyday variability of multiple signals” (Hollnagel, 2012b, p. 
29). In other words, some signals are detectable whereas others are not; when the variability of 
functions within the system resonates and gains larger amplitude exceeding the limits of system 
capacities, the signal is therefore detectable. A resilient system is one that is also able to detect 
such signals beforehand, act upon to minimise or eliminate those that may exceed the limits of 
systems capabilities.  
For Ferreira (2011), people and organisations should be provided with tools that allow 
monitoring sources and changes in system performance variability. Providing a tool to measure 
system abilities is a great challenge thus. 
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3.3.4. From ALARP to AHRAP: Looking Ahead 
The challenge is therefore how to manage properly a situation in order to enable the 
optimisation of human factors by consolidating and enhancing positive adjustments and 
mitigating or reducing negative ones.  
In the traditional approach, risk must be reduced until what is called As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable, ALARP. According to this concept, the reduction of risk must take into account 
costs and benefits of risk reduction so that risk becomes tolerable. In other words, reduce the 
risk to the level that putting more money will be vain. As explained by Hollnagel in resilience 
engineering in practice, a guidebook (2011), such a principle deals with what is called the 
unwanted outcomes or things that can go wrong where safety efforts have generally focused 
on. In resilience engineering, the focus is on the two sides of the coin namely things that go 
wrong as well as things that go right. Figure 3.2- that has been adapted from Hollnagel (2010b) 
- depicts the reality of what happens in a system. In the life cycle of a system, things that go 
wrong represent only a small fraction, the exception, e.g. no more than 5 % whereas things that 
go right represent the large majority, may be more than 95 % of the situations. Why put a 
strategy that focuses only on things that go wrong which represents the rare cases? The time 
has come to make the shift to understand why things go right too. Therefore, what will happen 
if a strategy that addresses all cases is set? This may allow putting barriers to situations where 
there could be a drift toward hazardous states and boost situations that have positive outcomes. 
In other words, increasing the situations that go right will decrease situations that go wrong. 
 
 
Figure 1-8 : Make the shift to understand why things go right too (adapted from Hollnagel, 2010b) 
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For Hollnagel (2012a), resilience engineering assumes that things that go right and those that 
go wrong are a result of the same underlying processes. Accordingly, it is worth knowing what 
the four cornerstones, cited previously in section 1.2.3., are in a given system and attempt to 
increase these abilities. Concisely, increase the resilience of a system that makes it As High 
Resilient As Possible. It has also been shown in previous sections that organisations adapt their 
functioning to achieve assigned objectives by adjusting available resources and time. As a 
result, there must be a move from following the principle of As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP) to adopt the principle of As High Resilient As Possible (AHRAP). 
The terms found in resilience definitions are system features that allow responding to 
unanticipated disturbances that may lead to failures and resume normal operations on the one 
hand, and grasp any opportunity to improve this performance on the other hand. The 
characteristics of high resilient systems allow them to succeed under all conditions including 
achieving goals, preventing drift towards hazardous situations, recovering from disturbances 
(bounce back), taking benefit of opportunities and so forth. 
On the other hand, a resilient system may also fail to face opportunities/threats, it is the reason 
why it is more interesting to address levels of resilience and levels of improvements; hence, a 
system must attempt to become AHRAP. In the large majority of cases, these adjustments lead 
to successful outcomes and only rarely result in undesired events.  
As explained in the previous Section 3.3.3, in order to be resilient, an organisation must be able: 
(1) to respond to threats/opportunities i.e. know what to do, (2) to flexibly monitor i.e. know 
what to look for, (3) to anticipate any development i.e. know what to expect, and (4) to learn 
i.e. know to learn from past experiences. System resilience should be increased in a continuous 
improvement way by the ability of the system to transform its maturity level to a higher one. 
Since resilience concerns the ability of a system to deal successfully with any situation, 
resilience engineering is the approach that engineers (plan for, design, and build) practices to 
identify and implement strategies that make a system AHRAP. 
The underlying process that guides this research work is based on making a system more 
resilient by measuring its four abilities and identifying strategies to increase these abilities in a 
continuous improvement way to make the system AHRAP. This is actually an endless process. 
Measuring system’s resilience does not mean measuring percentage of compliance/non-
compliance to rules, standards and so forth as required by the traditional approach in auditing 
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any management system. What is required, is measuring actual system performance. In this 
research work, it is achieved by the development of a tool, MASRAT, which measures the four 
abilities of the maintenance system of an oil and gas asset, and identifies maturity levels and 
strategies for improvement. This is addressed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
3.4. Chapter Summary and the Way Ahead 
3.4.1. Chapter Summary 
In this Chapter, resilience engineering concepts and precepts were reviewed. First, limitations 
of the traditional approach were recalled. It has been shown that the traditional approach is 
based on a supposition that the underlying principles applied to equipment/component failures 
(failures, causes, consequences, probability of occurrence, etc.) can be used to characterise the 
human intervention that includes for instance the search of “human errors”, taxonomy of 
“human errors”, a probability of “human errors”. This assumption was found not valid; the 
human intervention is rather considered as an asset. Then, the concept of human error was 
discussed. It has been exposed that such a concept is meaningless and elusive that hinders the 
examination of various conditions, pressures, conflicting goals, trade-offs in decision making, 
etc. that may lead to an outcome.  
The remainder of the Chapter was devoted to the resilience engineering concept. It has been 
found that most definitions of resilience refer to an ability to face some threats, changes, or 
unexpected situations expecting as a result a positive outcome. After that, performance 
variability was thoroughly addressed. It has been shown that systems are underspecified due to 
a combination of multiple factors implying approximate adjustments based on trade-offs made 
in daily activities. It has also been shown that systems can be characterised by abilities to 
perform daily work to achieve objectives that make them resilient, namely the ability to 
respond, monitor, anticipate, and learn to which the ability to transform is added. Eventually, it 
has been shown that it is necessary to move from following the ALARP principle to adopt the 
principle of AHRAP and measure system performance through the measurement of its abilities. 
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3.4.2. The Way Ahead 
The first part of this thesis dealt with a review of relevant literature and theoretical background 
covering the key important issues of this research work that have been tackled by some 
researchers. This addressed objective 1 of this research work. 
The literature review revealed that despite the significant amount of money spent to reduce the 
rate of accidents, people continue to be injured and/or killed in the workplace. It also revealed 
that maintenance tasks are one of the major contributors to industrial accidents. However, the 
impact of poor maintenance on industrial accidents has not been adequately examined in the oil 
and gas sector and research in the area of human factors in the maintenance in this industry is 
limited. Moreover, it has been shown that more powerful, non-linear models, based on system 
theory and resilience engineering, are needed. This approach was found the appropriate way to 
address the management of safety. However, there is a need to bridge the gap that exists 
between theory and practice of resilience engineering.  
 
In this thesis, resilience engineering has been defined as the approach that engineers (plan for, 
design, and build) practices to identify and implement strategies that make a system AHRAP.  
The remainder of this study addresses the different components of this definition and remedy 
the limited number of studies in the oil and gas industry by exploring the maintenance system 
of the national oil and gas Company, developing, and validating a tool that measures the 
resilience of this system. 
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 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
4.1. Introduction 
This Chapter is devoted to outline the chosen research strategy to achieve the aim and objectives 
of this work. The research process is dealt with in Section 4.1. The class of research and the 
research strategy are introduced in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. In Section 4.5, the most 
common paradigms underpinning a research strategy are described and the reasons for the 
paradigm choice for this study are explained. Section 4.6 addresses the research design. The 
adopted methodology and the selected methods are presented in Section 4.7. Data collection 
and analysis are given in Section 4.8. The ethical issues and considerations are discussed in 
Section 4.9. Section 4.10 summarises this Chapter. 
4.2. The Research Process 
Three phases have been designed to carry out this piece of research. Phase one was concerned 
by the theoretical part of the study. Phase two related to the empirical studies. Phase three 
addressed the validation and testing part. Figure 4.2 shows the three stages of the research 
process. 
 
Figure 1-9 : The research process 
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4.2.1. Stage One 
Stage one involved building the foundations of this study. It includes Chapters 1 to 4 that 
comprise the introduction, the theoretical background to the study, and the research strategy. 
The theoretical background to the study encompassed three themes. Firstly, an overview of the 
management of safety was given. A critical review of the conventional approach to the 
management of safety was carried out and the main limitations of traditional risk assessment 
techniques and accident causation models were addressed. Secondly, the impact of maintenance 
activities on safety was critically reviewed. Thirdly, the resilience engineering concepts and 
precepts were explored. The research strategy emanating from the literature review was then 
designed. 
4.2.2. Stage Two 
This stage covered the empirical studies based on resilience engineering. First, the maintenance 
system of SONATRACH was explored. A study of the maintenance environment was carried 
out by means of the Maintenance Environment Questionnaire to identify Human factors 
inherent in such activities and a functional analysis was performed to show the complexity of 
the maintenance system by the FRAM method; this was completed by storytelling. Then a 
strategy to achieve safety excellence in the maintenance of SONATRACH facilities and the 
required tool, the MAintenance System Resilience Assessment Tool, MASRAT, which 
measures the resilience of the maintenance system to achieve this goal, was outlined. This is 
reported respectively in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, part 1. 
4.2.3. Stage Three 
Stage three concerned the validation and testing phase of MASRAT. The content validity and 
reliability of the tool regarding the most significant human factors identified by this study 
including field-testing to get psychometric information to validate the tool was addressed. This 
is reported in Chapter 6, part 2. Then the field-testing of the tool by means of expert panel in a 
workshop arranged in three ateliers to study the three significant human factors identified in 
stage two was evaluated; this is reported in Chapter 7. 
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4.3. The Class of Research in the Research Process 
In the research process, there are five main elements to consider which are linked together as 
shown in Figure 4.1 (adapted from Walliman, 2011). It shows the way these elements are 
interrelated and particularly displays the central role of the research theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-10 : The research process (adapted from Walliman, 2011) 
It is worth beginning by defining the word research itself. According to Singh (2006), research 
seeks to answer questions that have not been answered so far. For Crawford (cited in Singh, 
2006, p.3), research is defined as a “systematic and refined technique of thinking, employing 
specialised tools, instruments and procedures in order to obtain a more adequate solution of the 
problem than would be possible under ordinary means. It starts with a problem, collects data or 
facts, analyses them critically and researches decisions based on the actual evidence”. 
Research may be applied or basic. Whereas basic research focuses on fundamental principles 
and testing theories, applied research uses the data directly for real world application (Hale, 
2011). The former is generally called pure research and targets for instance a general 
phenomenon; it may be considered as a starting point to gain and expand knowledge. The latter 
is oriented towards finding solutions to a specific issue by using available knowledge. Starting 
from the current situation in the maintenance of oil and gas assets characterised by activities 
that are accidents prone where human factors play an important role, the research work was 
oriented toward finding the appropriate way to approaching the problem. The theoretical 
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background, a systemic approach based on resilience engineering played therefore the central 
role in this study. Accordingly, this research work is applied research oriented.  
4.4. The Research Strategy 
To guide the work, a research strategy must be adopted. It consists of choices leading to answer 
the research question and achieve the aim of the research. These choices start by identifying the 
philosophy underpinning the study through a set of beliefs known as the research paradigm that 
guides the design of the research and permits choosing the research methodology. The methods 
applied in this study, data collection and analysis as well as the presentation of findings are 
selected according to the methodology adopted. Ethical issues and considerations are then 
discussed. All these choices are outlined in the following sections and the reasons for a 
particular choice are given. 
4.5. The Research Paradigm 
Saunders et al. (2009) defines research philosophy as an over-arching term relating to the 
development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge. It contains important assumptions 
about the way in which the world is viewed. Bogdan and Bikken (2003) and Mertens (2005) 
see the research paradigm as the theoretical framework underpinning a research study. Creswell 
(2009) uses worldviews instead of paradigm and classifies paradigms into two major ones: 
quantitative and qualitative; any paradigm falls into one of them. Qualitative research copes 
with exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or 
human problem while the other is a means for testing objective theories by examining the 
relationship among variables (Creswell 2009). However, a researcher may combine or associate 
them so that the overall strengths of a study is greater (Creswell, 2009).  
In the following sections, the most used paradigms are described so that the current research 
can be placed into its theoretical context. The subsequently arising methodology (how the 
current research was practically carried out) is explained and the way in which the data was 
gathered and analysed is detailed. 
4.5.1. Positivism 
According to Creswell (2009), positivist and post-positivist worldview are the same and are 
sometimes called the scientific method since it has represented the traditional form of research. 
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Post-positivism replaced positivism after World War II (Mertens, 2005). This worldview is 
called post-positivism because it represents the thinking after positivism (Creswell, 2009). 
Based on the deterministic philosophy of August Comte, it narrows down the ideas into some 
small and discrete set ones to test (variables comprising hypothesis and research questions), it 
develops knowledge based on careful empirical observation and measurement of the real world, 
and eventually theories are tested or verified and refined (Creswell, 2009).  
The aim of this deterministic philosophy is to observe directly, measure quantitatively and 
predict objectively the relationships between studied variables (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). 
For Macleod (2009), positivism is linked to the real world, a world of science and testing 
hypothesis, where sources of bias are minimised wherever it is possible and researchers are 
objective. It deals with the real world and can be demonstrated by significant statistic numbers. 
It uses therefore a quantitative analysis method. For Mackenzie and Knipe (2006), positivism 
and post-positivism research is most commonly aligned with quantitative methods of data 
collection and analysis. 
4.5.2. Constructivism 
As its name says, there is a kind of construction of own reality by individuals in contrast with 
the positivism paradigm. For constructivists, individuals seek at finding meanings and 
understanding of the world in which they live and work (Creswell, 2009). The researcher listens 
carefully to what people say and do in their life by using open-ended questions (Creswell, 
2009). People may construct the same reality in quite different ways (Macleod, 2009). A theory 
or pattern is generated or inductively developed in the constructivist approach by contrast to 
the positivist one. The goal of constructivist research is to understanding and structuring, as 
opposed to predicting (Macleod, 2009).  Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) associate constructivism 
with interpretivism. For Mackenzie and Knipe (2006, citing Cohen and Manion, and Mertens), 
the constructivist/interpretivist approaches aim at understanding the world of human experience 
(Cohen and Manion, 1994) and suggesting that reality is socially constructed (Mertens, 2005). 
Qualitative data collection methods and analysis are most likely used or mixed methods 
(Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006) 
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4.5.3. Pragmatism 
A study may be more quantitative than qualitative or vice versa (Creswell, 2009). Researchers 
may find that the use of both designs provides a better understanding of the studied problem. 
They seek a kind of freedom to choose methods that may strengthen the research by taking 
benefit of the advantages of any method. The philosophy underpinning such an approach is 
called pragmatism. According to Creswell (2009), it is problem centred and real world oriented. 
It provides a philosophical basis of research that is not committed to anyone system of 
philosophy and reality where the researchers are free to choose methods, techniques, and 
procedures of research that best meet their needs and purposes (Creswell, 2009). According to 
Creswell (2009), pragmatism is the philosophy that underpins mixed methods where 
investigators use both qualitative and quantitative data because they work to provide the best 
understanding of a research problem. The research work benefits in fine from the advantages 
of any method used to make the study stronger.  
4.5.4. Critical Theory 
This paradigm looks at power relations, politics, and patterns of dominance (Macleod, 2009). 
As a result, it does not concern the subject of this research, thus it is not developed.  
4.5.5. Paradigm Choice 
There are three major ways of thinking that guide a research namely ontology, epistemology 
and methodology; Creswell (2009) added axiological and rhetorical, that is respectively the role 
of values and the language of research (see table 4.1).  
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Table 1-5: Ways of thinking guiding a research (adapted from Creswell, 2009) 
Assumption Question Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontological 
What is the 
nature of 
reality? 
Reality is objective and 
singular, apart from the 
researcher 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple and seen by 
participants in a study 
Epistemological 
What is the 
relationship of 
the researcher 
to that 
researched? 
Researcher is independent 
from that being researched 
Researcher interacts with 
that being researched 
Axiological 
What is the role 
of values? 
 
Value-free and unbiased Value-laden and biased 
Rhetorical 
What is the 
language of 
research? 
Formal based on set 
definitions, impersonal 
voice, use of accepted 
quantitative words 
Informal, evolving 
decisions, personal voice, 
accepted qualitative 
words 
Methodological 
What is the 
process of 
research? 
Deductive process 
Cause and effect 
Generalisations leading to 
predictions, explanation, 
and understanding 
Accurate and reliable 
through validity and 
reliability (testing) 
Inductive process 
Mutual simultaneous 
shaping of factors 
Patterns and theories 
developed for 
understanding 
Accurate and reliable 
through verification 
 
Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999) defined the three major ways respectively by the 
specification of the nature of the reality to be studied, the specification of the nature of the 
relationship between the researcher and what can be known, and the practical way in which the 
researcher goes about doing the research.  
The choice of a paradigm sets down the intent, motivation and expectations for the research 
(Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). If a paradigm is not nominated at first step, there will be no basis 
for any subsequent choices concerning the methodology, methods, literature or research design 
(Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). Quoting Bogdan and Bikken (2003), (Mackenzie and Knipe, 
2006, p 194.) define a paradigm as “a loose collection of logically related assumptions, 
concepts, or propositions that orient thinking and research”.  
There are many reasons to choose a paradigm. For Creswell (2009), they include worldview or 
assumptions of each paradigm, training and experience, psychological attributes, nature of the 
problem, and audience for the study. Table 4.2 reproduces and explains these reasons. 
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Table 1-6: Reasons for choosing a paradigm (adapted from Creswell, 2009) 
Criteria Quantitative paradigm Qualitative paradigm 
Researcher’s 
worldview 
A researcher’s comfort with 
assumptions of the quantitative 
paradigm 
A researcher’s comfort with 
assumptions of the qualitative 
paradigm 
Training and 
experience of 
the researcher 
Technical writing skills 
Computer statistical skills 
Library skills 
Literary writing skills 
Computer text- analysis skills 
Library analysis skills 
The 
researcher’s 
psychological 
attributes 
Comfort with rules and guidelines 
for conducting research 
Low tolerance for ambiguity 
Time for a study of short duration 
Comfort with lack of specific rules 
and procedures for conducting 
research 
High tolerance for ambiguity, may 
lack lengthy study 
Nature of the 
problem 
Previously studied by other 
researches so that the body of 
literature exists, is known along 
with the variables, and existing 
theories 
Exploratory research, variables 
unknown, context important, may 
lack theory base for study 
Audience for 
the study  
Individuals accustomed to 
supportive of quantitative studies 
Individuals accustomed to 
supportive of qualitative studies 
 
This research work aims at developing an approach based on resilience engineering to achieve 
safety excellence in the maintenance of oil and gas assets. It is considered as an applied research 
in contrast to a basic on; it narrows down this topic from a general application of resilience 
engineering to a more specific one tailored to the maintenance of oil and gas assets.  
In addition, the following elements are taken into consideration to choose the research 
paradigm. 
 Way of thinking guiding the research: reality is both objective from the researcher and 
subjective from the participants particularly during the workshop is presented in Chapter 
7. Furthermore, the researcher is independent from that being researched and interacts 
with it (see Chapter 7); the methodology adopted, as argued in section 4.7, is deductive 
and context bound. The way of thinking guiding this research is quantitative but it 
contains also some qualitative approach as discussed in section 4.8. 
 Reasons for choosing the paradigm: there is a comfort with regard to the way of thinking 
as described above and the assumptions of each paradigm (quantitative and qualitative 
paradigm) as well as the rules and guidelines for conducting this research. In addition, 
human factors in maintenance activities are studied in other industries such as aviation 
and nuclear in comparison to the oil and gas sector as it has been shown in Chapter 2. 
This constituted an exploratory aspect. On the other hand, resilience engineering is a 
powerful approach that needs more exploration in the oil and gas industry. 
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Accordingly, the research paradigm chosen was pragmatism. It allowed the freedom of choice 
for the most appropriate methods that can be used to achieve aim and objectives of this research. 
It is a quantitative approach as well as a qualitative one dealing with the human part of the 
complex studied system. 
4.6. The Research Design 
According to Yin (2009), a research design deals with a logical problem and not a logistical 
problem. It is therefore a clear thinking based on a philosophical approach that allows setting 
the strategy and the way of conducting the research. It is not just a work plan; it is directly 
linked to the research questions to ensure finding answers as clear as possible. It is not related 
to a particular method of data collection; it is a logical task undertaken to ensure that the 
evidence collected enables the researcher to answer questions or to test theories as 
unambiguously as possible. The identification of type of evidence required to answer the 
research question is also essential when designing research (Kirshenblatt-Gimblet 2006). 
There are actually many types of research design. The most important ones (among them those 
that could be used in this research) are briefly outlined in table 4.3. 
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Table 1-7: Types of research design 
Research design Meaning and uses 
Philosophical design 
(Maykut, 1994) 
Based on philosophical analysis and argumentation, it is a broad 
approach rather than a methodological design which critically 
explores the relevance of logic and evidence in academic debates. It 
has limited application to specific research problem 
Observational design 
(Patton, 2002; 
Rosenbaum, 2010) 
Used to compare subjects against a control group. It can be direct or 
unobtrusive observation. It is useful for discovering what may be 
important before applying other methods like experiments. It may 
reflect a unique sample population; thus it cannot be generalised to 
other groups (low data reliability). 
Longitudinal design 
(Ployhart and 
Vandenberg, 2010; 
Anastas, 1999) 
In this approach, researchers make repeated observations by doing 
the same sample over time. It is also referred to as a panel study.  
 
Cross-sectional 
design (Barrat and 
Kirwan, 2009) 
Focuses on finding relationships between variables at one moment in 
time whereas longitudinal design involves taking multiple measures 
over an extended period of time. 
Historical design 
(Gall et al, 2007) 
Aims at collecting, verifying, and synthesising evidence from the 
past. 
Exploratory design 
(Brown, 2006) 
 
Used when there are few or no earlier studies to refer to. It may 
determine the nature of the problem, the feasibility of the study in 
question in the future and help gain background information on a 
particular topic but the findings are often not generalizable. 
Experimental design 
(Anastas, 1999 
Enables the researcher to maintain control over all factors that may 
affect the results of an experiment. It allows identifying cause-effects 
relationships between variables. On the other hand, results of such 
studies may not generalise well to the real world. 
Descriptive design 
(Anastas, 1999) 
Used to obtain information concerning the current status of the 
phenomena and to describe “what exists” with respect to variables in 
a situation. 
 
Moreover, the case study design (Anastas, 1999; Hancock and Algozzine, 2006; Yin, 2009), on 
which this study is mainly based, is presented deeper in the following.  
The case study design is seen as an in-depth study of a particular research problem by 
conducting an empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its natural context 
using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). More often, it addresses a phenomenon studied 
in its natural context, bounded by space and time. It is richly descriptive and the information is 
explored and mined in the case study environment for a more thorough examination of the given 
phenomenon. Used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one or a few easily 
researchable examples, the case study research design is also useful for testing whether a 
specific theory and model actually applies to phenomena in the real world. It is a useful design 
when not much is known about a phenomenon. A case study design can apply a variety of 
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methodologies and rely on a variety of sources to investigate a research problem. It is generally 
more exploratory than confirmatory in comparison to experimental research. 
Furthermore, mixed methods approach may be sequential or concurrent. In the former, 
researchers look for expanding on the findings of one method to another one whereas for the 
latter, the researcher converges or merges quantitative and qualitative in order to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the research problem (Creswell, 2009) 
The study of human factors in the maintenance of oil and gas industry is limited in comparison 
to the aviation and nuclear sectors as stated in Chapter 2. Exploratory design therefore helped 
gain information on this topic by the identification of inherent human factors and their impact 
on safety as it is developed in Chapter 5 in the study of the maintenance environment. Using 
the developed tool, MASRAT (see Chapter 6), description to obtain information on what exists 
with respect to the three most important human factors studied (resources, time-pressure, and 
supervision/coordination) were dealt with. Finally, yet importantly, most of this research work 
was a case study that looks in-depth at the way to implement a resilience engineering based 
approach in the maintenance of oil and gas assets to achieve safety excellence (see Chapter 7). 
This was done by investigating the maintenance activities within their natural context and 
narrowing down to the three most significant human factors. 
In addition, testing MASRAT necessitated an evaluation. There is increasing recognition of the 
inherent complexity of implementing research into practice. According to Worthen and Sanders 
(1987), evaluation is a formal or disciplined approach to examine the value of a program based 
not only on its outcomes but also on its context, inputs, processes and procedures, and products. 
For Taylor-Powel (2003), a researcher must ask certain questions while performing an 
evaluation. They include: 
 What is the purpose of the evaluation?  
 What are the circumstances surrounding the program? 
 What resources are available for the evaluation? 
 What accountability is required? 
 What knowledge generation is expected or desired? 
Evaluation can be formative and/or summative. Formative evaluation is defined as a rigorous 
assessment process designed to identify potential and actual influences on the progress and 
effectiveness of implementation efforts while summative evaluation as a systematic process of 
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collecting data on the impacts, outputs, products, or outcomes hypothesized in a study (Stetler 
et al., 2006)). This is to find out whether issues may arise during the process of implementation 
and make the correct adjustments for the former and to provide information on the degree of 
success, effectiveness, or goal achievement of an implementation program that is to know 
whether the program has met the assigned goals or not for the latter. In other words, summative 
evaluation allows to prove and adopt a program whereas formative evaluation permits improve 
a programme. Table 4.4 gives potential uses of formative evaluation. 
Table 1-8: Potential uses of formative evaluation (adapted from Stetler et al, 2006) 
Potential uses of formative evaluation 
Understand the nature of the local implementation setting 
Assess whether a program or intervention addresses a significant need 
Modify a proposed program or intervention, as needed 
Determine the extent, fidelity, and qualities of the implementation of an intervention 
program...(e.g.) to describe the activities actually implemented...(and) ...explain program 
operations 
Systematically detect and monitor unanticipated events (and adjust if appropriate) 
Optimise/control implementation to improve the potential for success 
Document continual progress 
Inform future similar implementation efforts 
Understand the extent/dose, consistency, usefulness, context, and quality of an 
intervention’s implementation 
Understand the nature and implications of local adaptations 
Understand the experience of those directly affected by implementation efforts 
 
 
There are various uses of formative evaluation for implementation research associated to each 
stage of the research that is, developmental, implementation-focused, progress-focused, and 
interpretive (Stetler et al, 2006).  
A collection of relevant data was performed to build judgments about MASRAT regarding its 
improvement; this was done by means of a formative evaluation and/or to prove its 
appropriateness carried out by means of a summative evaluation. In this study, both formative 
and summative evaluations were used as argued in the following section with respect to data 
collection methods. 
4.7. Methodology 
This research work was applied research oriented, deductive and context bound. Human factors 
in the maintenance of oil and gas assets are not studied in comparison to other industries such 
as aviation and nuclear as it has been shown in Chapter 2. On the other hand, resilience 
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engineering is a powerful approach that needs more exploration in the oil and gas industry. This 
constituted an exploratory aspect. 
The research paradigm chosen was pragmatism. It allowed the freedom of choice for the most 
appropriate methods that can be used to achieve aim and objectives of this research. The way 
of thinking guiding this research was a quantitative approach as well as a qualitative one dealing 
with the human part of the complex studied system.  
Exploratory design helped gain information on this topic by the identification of inherent human 
factors and their impact on safety. Using MASRAT (see Chapter 7), information on what exists 
with respect to the three most important studied human factors (resources, time-pressure, and 
supervision/coordination) was obtained. This research work was a case study. MASRAT has 
been developed to look in-depth at the way to implement a resilience engineering based 
approach in the maintenance of oil and gas assets to achieve safety excellence. This was done 
by investigating the maintenance activities within their natural context and narrowing down to 
the three most significant human factors. 
Table 1-9: The research methodology 
Class of research  Applied research 
Paradigm Pragmatism 
Aim & objectives Descriptive Explorative 
Way of thinking 
Quantitative 
Qualitative  
Deductive and context bound 
Design Case study Exploratory 
Implementation evaluation and 
field testing 
Formative 
Summative 
Chosen methodology Mixed methods approach 
 
Besides, testing the tool necessitated an evaluation. In this study, both formative and summative 
evaluations were used. A summary of the adopted methodology is given in table 4.5. As a result, 
mixed methods approach was applied in this study. 
4.8. Data Collection and Analysis 
This section deals with data collection and analysis. First, data requirements are addressed. 
From each of the objectives set in Chapter 1, research questions, research methods, and 
variables are identified. Then, the chosen data collection methods for each objective are 
- 76 - 
 
explained. Eventually, the analysis of data is specified through a content validity and a 
reliability analysis. 
4.8.1. Data Requirements 
The research strategy adopted in this thesis is based on the context of SONATRACH (Chapter 
1) and relevant elements taken from the literature review. In Chapter 1, the different entities 
that constitute the company were described along with the relationships that exist between them. 
There are two kinds of data required to ensure achieving the objectives set so that the aim of 
this research work is attained. First, the theoretical background that made the concepts, models, 
and methods clearer was taken from the literature review and based on resilience engineering 
concepts and precepts. Then, the empirical study designed to fill in the gap between the 
resilience engineering approach theory and its practice was considered. The first part has 
already been tackled in Chapters 2 and 3. The empirical part comprised review and analysis of 
available documentation, interviews, expert panel testing, and field visits and observations.  
The maintenance system was explored through the analysis of the maintenance system 
documentation and processes, interviews with maintenance staff, questionnaires, field 
observations, functional analysis, and storytelling. This was done to find out how the system is 
organised, how it is linked to other departments, and how the activities affect the safety of 
facilities. As a result, a snapshot of daily activities regarding variables such as resources 
(available and easy to obtain), time pressure, supervision, coordination, defences, and fatigue 
was taken; and a profile comparing the maintenance system of oil and gas assets with other 
industries was drawn.  
On the other hand, this study provided with data concerning the contribution of maintenance 
activities to achieve goals successfully as well as the activities that may lead to failures and 
determine critical human factors. Besides, it delivered information about the complexity of such 
systems along with sources of performance variability.  
Based on resilience engineering concepts and precepts stemming from the inherent literature 
review, a strategy to reach safety excellence in the maintenance of oil and gas facilities was 
designed through a gap analysis, questionnaires, and interviews with maintenance staff. To 
achieve this objective, a framework was developed. Resilience of the maintenance system was 
assessed to serve as a diagnosis of current situation by the determination of a maturity level and 
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maintenance department profiles according to the four cornerstones of resilience: ability to 
respond, to monitor, to anticipate, and to learn (see Chapter 4), and to design strategies for 
improvement in a continuous way. 
Based on the analysis of required information taken from related literature review and 
interviews of maintenance staff and HSE practitioners, MASRAT was outlined to measure the 
resilience of the system. The questions (statements) were then written accordingly.  
Afterwards, MASRAT was tested and validated by means of congruency and principal 
components analysis, and Cronbach’s alpha to determine respectively its content validity and 
reliability. An expert panel testing was carried out to test the usability of the tool where the four 
cornerstones of resilience are examined in three ateliers according to the critical human factors 
identified during the exploratory study.  
For daily activities snapshot, the use of the Maintenance Environment Questionnaire imposed 
the retention characteristic of the data collected since the 36 questions begin with “At work in 
the last six months, on average, how often have you…” 
To analyse the successful contribution of the maintenance system to achieve goals, there should 
be documented data. Actually, this is not the case; the only way to access such pieces of 
information is by means of storytelling. Therefore, the maintenance staff was approached by 
directed questions. People were asked to describe actions that necessitated local adjustments 
without which negative outcomes would have occurred but fortunately such actions have 
successfully ended and goals have been achieved. These actions are those that have been 
performed with lack of resources, or time, or competence, or knowledge, or altogether.  
The only documented actions are those that ended by an incident/accident where investigations 
have been carried out without having access to reports; the only available data are numbers. For 
the study of archival data where data are available, ten years were found acceptable. 
After the validation of the tool, data requirements currency should be current maturity level 
measurement each month where the inputs are: 
 A review of available records,  
 Past interviews,  
 Focus groups in the form of ateliers,  
 Anonymous questionnaires,  
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 Comments about existing and collected data, and  
 Decisions about what users really do, what they use, and what they need. 
 A summary of data requirements is given in table 4.6. 
Table 1-10: Data requirements 
Objectives  Research questions Research 
methods 
Variables  
Explore the 
maintenance 
working 
environment of 
SONATRACH 
How is the maintenance system 
organised? 
How is the maintenance 
department linked to other 
departments? 
How are daily activities in the 
maintenance department 
performed? 
What are the impacts of 
maintenance activities on safety? 
How often accidents/incidents 
occur due to maintenance 
activities?  
How often maintenance activities 
contribute to achieve goals 
successfully? 
What are the main critical human 
factors in maintenance? 
In comparison to other industries, 
what is the profile of 
SONATRACH maintenance 
system? 
How complex is the maintenance 
system in SONATRACH? 
What sources of performance 
variability can be found in the 
maintenance system of 
SONATRACH? 
How functions are linked together 
and how do they interact? 
 
 
Analysis of 
maintenance 
system 
documentation 
and process 
Interview with 
maintenance 
staff 
Questionnaire 
Functional 
analysis 
Field 
observations 
 
 
 
Nature of 
maintenance 
activities 
Types of 
maintenance 
Staff experience 
Structure of the 
organisation 
Snapshot of daily 
activities for the 
last six months 
with respect to 
parameters such as 
resources, time 
pressure, defences, 
supervision, 
coordination, 
fatigue, etc. 
Things that went 
wrong 
Things that went 
right 
Profile comparison 
 
 
Identify a strategy 
based on 
resilience 
engineering to 
achieve safety 
excellence in the 
maintenance 
system of 
SONATRACH 
What framework may allow to 
achieve safety excellence in the 
maintenance system of 
SONATRACH? 
How can current situation be 
assessed? 
How can the resilience of the 
maintenance system be measured? 
How can the different profiles of 
the maintenance system of 
SONATRACH be identified? 
How can strategies for 
improvement be designed? 
 
Framework  
Gap analysis 
Questionnaire 
Interview with 
maintenance 
staff 
 
 
Current situation 
level of maturity 
Four cornerstones 
of resilience 
Maintenance 
system profiles 
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Data requirements (continued) 
Objectives  Research questions Research 
methods 
Variables  
 
Outline a tool to 
measure the 
resilience of the 
maintenance 
system of 
SONATRACH 
 
 
What tool can be developed to 
measure the maintenance system 
of SONATRACH? 
 
Analysis of 
required 
information to 
fulfil the aim and 
objectives from 
the literature and 
interview 
Writing the 
questions 
(statements) 
Questionnaire 
Four cornerstones 
of resilience 
Test and validate 
the tool 
What kind of validation is 
required? 
 
Carry out a 
content validity 
analysis 
Carry out a 
reliability 
analysis 
Structured 
interviews 
Expert panel 
testing 
Semi-structured 
interviews with 
participants and 
facilitators 
 
Congruency 
Principal 
component analysis 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Current situation 
level of maturity 
Four cornerstones 
of resilience 
Maintenance system 
profiles 
Next level of 
maturity 
 
 
 
4.8.2. Data Collection 
The data that should be collected and the way to collect them must be first specified. Then, the 
data collection procedures are identified. Data may be primary (that has been collected for the 
first time) or secondary (that comes from other researches or from manuals and reports, etc.). 
In this study, both were used. Data may be collected from three main sources: documents, 
observations, and interviews.  
Yin (2009) identified six sources of data collection including documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts. Yin (2009) 
showed strengths and limitations of the six sources (table 4.8); if three principles relevant to all 
six sources are followed, then maximum benefits are yielded. The three principles of data 
collection linked to concepts such as reliability, triangulation, and quality control are: (1) the 
use of multiple sources, (2) the creation of a case study database of materials for later use by 
the researcher or interested others, and (3) the maintenance of a chain of evidence.  
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Table 1-11: Strengths and weaknesses of six sources of data (adapted from Yin, 2009) 
Source of 
evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation 
 Stable-can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
 Unobtrusive-not created as a 
result of the case study 
 Exact-contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
event 
 Broad coverage-long span of 
time, many events, and 
many settings 
 Retrievability- can be low 
 Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
 Reporting bias-reflects 
(unknown) bias of authors 
 Access- may be deliberately 
blocked  
 
Archival 
records 
 Same as above for 
documentation 
 Precise and quantitative 
 Same as above for 
documentation 
 Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Interviews 
 Targeted- focuses directly 
on case study topic 
 Insightful- provides 
perceived causal inferences 
 Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
 Response bias 
 Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
 Reflexivity- interviewer wants to 
hear 
Direct 
observations 
 Reality- covers events in real 
time 
 Contextual- covers context 
of event 
 Time consuming 
 Selectivity- unless broad 
coverage 
 Reflexivity- event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
 Cost- hours needed by human 
observers 
Participant-
observation 
 Same as above for direct 
observation 
 Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
 Same as above for direct 
observation 
 Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical 
artifacts 
 Insightful into cultural 
features 
 Insightful into technical 
operations 
 Selectivity 
 Availability  
 
Accordingly, except physical artefacts, all the remaining sources were used in this research 
work.  
The study dealt with the identification of strategies to improve current resilience maturity level 
of the maintenance system. It identified first the human factors in the maintenance environment 
of oil and gas assets. A variety of data collection methods could be used. Among these methods, 
observations, interviews, questionnaires, and quantitative performance or achievements were 
used to perform the evaluation.  
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To address the lack of data within SONATRACH, the impact of maintenance working 
environment on plant safety was investigated by adapting Hobbs’ MEQ. The objective of the 
questionnaire is to gather information regarding the workplace conditions that promote unsafe 
acts as well as defences designed to manage human-induced hazards. By defences, the authors 
meant system elements that are intended to detect maintenance errors (Hobbs and Tada, 2006).  
The choice of such a tool was actually done to overcome the lack of data due to poor recording 
of failures, lack of trend analysis, poor communication, and blame and production driven 
organisational culture. The questionnaire was tested to determine its reliability and construct 
validity by means of Cronbach’s alpha and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This analysis 
was performed on data collected in 2006 in English speaking countries (see Hobbs and Tada, 
2006). On the other hand, the Functional Resonance Analysis Method, FRAM, which has been 
introduced in section 1.2.2, is an opportunity to explore how work is actually performed in real 
world by carrying out a functional analysis; therefore, it was used to perform a functional 
analysis. Storytelling was the third chosen method to explore the maintenance system 
environment.  
Following this, the design of the required tool in the form of a questionnaire was the next step. 
The methodology that has been adopted to design the questionnaire included writing items and 
assembling/organising them. A number of principles have been taken into account during this 
design phase. They included the following. The wording of the questions/statements must be 
as clear and concise as possible about what is being studied. According to Lietz (2010), a 
general advice is to keep questions/statements as short as possible so that respondents’ 
comprehension is increased. In addition, for Lietz (2010), maximum number of 16 words for 
each sentence (according to Brinslin, 1986) or 20 words for each sentence (citing Oppenheim, 
1992) for English language, active rather passive voice, specific rather than general words, and 
the use of adverbs of frequency are recommended. Besides, it is not good practice to use 
negatively worded questions (Lietz, 2010).  
Afterwards, field test for psychometric information needed to validate the tool was carried out 
to determine content validity and reliability. This was followed by a workshop to test the 
usability of MASRAT by experts from SONATRACH (Chapter 7). The use of questionnaires, 
interviews, documents, and observation were therefore the sources of data collection. 
These activities required evaluation as stated previously. The main concerns were seeking (1) 
the implementation goal (s), (2) the activities during the implementation process, and (3) the 
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values expected from the implementation. The information needed during the field test included 
to know if the tool was workable for the users in real world as well as if it achieved the goals 
for which it has been designed. 
4.8.3. Data Analysis 
There are actually two parts in analysing the data collected (notwithstanding the secondary data 
needed retrieved from the state of art literature review). The first part consisted of analysing the 
data collected to validate MASRAT, the developed tool. The methods used are explained in 
Section 4.8.4. It included a content validity analysis using item-objective congruence performed 
with a panel of experts (in this case, an index of congruency was computed to determine content 
validity) and principal component analysis. Then a reliability analysis was performed. SPSS 
software was used for the two last tests.  
The second part concerned the analysis of MASRAT testing in a workshop where a panel 
composed of maintenance managers and engineers representing the main branches of the 
Company were invited to apply the tool. The analysis of findings was performed to find out 
whether the tool was workable for the users in real world as well as if it achieved the goals for 
which it was designed.  
4.8.4. Validation 
4.8.4.1. Content Validity 
i. The Index of Item-Objective Congruence 
The first operation consisted of a content validity. An efficient way to measure the assessment 
made by a panel of experts is the use of the index of item-objective congruence according to 
Turner and Carlson (2003). “This is a process by which content experts rate individual items 
based on the degree to which they measure specific objectives listed by the test developer” 
(Turner and Carlson, 2003, p. 164). The method consisted of measuring the adequacy of the 32 
statements (representing the items, see Chapter 6 for more details) for three (03) factors and 
four (4) objectives (the cornerstones of resilience engineering). This was performed by giving 
the statement a score of +1 when the statement clearly measures the objective for each factor, -
1 when clearly does not measuring the objective for each factor, or 0 degree to which its 
measure of the content area is unclear (the expert is undecided or uncertain). Factors and 
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objectives are given in Table 4.9. For each statement, the expert attributed a value to each 
objective. An index ranging from -1 to +1 was then computed according to panel expert 
responses using equation (1) developed by Rovinelli and Hambleton (1977); a value of +1 
indicates that all experts agree that the item is clearly measuring that objective (Turner and 
Carlson (2003). See Chapter 6 for more details. 
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Where: 
Iik is the index of item-objective congruence for item k on objective i, N is the number of 
objectives (i = 1, 2… N), n is the number of content specialists (j = 1, 2 … n), and  
Xijk is the rating (1, 0, –1) of item k as a measure of objective i by content specialist j  
Table 1-12 : Factors and objectives 
Studied factors 
1. Resources 
2. Time pressure 
3. Supervision/coordination 
Objectives (aspects) 
Ability to respond: know what to do 
Ability to flexibly monitor: know what to look for 
Ability to anticipate: know what to expect 
Ability to learn: know to learn from past experiences 
 
ii. Principle Component Analysis Approach 
This analysis was carried out in order to test whether the items (statements) of MASRAT 
actually measure that for which they have been designed and to review these items according 
to the feedback and the statistic study. In other words, the objectives of this action were as 
follows: 
 Do the set of items designed to measure for instance “the ability to respond” actually do 
it? (The same is performed for the other sets) 
 What could be changed in the four sets of items according to the feedback and statistics 
data so that they can achieve what was intended? 
According to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), principal components analysis (PCA) and factor 
analysis (FA) are used by researchers to discover which variables in the set form coherent 
subsets that are relatively independent of one another by means of statistical techniques that are 
applied to a single set of variables; in other words, variables that are correlated with one another 
but largely independent of other subsets of variables are combined into factors. These methods 
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are carried out to confirm/explore to what extent items (variables) in the assessment are 
correlated.  
To conduct a PCA method, it is required to follow steps including (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007): 
 The selection and measurement of a set of variables,  
 The preparation of the correlation matrix,  
 The extraction of a set of factors from the correlation matrix,  
 The determination of the number of factors,  
 The rotation of the factors to increase interpretability, and, finally,  
 The interpretation of the results.  
 
 
In the following, the steps carried out are given in more details. 
a. Assumption of Normality 
The first step of analysing a set of data is the assumption of normality. This can be performed 
by running Skewness and Kurtosis tests. Values for departure from normality, hence dismissal 
of variables, are given in the literature. For instance, West et al (1996) recommended an 
absolute skew value above two and an absolute kurtosis value above seven and Ferguson and 
Cox (1993), a cut-off of +/- 2 for both values. Neither Skewness values nor Kurtosis ones 
suggested any dismissal of variables; Skewness values ranged from -0.450 to 0.474 and 
Kurtosis ones ranged from -0.877 to 0.440. According to Henson and Roberts (2006), a 
correlation matrix is the most used by researchers in factor analysis. For the set of data studied, 
the correlation matrix showed a large number of correlations above 0.300.  
b. The Factorability of Data  
In this section, sample size requirement for factor analysis is addressed. There is a debate among 
statisticians about the accepted size of a sample for analysis. For Hale et al (1998), the more 
acceptable sample size would have a ratio of 10:1 and the minimum is a ratio of 5:1. In other 
words, the sample would have a number of respondents at least five times the number of 
variables to be accepted.  
Before performing a factor analysis, two statistic tests should be carried out: the Kaiser-Meyer 
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The factorability 
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of data is regarded through these two tests to determine the strength of the relationship among 
the studied items. For Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), a KMO value above 0.6 is acceptable.  
c. Eigenvalues and Scree Test 
Two other criteria should be considered: the eigenvalues and the scree test. From a variance 
perspective, if the eigenvalue of a component is less than one, then it is not considered as 
important (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Eigenvalues above one rule is the most frequently 
used method (Henson and Roberts 2006) for the extraction of the maximum number of 
components. Quoting Thompson and Daniel, (Henson and Roberts 2006) wrote… “this 
extraction rule is the default option in most statistics packages and therefore may be the most 
widely used decision rule, also by default”. Another criterion is the scree test of eigenvalues 
plotted against factors. It is considered by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) as a reliable indicator 
for the most appropriate number of components to be extracted. 
Ferreira (2011) suggested the use of the concept of “simple structure” described by Kline (1994) 
to select the most appropriate solution. According to Ferreira (2011), a simple structure is 
defined by the following principles:  
 Each of the rotated matrix should contain at least one zero.  
 In each factor, the minimum number of zero loadings should be the number of factors 
in the rotation.  
 For every pair of factors, there should be variables with zero loadings on one and 
significant loadings on the other.  
 For every pair of factors, a large proportion of the loadings should be zero, at least in a 
matrix with a large number of factors.  
 For every pair of factors, there should be only a few variables with significant loadings 
on both factors.  
d. Rotation  
Rotation is carried out after the factor extraction in order to increase the interpretability and 
scientific utility of the solution because when rotation is not performed, the results of factor 
extraction are difficult to interpret regardless of which method of extraction is used. It is done 
to maximise high correlations between factors and variables and minimise low ones; it is not 
used to improve the quality of the mathematical fit between the observed and reproduced 
correlation matrices because all orthogonally rotated solutions are mathematically equivalent 
- 86 - 
 
to one another and to the solution before rotation (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Varimax is a 
variance maximising procedure with the goal of maximising the variance of factor loadings by 
making high loadings higher, and low ones lower for each factor and orthogonal rotation using 
the Varimax method offers ease of interpreting, describing, and reporting resu1ts according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).  
e. Interpretation 
This step of principle component analysis addresses the interpretation of extracted components 
to characterise the meaning of each component. Once interpretability is adequate, the last, and 
very large, step is to verify the factor structure by establishing the construct validity of the 
factors (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). 
iii. The Choice between PCA and FA 
Some issues are raised with regard to the use of these methods such as the nonexistence of 
readily available criteria against which to test the solution and the infinite number of rotations 
available, all accounting for the same amount of variance in the original data, but with the 
factors defined slightly differently, after extraction. The final choice among alternatives is then 
given to the researcher for interpretation (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). 
According to Rybakov and Marcoulides (2008), there exists some confusion with respect to 
principal components analysis and factor analysis in applied literature, probably due to a 
number of similarities that are exhibited by these methods. It is the reason why it is worth 
situating the differences. Table 4.10 summarises these differences.  
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Table 1-13: Differences between PCA and FA (adapted from Suhr, 2005; Rybakov and Marcoulides 
2008) 
Principal Component Analysis Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Principal Components retained account for a 
maximal amount of variance of observed 
variables 
Factors account for common variance in the 
data 
 
Analysis decomposes correlation matrix Analysis decomposes adjusted correlation 
matrix  
Ones on the diagonals of the correlation 
matrix 
Diagonals of correlation matrix adjusted 
with unique factors 
Minimizes sum of squared perpendicular 
distance to the component axis  
Estimates factors which influence responses 
on observed variables 
Component scores are a linear combination 
of the observed variables weighted by 
eigenvectors 
Observed variables are linear combinations 
of the underlying and unique factors 
A mathematical technique that does not 
allow for error terms as random variables 
and has no model underlying PCA 
A statistical technique that utilizes specific 
error terms within a particular model 
The resulting principal components are 
linear combinations of the observed 
variables 
Factors are not linear combinations of the 
manifest measures 
 
For Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), there are two major goals (and the motivation behind 
extraction) for using principal components analysis and factor analysis:  
 To discover the minimum number of factor axes needed to reliably position variables  
 To discover the meaning of the factors that underlies responses to observed variables. 
The choice between principal components analysis and factor analysis depends on the interest 
of the researcher. For Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), principal component analysis analyses all 
the variance of the observed items whereas factor analyses deal rather with the covariance.  
Accordingly, principal component analysis was found more convenient and appropriate to 
achieve the objectives of this research work. 
4.8.4.2. Reliability 
The second action consisted of a reliability measure of the tool to check the internal consistency 
of data collected. In order to determine a tool’s reliability, Cronbach’s alpha is used. Cronbach's 
alpha is a coefficient of reliability (or consistency); it measures how closely related a set of 
items are as a group. Cronbach's alpha increases when the correlations between the items 
increase. It measures the internal consistency and shows the amount of measurement error in a 
test (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). This coefficient ranges from zero to one; the nearest the 
value to one is, the highest the internal consistency of studied items. It calculates the correlation 
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coefficient between items (statements). Cronbach’s alpha is the most widely used objective 
measure of reliability because it is easier to use in comparison to other estimates (Tavakol and 
Dennick, 2011). Reliability estimates show the amount of measurement error in a test (Tavakol 
and Dennick, 2011). The index of measurement error is produced by subtracting from 1.00 the 
squared value of Cronbach’s alpha. For instance, if the value of alpha is 0.80 then there is 0.36 
error variance in the scores calculated as follows 1-(0.80)2= 0.36. When Cronbach’s alpha 
increases, the error variance decreases 
4.9. Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues may arise during the research work itself as well as during the phase of writing 
(either writing the proposal, journal and conference papers, reports to management, or the thesis 
itself). The researcher must apply the principle of doing well and avoiding harm (Sanjeev and 
Khanna, 2009). Resnik (2011) presented five main reasons why it is important to adhere to 
ethical norms in research. They are summed up in the following: 
 Promoting the aims of research, such as knowledge, truth, and avoidance of error.  
 Promoting the values that are essential to collaborative work, such as trust, 
accountability, mutual respect, and fairness.  
 Being held accountable to the public. 
 Building public support for research. 
 Promoting a variety of other important moral and social values 
These principles have been linked to the research strategy and design adopted in this piece of 
work - a mixed method approach (case study and exploration of the maintenance environment 
of an oil and gas company) - where individuals are involved as well as data belonging to the 
company. The following important issues that might arise during this research work have been 
taken into consideration as thoroughly argued by Laerd dissertation (2012): 
 Minimising the risk of harm 
 Obtaining informed consent 
 Protecting anonymity and confidentiality 
 Avoiding deceptive practices 
 Providing the right to withdraw 
Moreover, before performing any interview or storytelling, the consent of interviewees was 
sought. These activities were completely anonymous. 
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4.10. Chapter Summary 
The research strategy guiding the progress to achieve aim and objectives of this research work 
was outlined in this Chapter. Pragmatism paradigm was chosen as a philosophy underpinning 
such a research work. This study is descriptive and explorative. Its way of thinking is 
quantitative and qualitative as well. Case study and exploratory design were chosen for the 
research design. For data collection and analysis, investigative research questions were defined 
as well as appropriate research methods and required variables. Theoretical and empirical data 
requirement to ensure achieving the aim and objectives of this research work were identified. 
For testing and validating the developed tool, appropriate content and reliability methods were 
chosen. Formative and summative evaluations were selected to perform the evaluation of the 
implementation and field-testing. Mixed methods approach was adopted. In the next Chapter, 
the maintenance-working environment of SONATRACH is explored. 
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 EXPLORING THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM OF OIL 
AND GAS ASSETS 
5.1. Introduction 
It has been revealed in the first part of this thesis that the impact of poor maintenance on 
industrial accidents has not been adequately examined in the oil and gas sector and research in 
the area of human factors in the maintenance in this industry is limited. The aim of this Chapter 
is to discuss and analyse the maintenance working environment of SONATRACH, the national 
Oil and Gas Company. This was performed by studying the impact of human factors in 
maintenance activities on safety as presented in section 5.2. The Maintenance Environment 
Questionnaire (Hobbs and Tada, 2006) was used to collect data; this tool gave a snapshot of 
daily activities and allowed to identify the critical human factors in the maintenance activities. 
The study was concluded by identifying human factors, highlighting the most significant ones, 
and showing the limitations of the questionnaire to respond to data requirements. Sections 5.3 
and 5.4 complete the exploration of the maintenance system by describing how functions are 
linked together and how the elements of the system interact in order to show whether they are 
tightly coupled, hence the system is complex on the one hand, and what could be the sources 
of performance variability on the other hand. This was achieved respectively by conducting a 
functional analysis and by means of storytelling (see Chapter 4, section 4.7). The need to 
measure the four cornerstones of resilience engineering is addressed in section 5.5. 
5.2. The Impact of Human Factors in Maintenance on Safety 
The maintenance working environment is one of the most critical factors that affect safety 
within any industry that utilises physical assets. It is often the reflection of the combination of 
organisational culture and human behaviours. These are often overlooked when designing 
overall maintenance improvement strategies as too much effort is focused on hardware than 
people-ware (Ameziane et al., 2011). A review of pertinent literature regarding industrial 
accidents has revealed that most accidents were maintenance related (see section 2.3). Despite 
these records, there is a limited research in the area of human factors in maintenance 
management within the oil and gas industry and there is a need to overcome the unavailability 
of data.  
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Anonymous surveys are used to collect information on maintenance human factors that could 
not be obtained from the existing failure reporting systems. To assess the actual situation, a 
review of existing tools has been carried out (section 2.3). The Maintenance Environment 
Questionnaire, MEQ, (Hobbs and Tada 2006) has been found of interest since it might give a 
snapshot of daily activities with respect to human factors and allow a comparison between 
SONATRACH’s profile and profiles from other industries. 
The following sections critically assess the maintenance working environment within the 
Algerian National Oil and Gas Company by means of the Maintenance Environment 
Questionnaire, MEQ, (Hobbs and Tada 2006). It identifies maintenance human factors inherent 
in the current working environment.  
5.2.1. Data Collected from the Maintenance Working Environment 
To address the lack of data within the Company, the impact of maintenance working 
environment on plant safety has been investigated by means of Hobbs’ MEQ (see section 4.7.2 
for details regarding MEQ construct validity and reliability).  To ensure data information was 
accurate, precautions have been taken. They include reviewing data entries (each data has been 
verified for accuracy and input meticulously when transferred from original questionnaire to 
spreadsheet and reviewed again after entry), double entering and proofreading the data, and 
administering the questionnaire simultaneously within a day in a given place. In addition, it has 
been ensured that the respondents were ready and willing to answer the questions and have 
clearly understood what was expecting from them as well as questions were clear enough. 
Moreover, Hobbs’ MEQ has been translated to French (French is the speaking language within 
the Company).  
The objective of the questionnaire as stated by Hobbs and Tada (2006) was to gather 
information regarding the workplace conditions that promote unsafe acts as well as defences 
designed to manage human-induced hazards (section 4.7.2). The Maintenance Environment 
Questionnaire was distributed anonymously to maintenance staff during first semester of year 
2010, in March and April. Workers have received a set of 36 questions beginning all by “At 
work in the last six months, on average, how often have you ...” followed by the desired item. 
They were encouraged to report the frequency of specific workplace situations using a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from “everyday” to “never”. The items covered include defences, 
procedures, fatigue, coordination, supervision, equipment, time-pressure, and knowledge as 
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suggested by Hobbs and Tada (2006). One hundred and fifty questionnaires were distributed 
out of which one hundred and twenty-two responses were received (57 engineers, 58 
technicians and 7 not mentioned); this represented a response rate of 81%. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
give a distribution of the answers according to the nature of work for engineers and technicians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-11: Distribution of the answers according to the nature of work for engineers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-12: Distribution of the answers according to the nature of work for engineers 
 
 
The information gathered from the questionnaires is discussed in the following subsection. The 
data presented in the following figures are for both engineers and technicians. Figures 5.3, 5.4, 
5.5, and 5.6 provide samples of the MEQ and show the percentage of respondents that reported 
a situation occurred at least once in 6 months or more frequently for a given item. 
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5.2.2. Analysis of Data from the Maintenance Working Environment 
The results of data collected were analysed by SPSS (STATISTICA). The analysis of responses 
to the MEQ gave a “snapshot” of everyday maintenance activities. Figure 5.3 shows the items 
that received the most frequent rating for a situation that occurred at least once in six months 
or more frequently with respect to the year of study (2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-13: Percentage of respondents that reported the situation occurred at least once in 6 months 
or more frequently 
 
Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 provide the percentage of respondents that reported the situation 
occurred at least once in six months or more frequently for equipment, time pressure, and 
supervision/coordination issues for the same period of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-14: Percentage of respondents that reported the situation occurred at least once in six months 
or more frequently for equipment issues 
 
 
 
93%
91%
85%
84%
83%
78%
78%
Been interrupted part-way through a task to
perform another more urgent task
Been delayed on a task because you could not 
obtain a consumable part (for example, an …
Had trouble concentrating because you were
tired
Been delayed on a task because you could not
obtain a major part (for example, a wheel or…
Been asked to hurry a task
Had to rush an inspection
Felt that managers or supervisors had unfairly
blamed a colleague for an error
91%
84%
74%
68%
60%
Been delayed on a task because you could not 
obtain a consumable part (for example, an …
Been delayed on a task because you could not
obtain a major part (for example, a wheel or…
Been unable to obtain a special tool or item of
maintenance equipment
Lost a tool
Done a task without the correct tools or
equipment
- 94 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-15: Percentage of respondents that reported the situation occurred at least once in six months 
or more frequently for time pressure issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-16: Percentage of respondents that reported the situation occurred at least once in six months 
or more frequently regarding supervision/coordination 
5.2.3. Discussion 
Examining closely the responses, the information collected could supplement the lack of data 
that was not available directly from the safety management system when implemented. The 
implementation of the Company’s HSE management system (HSEMS) has already begun 
(February 2014) in the upstream branch (Exploration and Production) by a training program for 
the steering committees where the researcher is involved. Actually, the program content has 
been based on resilience engineering concepts according to the researcher’s orientation. This 
has been found a great opportunity to introduce these concepts and make them embedded in the 
culture of the organisation. 
93%
78%
77%
75%
67%
Been interrupted part-way through a task to
perform another more urgent task
Felt that managers or supervisors had unfairly
blamed a colleague for an error
Been given wrong information about a task
Not been aware of maintenance activities done
previously, when you needed to know
Found that somebody else had already started
a task you were about to do
83%
78%
69%
54%
39%
Been asked to hurry a task
Had to rush an inspection
Not had enough time to adequately read the
documentation before you started a task
Had  to cut short a functional check
Certified that someone’s work was correct 
without checking it
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If the analysis of the results was stuck to the underlying theory on which MEQ has been 
developed, then the result would be oriented towards looking up what may lead to maintenance 
“errors” and consequently towards accidents and undesired outcomes. Accordingly, items that 
received the most frequent rating resulted in the identification a priori of such issues. The results 
would be as follows. 
Respondents highlighted enormous problems of equipment, time pressure, and 
supervision/coordination issues. For example, more than 93% reported they were interrupted 
partway through a task to perform a more urgent task. More than 90% said they had been 
delayed on a task because they could not obtain a consumable part. Procedures were underlined 
too. About 75% of respondents said they had used informal source of maintenance (e.g. 
personal notebook) and 67.23 % of them had difficulty understanding a maintenance document. 
More than 66 % of respondents reported they found an error in a maintenance document at least 
once in six months or more frequently. On the other hand, the MEQ questionnaire did not focus 
on the blame factor. Only one question dealt with this issue. 71.3 % of respondents felt that 
“managers or supervisors had unfairly blamed a colleague for an error” at least once in six 
months. According to this approach, factors such as lack or poor supervision, equipment issues, 
absence of or unworkable procedures, and time pressure/fatigue might push workers to find an 
easier and/or quicker way to perform tasks than the formal one. Moreover, mistakes might stem 
from coordination issues, inadequate training and supervision, procedures, time 
pressure/fatigue, and equipment deficiencies. This might be linked to parts damaged during 
repair, equipment or part of it wrongly installed, etc. Slips/lapses might derive from time 
pressure/fatigue and management pressure. Memory lapses such as leaving tasks incomplete 
might come from workers being under pressure or fatigue. As a result, maintenance working 
environment might generate conditions giving rise to accidents and causing harm. For the 
traditional approach, such behaviours are reprehensible or to some extent blameworthy for 
some managers. It is not the case in resilience engineering.  
Analysing the results from a resilience engineering perspective helped find out and understand 
why things actually go right. As discussed in Chapter three (section 3.4), when things go right, 
two situations may exist. First, one that may lead to a drift toward hazardous states that 
necessitates barriers and the other that leads to positive outcomes that needs to be boosted. The 
MEQ gave a snapshot of work as performed daily by individuals under conditions that were 
characterised by finite resources, time, and knowledge. When people were asked about 
accident/incidents occurrences in their facilities (see examples given in section 5.4), the answer 
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was generally no incident/accident, most accidents concern road accidents that happen out of 
the facilities. This meant that the human intervention actually prevented accidents occurrences 
most of the time. A study of the maintenance system based on resilience engineering is given 
in Chapter seven. Three significant factors identified by means of MEQ (resources, time 
pressure, and supervision/coordination) were studied by means of MASRAT. 
Another interesting aspect of MEQ was that it allowed benchmarking profiles with other 
industries. Data from three other industries (electronic equipment maintenance, railway train 
mechanics, and airline) have been provided by Dr Allan Hobbs the designer of MEQ. The result 
of the SONATRACH MEQ profile was then compared to the profiles of these industries as 
shown in figure 5.7.  The profiles showed that results were comparable even with different 
cultures and stage of country development. When drawing the profile, the scale ranges from 
zero to four where zero stands for never, and four for every day. From this benchmark, majority 
of items were comparable with some slight differences however. Especially, airlines and oil 
and gas industries gave quite the same frequency ratings on questions dealing with procedures, 
time-pressure, supervision/coordination, knowledge and defences whereas rail industry showed 
a slight higher frequency score regarding procedures and supervision. At the same time, rail 
and petroleum showed a slight higher frequency scores given by respondents to equipment item. 
On the other hand, all industries presented quite the same scoring for knowledge whereas 
electronic industry displayed a lower frequency score for quite all items except fatigue and time 
pressure where rail reported the lowest score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-17: MEQ profile of SONATRACH compared with other industries 
 
This comparison shows that for complex socio-technical systems, even with different cultures 
or different levels of country development, the results are comparable. 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Procedures
Equipment
Supervision
Knowledge
Time pressure
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Fatigue
Defences
Average problem score
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equipment
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5.2.4. Limitations of the MEQ and the Way Ahead 
The analysis of the responses to the Maintenance Environment Questionnaire (MEQ) gave a 
“snapshot” of everyday maintenance activities to guide organisation intervention. This study 
came up with the most significant human factors affecting maintenance activities within the oil 
and gas industry particularly in onshore activities. It showed the existence of important 
resources availability, time pressure, and supervision/coordination issues.  
A number of questions that need attention rose from this study. These questions were directly 
linked to the chosen strategy to achieve excellence as presented in Chapter 6. In particular,  
(1) Did MEQ allow performing a gap analysis as required by the framework?  
(2) Did it identify strategies for improvement as required by the framework?  
(3) Did MEQ study why things go right? Eventually,  
(4) Was MEQ appropriate for complex safety critical systems such as the oil and gas 
industry? 
Question 1 
MEQ gave a rapid snapshot of daily activities to guide organisational interventions rather than 
intending to represent a precise evaluation of the state of the workplace according to Hobbs and 
Tada (2006).  Since it was based on survey responses, there might be subject to biases such as 
memory effects, a reluctance to report issues, language ability, etc. (Hobbs and Tada, 2006). 
Hence, it could not be used to perform a gap analysis as required by the framework (Chapter 
6). 
Question 2 
MEQ was developed to meet the need for a tool to gather information on everyday incidents 
and near misses in maintenance in a standardised form that could be statistically analysed to 
detect trends over time (Hobbs and Tada, 2006). It was an interesting tool to collect data from 
the working environment. Even though there might be a kind of statistical analysis to detect 
trends over time as carried out in the previous sections, it could not help identify strategies for 
improvement as sought by the framework. 
Question 3 
For Hobbs and Tada (2006), the focus of MEQ was on the identification and modification of 
error-shaping factors in the workplace in order to avoid accidents occurrence. This might look 
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at things that go right but with the eye of seeking “errors” since systems were well designed 
and people well trained and behaved as expected to do according to this mind-set in addition to 
available resources and time. It is actually not the case of resilience engineering that considers 
the performance variability as an asset (Chapters 3, 6, and 7). According to resilience 
engineering approach, things go right because people can adapt or adjust their performance to 
the demands, because they can interpret and apply procedures to match the conditions, and 
because they can detect and correct when things that go wrong (Hollnagel, 2012a). For 
Hollnagel (2012a), people must be considered as a valuable asset without which the proper 
functioning of modern technological systems would be impossible. 
Question 4 
The conditions under which workers performed their tasks were focused on by MEQ without 
delving into the wider organisational or cultural issues that created these conditions (Hobbs and 
Tada, 2006). Actually, the use of MEQ was directed at finding what might be done to avoid 
workers’ “errors”, that is, constraining human intervention since it was not seen as an asset as 
stated previously. In complex critical systems, it is required to study why and when the human 
performance varies and to understand the consequences of this variability and how to control it 
(Hollnagel, 2012a). The performance variability that may lead to negatives outcomes should be 
stopped before it drifts toward hazardous situation and the one that may lead to positive 
outcomes should be boosted and reinforced. 
MEQ is a tool that helped gather data related to the maintenance working environment but it 
was not appropriate alone for complex safety critical systems such as the oil and gas 
maintenance-working environment. Therefore, the need for more appropriate tools that allow a 
thorough investigation and answer the questions regarding performance variability was 
highlighted.  
5.3. Functional Analysis of the Maintenance Activity 
This section explores the maintenance system by describing how functions are linked together 
and how the elements of the system interact. To carry out this action, a functional analysis by 
means of the functional resonance analysis Method, FRAM, was carried out. 
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5.3.1. Purpose of Analysis 
As stated previously (Chapter four, section 4.5), this study was an exploratory one and the 
FRAM method was used to investigate the maintenance system of the national Oil and Gas 
Company in order to find how functions within the system were linked together, how they 
interacted, and how complex the maintenance system was. 
5.3.2. Functions in the FRAM 
Functions describe an activity not a task according to Hollnagel (2012b) i.e. something that can 
be done or is being done. These functions are characterised by means of the FRAM functional 
unit (figure 1.2, Chapter 1); this way helps understand how the performance of these 
functions/activities may vary. Functions vary in the way they are carried out rather than because 
they fail (Hollnagel, 2012b). For Hollnagel (2012b), functions may be seen as 
upstream/downstream functions or foreground/background ones. Upstream functions occur 
before downstream ones as their names show; therefore, they may affect them. They refer to a 
temporal relation between these functions. Foreground/background functions refer to the 
relative importance of any function. Foreground functions denote the output that is being 
analysed whereas background functions contribute to the performance of the system; in this 
sense, performance-shaping factors (PSF) are considered background functions (Hollnagel, 
2012b). Background functions contribute to the working environment and provide support and 
means for foreground functions (Hollnagel, 2012b; Macchi, 2011). Background functions are 
identified from the description of foreground functions. 
5.3.3. The Maintenance Department within SONATRACH 
To study the maintenance activity, the maintenance system procedures were reviewed, field 
visits and observations done, and interviews with experienced personnel carried out. During 
these visits, people were asked to answer the following questions:  
 How is the maintenance department organised?  
 What is the role of each section within the department?  
 What process is followed when performing a maintenance task (either preventive or 
corrective task)? 
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The maintenance department is organised as follows. Facilities are under production 
department responsibility. Maintenance department provides counsels and help. Production 
department issues work demands; it determines priorities. There are actually five priorities for 
maintenance work:  
 P1, the job must be started immediately since there is a risk for people, the environment, 
or the facility; any other work is stopped; maintenance staff work without 
preparation/scheduling and do not care about costs for such activities. 
 P2, an imminent risk may face people, the environment, or the facility. No more than 
24 h delay are allowed; partial preparation is required; any P3 work is stopped or 
postponed.  
 P3, careful preparation/scheduling in order to respect time; work procedures are 
followed. 
 P4, work to be done during normal shut-down 
 P5, work is postponed because of lack of personnel, tools, or spares, etc. 
Production staff is responsible vis-à-vis maintenance since there is a constant monitoring of 
equipment status, an anticipation of maintenance needs, a clear description of nature and scope 
of work, availability of equipment for maintenance, etc. On the other hand, maintenance is 
responsible vis-à-vis production since work is executed according to state of the art, preventive 
maintenance is developed and respected, production is informed about spares and critical 
equipment status, etc. 
There are four sections in the maintenance department: preparation, planning/scheduling, 
statistics, and execution (crafts). The objectives of preparation are to provide the operating 
procedures, necessary time, and required means. Long-term and repetitive activities are 
prepared by defining safety precautions, required resources (equipment, tools, and spares), 
necessary human resources, and estimated time to carry out the activities. P2 work is prepared 
for the day in question and P3, P4, and P5 work according to the deadline. The role of this 
section is also to manage the work and improve the way it is performed. The roles of 
planning/scheduling section are to prepare daily work scheduling for preventive maintenance, 
normal shutdown and exceptional work, measure human resources need, provide necessary 
information to measure performance and costs of maintenance. This is work as imagined. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to perform a thorough study of the system. An example 
is taken into account to show that the maintenance system of an Oil and Gas Company is very 
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complex The example in question concerns a study of a piece of equipment that is, a turbo-
compressor for refrigeration in an LNG plant. 
5.3.4. Function Characterization 
Based on what was said previously in this section, a turbo-compressor for refrigeration in an 
LNG facility, which is strategic for the plant, was studied to identify the complexity of 
maintenance activities. The scenario addressed was a breakdown in the compressor noticed by 
operators. The breakdown was reported and a request for an inspection was made. Then, the 
maintenance system procedure was unfolded. Twenty-eight functions were identified out of 
which nine functions were considered foreground functions and the others background ones. 
They were characterised by the six parameters of the FRAM unit (section 1.2.1) and presented 
in appendix 2.  The consistency and completeness of the study was checked by verifying that 
same aspects referred to the same names or labels and that all aspects describing a function 
should be included in other functions as one or more of the aspects that characterised the 
function.  
For instance, excessive vibration of the turbo-compressor (e.g. in the spacer couplings) might 
cause the shutdown of the equipment either automatically or manually by operators. This 
excessive vibration could be due to a bad grease operation, axial movement of the rotor 
(process), or wear in the bearings, etc. If the intolerable threshold of vibration was attained, a 
shutdown of the LNG train would take place, provoking variability in the system. If this 
situation happened during winter where the demand on LNG is very high, the pressure on all 
staff became critical. In the case of all functions performed as imagined, the outage would last 
eight to ten days; this was actually a big loss. As explained earlier in this section, this action 
was considered priority P1 which meant any other function was put aside by staff so that they 
could join the rest of the personnel to solve such an issue; two or three teams would work 
24h/day to restart the LNG train in an optimum time. 
The instantiation of the relations between the inputs and outputs of the functions are given in 
appendix 2. It can be seen that a negative variability of outputs of functions might lead to 
increase the duration of the shut-down of the LNG train or might generate in the future another 
non-planned shut-down which in fine costs a lot of money for the Company. Since the 
refrigeration turbo-compressor was a strategic piece of equipment that was not redundant, this 
variability was affected mainly by the availability of resources. Lack of spares and inadequate 
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tools and equipment might lead to safety margin reduction and/or operational capability of the 
plant. The organisational culture affected these functions (strategy- production first, 
procurement procedures, etc.). The available time (time-pressure) to perform assigned tasks 
which was very common since the organisation is somewhat reactive (many tasks are done 
urgently), the supervision/coordination issues, the stress due to lack of necessary knowledge or 
experience to do an assigned task, and the absence of a vulnerability model were other sources 
of variability. The trade-off production/safety went towards satisfying production aspects. This 
might lead in fine to the systematic loss of safety defences. This is particularly emphasised is 
Chapter 7. 
On the other hand, even though such variability was noticed, it is worth highlighting the positive 
aspects characterised by the adaptation of people to the environment as well as actions to change 
this environment to perform required activities despite lacks (adaptation to lack of 
documentation, training, spares, etc.). The organisation as a whole also adapts to maintain a 
certain “health” of facilities to respond to production goals and objectives.  
The use of the FRAM was only for an exploratory purpose of the maintenance system. The 
method could allow to perform a gap analysis; consequently, the variability of functions has 
not been measured in this study. However, some barriers and specific performance monitoring 
of variability were proposed. At company level, the implementation of management systems 
(HSE, maintenance, etc.) and the acceleration of the introduction of the new permit to work 
system were judged of great importance. In addition, regulations regarding spares procurement 
should be evaluated and reviewed. The use of fully exploited information system for the 
maintenance management system could be the sought damping factors to prevent any 
undesirable future events stemming from maintenance activities.  
The strategic objectives might be: maintenance effectiveness, maintenance activities cost-
effectiveness, the improvement of equipment availability through improved maintenance 
materials/tools/equipment management, and the insurance of suitable training levels to fulfil 
the required missions. Performance indicators should be designed to follow up these objectives. 
Since FRAM method deals with functional resonance, the indicators should follow the same 
concept. Therefore, these indicators should be functional indicators. Examples of indicators 
include (Márquez, 2007): 
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 Maintenance effectiveness (the follow-up of the number of critical assets, the number 
of repetitive failures for those assets, the total number of failures and the reduction in 
preventive maintenance tasks, percentage of preventive maintenance),  
 Maintenance cost-effectiveness (compliance to maintenance planning and scheduling, 
quality of work and learning, etc.),  
 Equipment availability (spare parts service level, spare parts turnover and urgent 
purchase orders released), training level per each maintenance level.  
Additional strategies for improvement at both department and corporate levels are discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
5.3.5. Limitations of FRAM and the Way Ahead 
The same questions regarding MEQ were applied for the use of the FRAM. In particular,  
(1) Did the FRAM allow performing a gap analysis as required by the framework described 
in Chapter 6?  
(2) Did it identify strategies for improvement as required by the framework?  
(3) Did it study why things go right? Eventually,  
(4) Was it appropriate for complex safety critical systems such as the oil and gas industry? 
Question 1 
It was not the purpose of the FRAM to perform a gap analysis as required by the framework. 
The FRAM is rather used to carry out a risk assessment, an accident investigation, or simply to 
explore a system by finding how functions are linked together and how they interact to identify 
the variability of the outputs of these functions; in fine, how they may resonate. 
Question 2 
Actually, the FRAM allowed identifying strategies for improvement by finding dumping 
factors and specific performance monitoring of variability. However, the research aimed at 
identifying strategies that might lead the system to excellence. This is developed in more details 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Questions 3 and 4 
The answer for these questions was yes. The FRAM method uses a systemic approach based 
on the precepts of resilience engineering as stated in Chapter 3. This method is still under 
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development. Hollnagel (2012b) highlighted the need to develop a way of calculating the 
magnitude of functional resonance. The use of the Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) is something 
that needs exploration 
5.4. Storytelling 
After the use of the Maintenance Environment Questionnaire and the FRAM method, 
storytelling was used to collect some missing data, particularly sharing experiences about 
positive actions (things that went right) performed by maintenance staff generally characterised 
as “taken for granted” or “people are only doing their job”; hence they did not need to be 
documented. Moreover, this method gave valuable information that made the storyteller feeling 
proud of what he (she) did. It particularly provided rich contextual data (Herrera, 2012).  
5.4.1. Use of Storytelling 
Among the different uses of storytelling, it is particularly used to share knowledge and 
experiences (Stewart, 1998; Sole and Wilson, 2002), to understand current situation, to 
anticipate possible futures, and to prepare the organisation for action (Snowden, 1999). 
Therefore, the main objective of storytelling method was to collect data that could not be 
known. The objective was also to let people share their experiences and be proud about what 
they accomplished.  
The storytelling method was used to overcome the lack of recorded data to share experience 
about things that went right/wrong. Prior to interviewing maintenance staff, the resilience 
engineering approach was explained to the interviewees. Consent was requested so that the 
story recorded was anonymous regarding the storyteller and the location where this occurred 
(see Chapter 4). The interviewees were free to say what they want orally or to write stories that 
happened in their facilities. In quite all stories, actions were generally carried out in 
coordination with members from other departments (production and HSE). Stories were 
recorded when the consent of the interviewees was obtained or when they accepted to write 
stories on paper. 
Part of the seminars delivered by the researcher in his professional activity was devoted to 
discuss (group interviews about sharing positive actions) as well as during the workshop ateliers 
(see Chapter 7).  After the presentation of the approach, people were asked to tell stories about 
what they experienced and try to answer why the number of accidents/incidents was low. Was 
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it because individuals hide the truth? Or they simply made local adjustments to achieve goals 
by accomplishing positive actions. The stories generally showed that work was not carried out 
as imagined. 
Two kinds of actions were performed. When it was possible to have direct contact with 
maintenance personnel like training sessions for HSE MS, direct interviews and discussions 
occur. When this was not possible, the same questions were sent to individuals. There have 
been 20 training sessions; 15 persons on average attended each session out of which 03 to 04 
people were maintenance personnel together with personnel from other departments such as 
production, HSE, and human resources. 
5.4.2. Examples of Stories 
In the following subsection, excerpts of stories told orally or in a written form are given. Two 
air instrument compressors have been acquired without instruction manual. One of this 
important equipment broke down one day so that it necessitated an overhaul. The constructor 
of the compressor was contacted to provide with the manual. The constructor refused to provide 
with the manual and required that his staff will carry out the maintenance. Since the equipment 
was very important and there was an emergency, the maintenance team decided to perform the 
overhaul. After three days of hard working, they successfully did the job and the testing was 
conclusive. This action allowed saving time, money, and made the equipment available. 
As specified many times in this thesis, maintenance staff often work under pressure, particularly 
they are asked to perform their job without stopping production. Numerous daily actions have 
been carried out successfully without stopping production and without incidents. They include 
for instance: 
 Changing valves  
 Changing level transmitters 
 Fire and Gas signals transfer to new system without incident 
 Changing jockey pumps (fire-fighting system) warranting safety by means of the 
diesel pump 
 Switching from existing electrical lines to new ones without stopping electrical 
equipment 
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According to a chief mechanics, local adjustments were daily actions performed by 
maintenance staff. These adjustments such as adding a support to better hold something, adding 
a current shunt to the ground cable to earth, or designing a specific tool went generally 
unnoticed. In the following example, shortcuts were made to carry out a maintenance task. It 
concerned a gas turbine which stop will lead to a loss of production estimated to 1500 barrels 
per day. Every 48000 operating hours, a major inspection is performed on this equipment. A 
contractor, that is the machine manufacturer, does the activity. There are four steps in the major 
inspection: (1) dismantling of the equipment, (2) inspection, (3) remounting, and (4) final 
testing. During the second step, the contractor judged a mechanical part (the diaphragm) non-
repairable and must be changed. There was no spare part, on the other hand the acquisition of 
a new spare necessitated a long time that was not convenient. A decision was made by 
management to bypass the procedure, repair the diaphragm, and reuse it. Maintenance staff 
performed the task and the contractor had an order from management to reuse the diaphragm 
and finish the major inspection. The latter was carried out until the end and the gas turbine was 
returned to service to a new life cycle. A new diaphragm was ordered which will be replaced 
by five years!  
5.4.3. Storytelling Limitations and the Way Ahead 
The same questions regarding MEQ and the FRAM were applied for the use of the storytelling 
method. In particular,  
(1) Did it allow performing a gap analysis as required by the framework (see Chapter 6)?  
(2) Did it identify strategies for improvement as required by the framework?  
(3) Did it study why things go right?  
(4) Was it appropriate for complex safety critical systems such as the oil and gas industry? 
Question 1 
As per the other methods, storytelling was not intended to carry out a gap analysis; hence, it 
could not be used as required by the framework developed in Chapter six. It was rather used to 
complement the other data collection methods. 
 
 
- 107 - 
 
Question 2 
Again, it was not the case; it was used to put a stress on missing data that could be collected 
qualitatively by means of interviews. 
Question 3and 4 
Yes, in both cases. Researchers (Herrera, 2012) have already used it. 
5.5. The Need to Measure the Four Cornerstones of Resilience Engineering 
Resilience engineering aims at focusing not only on proactivity but has the ambition of being 
proactive in a systemic sense as well moving beyond classical components and failure 
orientation to deal with systems and anticipate behaviour at system level (Rosness et al., 2010). 
According to Hollnagel (2014), it is of great importance to understand how a system functions 
rather than how it is structured and it is both easier and more effective to manage risks and 
sustain existence by improving the number of things that go right, than by reducing the number 
of things that go wrong. Concisely, it is the ability to make the correct adjustments to match 
actual conditions.  
For a system to be safe, it must be resilient. A practical way for resilience engineering is to 
consider the four abilities (the four cornerstones), none of them can be left out if a system wants 
to call itself resilient. Hollnagel (2014) illustrated the couplings of the four abilities as shown 
in figure 5.8, where the ability to anticipate what may happen in the environment, now and in 
the future, is essential for the system’s survival. Consequently, the need to know the four 
abilities by measuring these abilities was emphasised. Developing and validating a tool based 
on resilience engineering precepts that measures the four abilities as shown in the previous 
Chapters and the sections of this Chapter was judged of great importance. 
 
In this research work, such a tool was developed and validated (see Chapters 6 and 7). The tool 
was used to perform the gap analysis as required by the developed framework that aimed at 
bringing the maintenance system from actual situation to safety excellence. It allowed achieving 
objectives 3 and 4 of this piece of research 
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Figure 1-18: The dependencies of the four cornerstones adapted from Hollnagel (2014) 
 
5.6. Chapter Summary 
In this Chapter, the maintenance environment of SONATRACH was explored by means of 
three methods that complement each other. Using the Maintenance Environment Questionnaire, 
a survey of SONATRACH maintenance system was carried out. This survey came up with a 
snapshot of daily activities and allowed identifying critical human factors and their impact on 
safety in the maintenance of oil and gas assets. It permitted also identify the most significant 
factors that will be investigated by means of the developed tool based on resilience engineering 
precepts (see Chapters 6 and 7). Moreover, in this Chapter the limitations of MEQ to respond 
to the framework requirements (Chapter 6) have been highlighted. The FRAM method was 
used then to describe how functions in the maintenance system of an Oil and Gas Company are 
linked together and how the elements of the system interact. The method that is still under 
development contributed to understand better the system. It showed the system elements were 
tightly coupled; hence, the system complex. A third method was used afterwards to complement 
the two others and to let people tell their experiences and share them with others, particularly 
positive actions (things that went right). Eventually, the need to measure the four cornerstones 
of resilience engineering was shown. Next Chapter will address objectives 3 (identify a strategy 
based on resilience engineering to achieve safety excellence in the maintenance system of 
SONATRACH) and objective 4 (Outline, test and validate a tool that measures the resilience 
of Oil and Gas maintenance systems) by developing a strategy to achieve excellence in the 
maintenance system of SONATRACH and outlining a tool that measures the resilience of Oil 
and Gas maintenance systems with respect to the most significant identified factors. 
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 DEVELOPMENT OF A MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 
RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL  
6.1. Introduction 
To achieve safety excellence, there is a need to know actual situation and identify strategies for 
improvement. This can be attained by performing a gap analysis using the appropriate tools and 
doing the correct assessment that is, the use of a systemic approach based on resilience 
engineering precepts. It has been shown in Chapters 2 and 3 that industrial systems have become 
more complex and traditional risk assessment techniques as well as accident causation models 
have failed to handle such systems. Only a systemic approach based on resilience engineering 
may address properly such systems. Resilience engineering deals with such an approach. The 
objective was therefore find out how to make a system become AHRAP (see Chapter 3). This 
might be achieved by knowing the four cornerstones of resilience as outlined by Hollnagel 
(2009b) that is the ability to respond (R), to monitor (M), to anticipate (A), and to learn (L) and 
increase these abilities. Instead of seeking only to avoid and/or eliminate failures (Hollnagel, 
2010a), it is worth measuring the resilience of the system in order to find ways to increase each 
of these abilities to achieve excellence.  
On the other hand, in Chapter 5, the most significant factors that impact activities in the 
maintenance system were identified by exploring the maintenance working environment of oil 
and gas assets. Among these factors, three were particularly highlighted; resources, time-
pressure, and coordination/supervision.  
The aim of the Chapter is to achieve objectives three and four of this research work. A strategy, 
through a framework to achieve safety excellence, is first outlined in section 6.2. The 
development and validation of the designed tool that allows implementing the framework, the 
MAintenance System Resilience Assessment Tool, MASRAT is addressed respectively in 
sections 6.3 and 6.4. Section 6.5 links the results to research objectives.  
6.2. A Framework for Safety Excellence 
As explained in the research method process (Figure 4.2, Chapter 4), this phase dealt with the 
development of the tool that allowed to achieve objectives (3) and (4, part 1) of this research 
work (see Table 4.9, Chapter 4). A general framework to achieve safety excellence was 
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developed to achieve these objectives. To reach safety excellence thus, a long journey toward 
continuous improvement, a gap analysis using the appropriate tools based on resilience 
engineering precepts and doing the correct assessment might be performed. Figure 6.1 
illustrates this view. A continuous improvement loop that consisted of the assessment of current 
situation by appropriate tools to identify strategies for improvement was required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-19: A framework for safety excellence 
 
From this generic framework, a more specific and detailed one was designed and tailored 
specifically to the maintenance system of industrial assets (Figure 6.2). It consisted of a gap 
analysis. First, a decision to achieve safety excellence was taken. Then, a diagnosis of the 
situation was carried out with respect to the four aspects of resilience to establish a maturity 
level (MAL) and identify strategies that may lead a system from a given level to maturity 
excellence level (MEL) for each of the three factors already identified in Chapter 5. Such an 
assessment required the development of a tool, a management tool that assesses the resilience 
of the maintenance system. This tool, the MAintenance System Resilience Assessment Tool, 
MASRAT, was developed based on the exploration of the maintenance environment system, 
the literature review, and particularly the probing questions proposed by Hollnagel (2010a); the 
details are given in section 6.3. It permitted determine the ability of the system to respond to 
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threats/opportunities i.e. know what to do, to monitor flexibly i.e. know what to look for, to 
anticipate any development i.e. know what to expect, and to learn i.e. know to learn from past 
experiences. By means of MASRAT, the assessment provided with profiles such as the 
MAintenance Resilience Department Profiles (MARP), and Maturity Levels (MAL). These 
profiles were analysed by means of a SWOT analysis to determine strategies for improvement 
through the identification of opportunities to enhance MAL as well as barriers and required 
performance monitoring specification (see Chapter 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-20: A framework for safety excellence in the maintenance system of oil and gas asset 
 
The development phase of MASRAT was performed in three 03 steps. First step was the 
identification of human factors.  This was followed by the creation of the items. Last step was 
the tool design. The aim of this research work was to identify a strategy based on resilience 
engineering to achieve safety excellence. The challenge was therefore how to manage properly 
such a situation in order to reach this goal. The precepts of resilience engineering have been 
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presented in details earlier in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. As safety is treated as a core value, not a 
commodity that can be counted, a resilient organisation is also safe; in order to be resilient, an 
organisation must be able: (1) to respond to threats/opportunities i.e. know what to do, (2) to 
flexibly monitor i.e. know what to look for, (3) to anticipate any development i.e. know what 
to expect, and (4) to learn i.e. know to learn from past experiences (Hollnagel, 2010b). A tool 
that allowed measuring these four aspects is presented in the following section. 
6.3. The Development of MASRAT 
The need to develop something different based on a systemic approach was highlighted in the 
previous sections. This should be in adequacy with the dynamic movement of the society 
characterised by (1) fast changes in technology, (2) ineffective approaches to accident 
investigation and prevention, and (3) the need to include interactions of socio-technical system 
elements. 
Based on the exploratory survey of the Company maintenance environment (Chapter 5), 
interviews, large consultation of maintenance managers and HSE practitioners within the 
Company, and the literature review (Chapter 2), a list of 24 factors was identified (see table 
6.1). These factors were considered as human factors that influence organisation behaviour. 
Each of these factors might be studied alone in order to determine system’s resilience allowing 
the identification of improvement strategies from resilience profiles of each of the four aspects 
of resilience. Table 6.1 below gives a list of the human factors (factors/issues used in the same 
way) that were identified at corporate level. 
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Table 1-14 : List of human factors 
Category Factors 
  Corporate 
organisational factors 
 Clarification of organisational missions and vision 
 Adequacy of identification, definition, and communication of 
organisational values and principles    
 Leadership & accountability within the organisation 
 Clarification of roles & responsibilities within the organisation 
 Policies, procedures, and practices foundation upon mutual trust and 
respect  
 Adequacy of communication (means & practices) within the 
organisation  
 Recognition, reinforcement, and reward of safe behaviour 
 Community & stakeholders’ awareness 
 Adjustments after disturbances 
Elements of the HSE 
MS factors 
 Management of HSE hazards 
 Management of occupational health 
 Environmental management 
 Accident/incidents analysis & prevention and past incidents responses 
effectiveness 
 HSE investments 
 Crisis & emergency management 
 Management of change 
 Contractors’ management issue 
Working 
environment factors 
 Fatigue/workload/personnel motivation issue 
 Time pressure issue (tasks performed urgently, short-cuts, rushed 
activities, etc.) 
 Knowledge/competence issues 
 Procedures/documentation issues (personnel document understanding, 
document errors, personnel compliance with rules/procedures, etc.) 
 Supervision/Coordination issues 
 Conditions of work (heat, noise, etc.) 
 Resources availability (planned and easy to obtain) 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.8, data requirements section, questions were written first. 
The questions content was based on the related literature review and the analysis of interviews 
of maintenance and production experienced personnel and HSE practitioners.  During these 
interviews, the resilience engineering approach and the four cornerstones of resilience were 
presented and explained. The approach was adopted immediately and found a very innovative 
one that is worth exploring and encouraging. 
Afterwards, these persons (maintenance, production, and HSE managers as well as 
maintenance, production, and HSE engineers) were asked to give their opinion about the set of 
questions individually; their consent was requested each time to take notes. The need to measure 
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the four cornerstones to establish the resilience of a system has been highlighted from the 
literature. In addition, Hollnagel (2010a) raised probing questions that might help design a basis 
for measuring system resilience. Besides, the exploratory study of the maintenance system of 
SONATRACH highlighted some factors that were deemed important. Grounded in these 
elements, a set of questions was designed. Examples include the set of questions given in table 
6.2. 
Table 1-15 : Designed questions according to aspect and factor 
Questions Aspect (ability) addressed for a given factor 
Have you performed analyses to establish 
prepared responses to fatigue issue? 
Respond to fatigue 
Have you investigated time pressure issue 
within the organisation? 
Respond to time pressure 
Do you have prepared responses for time 
pressure issue? 
Respond to time pressure 
For time pressure issue, do you apply any 
criteria for activating a response? 
Respond to time pressure 
For time pressure issue, do you evaluate 
systematically your responses by testing them 
onsite? 
Respond to time pressure 
For time pressure issue, have you established 
effectiveness speed response? 
Respond to time pressure 
Has the maintenance department performed 
analyses to establish prepared responses to 
fatigue issue? 
Respond to fatigue 
Has the maintenance department established a 
list of opportunities/threats that necessitate 
prepared responses? 
Respond to opportunities/threats 
If not, has the maintenance department 
(organisation) planned any initial analysis to 
establish such a list? 
Respond by analysis 
Have you prepared responses for personnel 
competence? 
Respond to competence 
Are resources planned and easy to obtain? Respond to resources 
 
Majority of respondents said the questions would be difficult to grasp by maintenance 
personnel. As can be seen, this set of questions could not be used to realise the objective of 
developing a strategy to achieve safety excellence. Accordingly, the work was directed toward 
finding a relevant set of questions for each of the four (04) aspects.  
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First, “the ability to respond” aspect was addressed. It can be illustrated by the ability to know 
what to do and be able to respond to any opportunity/threat. This is performed by adjusting the 
way things are carried out and having prepared responses that are effective and done in an 
appropriate time and have the desired effects before it is too late (Hollnagel, 2010a): the ability 
to deal with the REAL. The same procedure was applied with the interviewees. Taking into 
account their opinions again, the following questions were sorted out among all the developed 
questions; each question was followed by the factor (issue) to analyse (table 6.3), 
Table 1-16 : Examples of questions for the ability to “respond” 
Questions 
Have you investigated within the organisation ...issue? 
Do you apply any criteria for activating a response to ...issue? 
Do you have prepared responses to ...issue? 
Do you evaluate systematically your responses (onsite testing) to ...issue? 
Do you have sufficient staffing available to respond to ...issue? 
 
The same procedure was applied to the three remaining aspects. It is worth noting that parallel 
to this, a scale for categorising the assessment was looked out. A list of common used scales 
according to the possible use was studied (table 6.4).  
An example of a combination of the use of a frequency scale (Never: 1; Seldom: 2; Sometimes: 
3; Often: 4 and Always: 5) and an aspect (ability to respond) is given in the following. Eight 
questions beginning by “how often have you investigated...followed by the factors were 
constructed. The respondents are supposed to answer the questions according to a Likert scale 
ranging from never to always. It has been found that it might work for “the ability to respond” 
aspect but not for the other aspects which implied finding a different scale for each aspect. 
Another issue was raised. For some factors and for the same aspect, the questions had to be 
changed. Instead of beginning the questions by “how often”, it had to begin by “do you often”. 
Examples included for instance “how often have you investigated time pressure issue?” 
Moreover, “do you often search to make equipment resources planned and easy to obtain?”  
This led to changing the number of factors and adapting the wording to the questions. For 
example, “adequacy of communication (means & practices) within the organisation” became 
“messaging and information systems and practices”. The 24 factors (see table 6.1) were reduced 
to 22 to avoid repetition. Eight (08) questions were eventually set up for the first aspect (ability 
to respond). Table 6.5 below gives examples of questions. 
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Table 1-17 : List of common used scales (Mahoney, 2009) 
Acceptability Not at all acceptable, Slightly acceptable, Moderately acceptable, Very 
acceptable, Completely acceptable 
Agreement Completely disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor 
disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, Completely agree 
Appropriateness Absolutely inappropriate, Inappropriate, Slightly inappropriate, Neutral, 
Slightly appropriate, Appropriate, Absolutely appropriate 
Awareness Not at all aware, Slightly aware, Moderately aware, Very aware, Extremely 
aware 
Beliefs Not at all true of what I believe, Slightly true of what I believe, Moderately 
true of what I believe, Very true of what I believe, Completely true of what I 
believe 
Concern Not at all concerned, Slightly concerned, Moderately concerned, Very 
concerned, Extremely concerned 
Familiarity Not at all familiar, Slightly familiar, Moderately familiar, Very familiar, 
Extremely familiar 
Frequency Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Always 
Importance Not at all important, Slightly important, Moderately important, Very 
important, Extremely important 
Influence Not at all influential, Slightly influential, Moderately influential, Very 
influential, Extremely influential 
Likelihood Not at all likely, Slightly likely, Moderately likely, Very likely, Completely 
likely 
Priority Not a priority, Low priority, Medium priority, High priority, Essential 
Probability Not at all probable, Slightly probable, Moderately probable, Very probable, 
Completely probable 
Quality Very poor, Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent 
Reflect Me Not at all true of me, Slightly true of me, Moderately true of me, Very true of 
me, Completely true of me 
Satisfaction 
(bipolar) 
Completely dissatisfied, Mostly dissatisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, Neither 
satisfied or dissatisfied, Somewhat satisfied, Mostly satisfied, Completely 
satisfied 
Satisfaction 
(unipolar) 
Not at all satisfied, Slightly satisfied, Moderately satisfied, Very satisfied, 
Completely satisfied 
 
Table 1-18 : Second set of questions for ability to “respond” 
Questions 
How often have you assessed time pressure issue? 
Do you have prepared responses to time pressure issue? 
Do you apply any threshold criteria for activating a response to time pressure 
issue? 
How often have you systematically evaluated and tested on site your 
responses time pressure issue? 
How often have you established effectiveness speed response to time 
pressure issue? 
How often have you established best response duration to time pressure 
issue? 
How often have you provided sufficient resources to respond to time pressure 
issue? 
How often have you maintained readiness to respond to time pressure issue? 
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A set of questions were then designed for the second aspect i.e. “the ability to monitor”. Alike 
the first aspect, it was based on the objective of the aspect. That is the ability to know what to 
look for or be able to monitor what is changing or may change; this is monitoring systems’ 
performance or the changes in the environment. This allows the system to deal with 
opportunities/threats before becoming a reality. It is the ability to deal with the CRITICAL 
(Hollnagel, 2010a). The first thoughts were directed toward questions such as those given in 
table 6.6. 
 
Table 1-19 : First set of questions for the ability to “monitor” 
Questions 
Have you defined pertinent indicators to monitor fatigue issue? 
When was the list created? 
How often is the list of indicators revised? 
On which basis is it revised? 
Is someone responsible for maintaining the list? 
Are there leading, current, and lagging indicators? 
 
These questions did not fit in a matrix alike the “ability to respond” aspect. Then, another set 
was constructed to solve this problem (see table 6.7).  
 
Table 1-20 : Second set of questions for the ability to “monitor” 
Questions 
Does the organisation support (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring 
for fatigue issue? 
Are there Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of fatigue 
issue? 
Is there an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, lagging) for 
fatigue issue? 
Are there PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for fatigue issue? 
Are there PI’s to measure system vulnerability for fatigue issue? 
Do you update PI list regularly based on their pertinence for fatigue issue? 
Is someone responsible for maintaining the PI list for fatigue issue? 
Are PI measurements reliable for fatigue issue? 
Are data collected analysed immediately for fatigue issue? 
Are the results disseminated and the recommendations implemented 
throughout the organisation for fatigue issue? 
 
 
Finding ideal set of questions that might match all factors and aspects still remained not solved. 
This led to changing the strategy and moving toward designing a set of statements instead.  The 
questions were turned therefore into statements. Table 6.8 gives the set of statements for the 
first aspect that is the ability to “respond”. 
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Table 1-21 : Set of statements for the ability to “respond” 
Statements 
The organisation often assesses resources issue 
The organisation has prepared responses to resources issue 
The organisation applies threshold criteria for activating a response to 
resources issue 
The organisation systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses 
to resources issue 
The organisation often assesses effectiveness speed response to. resources 
issue 
The organisation often estimates best response duration to resources issue 
The organisation often provides sufficient resources to respond to. 
resources issue 
The organisation often maintains readiness to respond to resources issue 
 
The same action was performed for the second aspect i.e. “ability to Monitor”. The set of 
questions became statements (see table 6.9). 
Table 1-22 : Set of statements for the ability to “monitor” 
Statements 
The organisation supports (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring for 
resources issue 
There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of. 
resources issue    
There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, and 
lagging) for resources issue 
There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for resources issue  
PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence resources issue 
Someone is responsible within the organisation for maintaining the PI list 
for resources issue   
PI measurements are reliable for. resources issue 
Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the 
recommendations implemented throughout the organisation for resources 
issue 
 
Parallel to this, a five Likert scale was eventually adopted. The scale ranges from fully disagree 
to totally agree with the statement in question. Table 6.10 shows the category of assessment 
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Table 1-23 : Scores and meanings (adapted from Hollnagel, 2010a) 
Fully agree “5” The item can be addressed and the system exceeds item requirements 
Agree “4”  The item can be addressed and the system meets realistic item requirements 
Somewhat agree “3”   
The item can be addressed and the system meets the minimum item 
requirements 
Disagree”2”                
The item can be addressed but the system performs under the minimum item 
requirements 
Fully disagree “1”       The item can be addressed but the system does not address it 
Missing “M” The system cannot address the item whatever the conditions are 
 
First thoughts regarding the “ability to anticipate” aspect were constructed with respect to some 
important characteristics of anticipation and proactive actions. These characteristics concerned 
the frequency of investigating the future (trends), the existence of expertise and tools within the 
organisation to carry out such activities, and the existence of vulnerability models. All these 
characteristics dealt with strategic planning to anticipate the future by analysing trends and 
developing scenarios and contingency plans. This is the ability to know what to expect or be 
able to anticipate any developments, threats, and opportunities far in the future. The objective 
is to identify future events and conditions or changes that may affect the ability to function 
positively or negatively. It is the ability to deal with the POTENTIAL (Hollnagel, 2010a). From 
a set of twenty statements that were reduced to nine (09), eight (08) were eventually retained. 
Table 6.11 shows the set of statements. 
Table 1-24 : Set of statements for the ability to “anticipate” 
Statements 
The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the future 
(analyse trends) with respect to resources issue 
Threats and opportunities are reviewed each time new data are collected for 
resources issue 
The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety margins 
due to resources issue 
The organisation anticipates safety margins reduction due to resources issue 
The organisation assesses the absence of accidents/failures/hazards, etc. to 
anticipate the problems raised by resources issue 
The organisation reviews and updates risk models in the absence of 
accidents/failures/hazards, etc. for resources issue 
The organisation possesses analysis tools to predict problems due to 
resources issue 
The organisation possesses the abilities and expertise to detect signs of 
increasing level of risk due to resources issue, etc. 
 
Alike the three previous aspects, the remaining one, “the ability to learn” was developed 
according to its meaning and objectives that is, the ability to deal with the FACTUAL 
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(Hollnagel, 2010a). The “ability to learn” aspect was developed more rapidly than the other 
aspects; particularly the “ability to respond” which was designed in first instance and 
necessitated more efforts and investigation. A set of statements were designed for this aspect 
based on organisation support to learn, the learning process itself and its frequency as well as 
data collection, analysis, and dissemination throughout and outside the organisation (table 
6.12). 
Table 1-25 : First set of statements for the ability to “learn” 
Statements 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn 
from resources issue 
The learning process is built throughout the entire organisation for resources 
issue 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, anal disseminate 
results, and learn from resources issue 
Learning activity is a continuous process for. resources issue 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest 
possible for resources issue 
 
The statements were rearranged in a coherent way so that for instance the learning process and 
the learning activity were put close to each other. The statements became (table 6.13). 
Table 1-26 : Set of statements for the ability to “learn” 
Statements 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn 
from resources issue 
Learning activity is a continuous process for resources issue 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, analyse, 
disseminate results, and learn from resources issue 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest 
possible for resources issue 
The outcomes of these analyses are rapidly communicated inside and outside 
the organisation resources issue 
The learning process is built throughout the entire organisation for resources 
issue 
There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is taking place for 
resources issue 
There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for resources issue 
 
The list of factors (issues) was then adapted to fit the maintenance system object of this study. 
Sixteen factors were therefore sorted out based on the exploratory study of the maintenance 
environment. They include randomly (table 6.14). 
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Table 1-27 : Factors fitted for the maintenance system 
Factors 
Documentation issues (availability, appropriateness, personnel understanding, 
etc.) 
Time pressure issues (tasks performed urgently, short cuts, rushed inspection, 
skipped functional checks, etc.) 
Fatigue issue (tasks performed between 2.00 and 5.00, working more than 2 
night shifts in a row, trouble concentrating, etc.) 
Procedures/rules issues (errors in maintenance documents, referring to informal 
document, compliance, etc.) 
Workload issue (physical and mental) 
Personnel motivation/conditions of work issue 
Coordination/supervision issue (not aware of tasks done previously, given 
wrong information about a task, etc.) 
Competence/knowledge issue (lack of training, not enough knowledge to do a 
task, installing parts wrong way) 
Resource availability (planned and easy to obtain) 
Incident hazard prevention, investigation, and past response analysis 
Contractors’ management issue 
Clarification of roles and responsibilities issue within maintenance department 
Adequacy of communication (means and practices) within maintenance 
department 
Recognition, reinforcement, reward of safe behaviour 
Leadership and accountability issue within maintenance department 
Clarification of maintenance department missions, vision, values, and principles 
issue within maintenance department 
 
Since it was quite impossible to study all these factors, the list was reduced to the three ones 
that were considered the most significant during the study in question (Chapter five, the 
maintenance working environment study; namely resources, time pressure, and 
supervision/coordination (to be analysed further during a workshop, see Chapter 7).   
The list was then combined with the statements that were designed previously for each of the 
four aspects in the form of a matrix. This was performed by means of Excel files. The result 
constituted the developed tool, MASRAT, that allowed to measure the system’s resilience. It 
permitted the drawing of MAintenance Resilience Profiles (MARP) and Factor Resilience 
Profiles (FRP) for each of the four aspects. A MAturity Level (MAL) was then computed 
according to the scores obtained by factor and for the department (for ease of calculation, the 
average scores were rescaled from 0-100).  MAL ranges from MAL1 to MEL (Maturity 
Excellence Level) according to table 6.15 below. This tool necessitated a validation process. A 
content validity and reliability analysis were then performed. 
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Table 1-28 : Maturity level according to the score obtained 
Score  0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 
MAL MAL1 MAL2 MAL3 MAL4 MEL 
 
6.4. The Validation Phase 
In order to use adequately and properly any developed tool, a validation process of the measures 
in terms of content and reliability must be conducted. It allowed the tool user to interpret 
properly the results obtained by the tool in question. Content validity allows knowing to what 
degree the tool measures actually that for which it was designed whereas reliability relates to 
the consistency and repeatability of a test or a measure, in other words the stability of the scores 
with time. Testing the validity of the developed tool was performed to know to what extent the 
tool was intended to measure what it said to do and it showed that data are applied and 
interpreted as accurately as possible. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
was used as a support to carry out the statistical analyses in this research work. SPSS was chosen 
for its ability to perform rapidly the required tests whether it was principal components analysis 
and/or reliability analysis. As explained in the research method process (Chapter 4, figure 4.2), 
this phase addressed the tool validation in terms of content and reliability. This was done to 
achieve objective 4, part 1 of this research work. 
6.4.1. Content Validity 
The first operation consisted of a content validity. As stated in Chapter 4, section 4.7, it 
consisted of two parts: a measure by a panel of experts of the index of item-objective 
congruence and a principal component analysis. 
6.4.1.1. The Index of Item-Objective Congruence 
Six lay experts from maintenance departments of the Algerian oil and gas Company, academia 
from the Algerian Petroleum Institute, and two well-known international experts in resilience 
engineering domain were consulted. Comments of the international experts in resilience 
engineering are given in appendix 3.  
The statements (randomly arranged) were sent to the panel who were asked to give each 
statement a score according to the procedure explained previously (Chapter 4, section 4.7). As 
a result, all items were above 0.75 that was deemed acceptable; Turner and Carlson (2003, p. 
- 123 - 
 
167) stated “a generally accepted value might be a minimum of 0.75”. The number of items 
was reduced to 28 (some items were removed for redundancy and others have been combined) 
by taking into account the experts comments 
6.4.1.2. Principle Component Analysis 
As explained in section 6.2, MASRAT was intended to measure the resilience of the 
maintenance system of an oil and gas company. This was done by measuring the four abilities 
of the system namely ability to respond, ability to monitor, ability to anticipate, and ability to 
learn. The next action consisted of collecting data for psychometric analysis by applying 
MASRAT and discussing the results. It resided on presenting MASRAT and the underlying 
theory to a sample of maintenance personnel of the Company and asking these people to 
respond to the 28 items randomly arranged three times, one for “resources” factor, one for “time 
pressure” factor, and one for “coordination/supervision” factor. This was carried out in order to 
(1) test whether the items (statements) actually measured that for what they were designed and 
(2) review these items according to the feedback and the statistic study. In other words, the 
objectives of this action were as follows: 
 Did the set of items designed to measure for instance “the ability to respond” actually 
did it? (The same was performed for the other sets) 
 What could be changed in the four sets of items according to the feedback and statistics 
data so that they could achieve what was intended? 
Before carrying out the PCA analysis using the SPSS package, missing data and the 
characteristics of the population are first presented.  
 
i. Missing Data 
Missing data means one or more variables are not available for analysis. This issue is addressed 
by identifying the patterns and relationships underlying the missing data in order to maintain as 
close as possible the original distribution of values when any remedy is applied (Hale et al, 
1998). The analysis was performed by means of the principle components analysis (PCA) 
approach. In order to study the correlation between items, all missing data (one or more 
variables are not available for analysis) were excluded. In the case of this research work, 
missing data were due to the nonresponse to a set of questions by respondents. Two hundreds 
and two (202) files were distributed. A hundred and ninety-five responses were collected out 
of which thirteen were removed de facto since data were missing.  
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ii. Characteristics of the Population 
Industrial branches of the Algerian company SONATRACH were visited in six regions. Three 
regions are located in the North of Algeria, they concern downstream activities that is three 
LNG plants (two in West and one in East), two refineries (East and Centre), and two LPG plants 
(West of Algeria). Since South of Algeria, which concerns upstream activity of oil and gas and 
its transportation, is very large and vast, two representative regions (one for each activity) were 
chosen. A joint venture facility (SONATRACH and a foreign partner) was also concerned in 
the South of Algeria for upstream. A distribution of the population involved by type of facility 
in this action is given in figure 6.3.  
 
 
Figure 1-21: Distribution of the respondents by type of facility 
 
It is worth noting that it is pretty easy to visit four plants (downstream) in few days since the 
plants are situated in the same region (only few minutes are required to travel from one plant to 
another) than upstream facilities which are very remote and difficult to access in the short period 
of time allocated to do this action. This was the reason why these sites have been chosen. 
The distribution of level of experience in maintenance of the personnel met during this action 
is given in figure 6.4. The age average of these people was nearly 40 years. As can be seen from 
this figure, the maintenance personnel are very experienced since the majority of them (55%) 
have more than 10 years of experience in maintenance department. All people met have more 
than 03 years of experience in maintenance activities and quite 10% are managers (mid or 
frontline managers) in maintenance departments.  
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Figure 1-22: Distribution of level of experience of respondents in maintenance activities 
 
 
iii. Testing MASRAT with Maintenance Personnel 
Meetings with middle and frontline managers and engineers/technicians from SONATRACH 
maintenance departments were held in the main sites and industrial areas where the company 
is based as explained previously. During these meetings, MASRAT and the underlying theory 
was presented to the participants and debated. After that, the participants were asked to rate 
each statement (item) by ticking the relevant box from “1” to “M” to confirm or invalidate the 
statement in question according to the situation that actually exists in their facilities (see table 
6.10 in section 6.3 for scores and meanings). The results were then analysed by means of 
principal component analysis method. 
iv. The Principal Components Analysis (PCA) Results 
The principal component analysis approach and the reasons for choosing such a method have 
been explained in Chapter 4, section 4.8.4. In the following, the results of the different steps 
carried out are given. 
a. Assumption of Normality 
The first step of analysing a set of data is the assumption of normality. This can be performed 
by running Skewness and Kurtosis tests. Neither Skewness values nor Kurtosis ones suggested 
any dismissal of variables; Skewness values ranged from -0.450 to 0.474 and Kurtosis ones 
ranged from -0.877 to 0.440. According to Henson and Roberts (2006), a correlation matrix is 
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the most used by researchers in factor analysis. For the set of data studied, the correlation matrix 
showed a large number of correlations above 0.300.  
b. The Factorability of Data  
In this section, sample size requirement for factor analysis is addressed. In the case of this 
research, the ratio was higher than 6:1 (182/28) which satisfied the first test regarding sampling 
that is a rapid inspection of the sample. 
Before performing a factor analysis, two statistic tests were carried out: the Kaiser-Meyer Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The factorability of data 
was regarded through these two tests to determine the strength of the relationship among the 
studied items. For Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), a KMO value above 0.6 is acceptable. The 
values of KMO test and Bartlett's test of sphericity are shown in tables 6.16, 6.17, and 6.18 
respectively for the “resources”, “time pressure”, and “supervision/coordination” factors. 
Table 1-29 :  KMO and Bartlett's Test for “resources” factor 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.892
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2131.084
df 378
Sig. 0.000
 
Table 1-30: KMO and Bartlett's Test for “time pressure” factor 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.903
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2497.938
df 378
Sig. 0.000
 
Table 1-31 : KMO and Bartlett's Test for “supervision/coordination” factor 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.896
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2349.942
df 378
Sig. 0.000
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These values were significant and indicated that the correlations between items were good. 
Besides, the results of the Bartlet’s test of sphericity were below the value p < 0,05 that is, also 
significant and allowed to reject the null hypothesis that says the population for which the 
correlation matrix is an identity matrix, this indicated that there existed sufficient correlations 
between variables to proceed. Therefore, the set of data were suitable for factor analysis. 
c. Eigenvalues and Scree Test 
Two other criteria were considered in the following: the eigenvalues and the scree test. To begin 
with the “resources” factor, SPSS extracted a six component solution by applying the 
eigenvalues above 1 rule even though one component has an eigenvalue very close to 1. The 
scree test of eigenvalues plotted against factors showed rather a four or five component solution 
(figure 6.5). It can be seen from the figure that the blue line that has been added to show the 
number of components above the inflection point (the elbow), indicates that there may be a four 
or five component solution.  
 
 
Figure 1-23: Scree plot for the “resources” factor 
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For the “time pressure” factor, SPSS extracted a five-component solution by applying the 
eigenvalues above one rule. All the five values were above one, the lowest one was quite 1.1 in 
comparison to the values extracted for the previous factor. The scree test of eigenvalues plotted 
against factors showed quite the same plot that is a four or five component solution (figure 6.6).  
 
Figure 1-24: Scree plot for the “time pressure” factor 
The same action was carried out for the “supervision/coordination” factor. SPSS extracted a 
five-component solution by applying the eigenvalues above one rule. The scree test of 
eigenvalues plotted against factors showed quite the same plot that is a four or five component 
solution (figure 6.7).  
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Figure 1-25: Scree plot for the “supervision/coordination” factor 
 
To sum up, the three factors that were investigated showed quite the same scree plot of 
eigenvalues suggesting a same number of factors (components). From these scree plots, a four 
or five solution was considered in the rotation test. 
 
d. Rotation  
Rotation is carried out after the factor extraction in order to increase the interpretability and 
scientific utility of the solution to maximise high correlations between factors and variables and 
minimise low ones. The results of the orthogonal rotation are shown in a loading matrix where 
the values give correlations between variables and factors. For each of the three factors, 
solutions for four and five components were extracted and rotated using a Varimax method. 
The study of these solutions converged toward the fact the four-component solution was judged 
the most convenient and the one that fitted the criteria of simple structure as suggested by 
Ferreira (2011).  
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The recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) with respect to loading factors were 
into account; they are recalled in the following:  
 The choice is given to researchers to decide about interpretation 
 A loading value of 0.32 or larger for meaningful correlation is suggested as a rule of 
thumb; in this study 0.400 is chosen as a criterion to construct a factor (component) 
 Where there are multiple loadings a minimum difference of 0.200 is imposed 
 The variables that have loadings in excess with respect to the chosen criterion (0.400) 
are put together 
 Eventually, interpretation is preformed  
Tables 6.19, 6.20, and 6.21 give the loading components for each variable respectively for the 
“resources” factor, the “time pressure” factor, and the “supervision/coordination” factor. The 
loading values above 0.400 are in bold. 
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Table 1-32 : Rotated Component Matrix for the “resources” factor 
Rotated Component Matrix for the “resources” factor 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
The organisation analyses long term effects and develops strategic planning for resources issues 0.706 0.121 0.268 0.017 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn from resources issues 0.224 0.718 0.022 0.330 
The department maintains readiness to respond to resources issues 0.252 0.160 0.061 0.655 
There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for resources issues 0.282 0.190 0.690 0.123 
Before each management review, the department assesses resources issues 0.294 0.081 0.154 0.596 
The department systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses to resources issues 0.053 0.292 0.394 0.417 
The department assesses absence of failures, hazards, and accidents to anticipate resources issues 0.647 0.314 0.111 0.150 
The learning activity is a continuous process and built throughout the entire organisation for resources issues 0.395 0.511 0.093 0.377 
Information exchange within the department is a continuous and spontaneous flux that constitutes a basis to locate 
signs of trouble stemming from resources issues 
0.666 0.089 0.068 0.210 
The outcomes of the analyses are rapidly communicated inside and outside the organisation for resources issues 0.231 0.691 0.195 -0.047 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, analyse, disseminate results, and learn from 
resources issues 
0.252 0.687 -0.051 0.061 
There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of resources issues 0.355 -0.171 0.523 0.295 
There is a vulnerability model within the organisation clearly formulated for resources issues 0.486 0.180 0.212 0.168 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest possible for resources issues 0.063 0.689 0.254 -0.121 
There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for resources issues 0.361 0.723 0.139 0.161 
PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for resources issues 0.441 0.140 0.648 0.019 
PI measurements are reliable for resources issues 0.135 0.250 0.660 0.319 
Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the recommendations implemented 
throughout the organisation for resources issues 
0.532 0.128 0.262 0.226 
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Rotated Component Matrix for the “resources” factor (continued) 
Rotated Component Matrix for the “resources” factor 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
The department applies threshold criteria for activating a response to resources issues 0.011 0.011 0.377 0.553 
There is a regular diagnosis of safety/production trade-off within the organisation for resources issues 0.584 0.301 0.076 0.128 
The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety margins stemming from resources issues 0.535 0.329 -0.154 0.242 
The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the future (analyses trends) for resources issues 0.539 0.306 0.240 -0.050 
The department has prepared responses to resources issues -0.106 0.068 0.244 0.759 
There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is taking place for resources issues 0.150 0.753 0.286 0.131 
There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, and lagging) related to resources issues 0.088 0.137 0.667 0.244 
The department  supports (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring of resources issues 0.469 0.177 0.398 0.423 
The organisation possesses tools to analyse and predict outcomes caused by resources issues 0.607 0.214 0.282 0.049 
The department provides sufficient resources to respond to resources issues 0.375 -0.032 0.078 0.558 
Eigenvalues  4.596 4.119 3.184 3.134  
% of variance explained 16,41 14,71 11,37 11,19 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. 
Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
Total % of variance explained 53,690: the four variables explain up to 53.69% of the variance. 
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The rotation converged after 08 iterations. It can be seen from table 6.19 that all variables have 
a loading value above the chosen criteria 0.400. Two variables presented cross-loading values. 
The first variable is “PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for resources 
issues”. The two loading values are 0.441 for component 1 and 0.648 for component 3. The 
difference is largely above 0.200. The second variable is “The department supports (resources 
& visibility) flexible monitoring of resources issues” for which the difference is less than 0.200 
(in blue colour). Except these two variables, the others showed significant loadings 
demonstrating a strong correlation between variables and components.  
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Table 1-33 : Rotated Component Matrix for the “time pressure” factor 
Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
The organisation possesses tools to analyse and predict outcomes caused by time pressure issues 0.218 0.635 0.212 0.172 
There is a regular diagnosis of safety/production trade-off within the organisation for time pressure issues 0.124 0.725 0.123 0.267 
PI measurements are reliable for time pressure issues 0.228 0.261 0.604 0.257 
There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, and lagging) related to time pressure issues 0.120 0.185 0.768 0.157 
There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for time pressure issues 0.802 0.166 0.169 0.203 
PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for time pressure issues 0.269 0.219 0.706 0.115 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn from time pressure issues 0.607 0.423 0.090 0.191 
Information exchange within the department is a continuous and spontaneous flux that constitutes a basis to 
locate signs of trouble stemming from time pressure issues 
0.290 0.525 0.229 0.245 
There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for time pressure issues 0.160 0.184 0.770 0.108 
Before each management review, the department assesses time pressure issues 0.025 0.347 0.078 0.604 
The learning activity is a continuous process and built throughout the entire organisation for time pressure issues 0.681 0.346 -0.021 0.143 
There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is taking place for time pressure issues 0.772 0.309 0.097 0.181 
The department provides sufficient resources to respond to time pressure issues 0.148 0.103 0.254 0.695 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, analyse, disseminate results, and learn from time 
pressure issues 
0.730 0.275 0.100 0.166 
Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the recommendations implemented 
throughout the organisation for time pressure issues 
0.167 0.375 0.360 0.280 
The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety margins stemming from time pressure 0.263 0.649 -0.017 0.233 
There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of time pressure issues -0.023 -0.006 0.771 0.217 
The outcomes of the analyses are rapidly communicated inside and outside the organisation for time pressure 0.724 0.110 0.269 0.059 
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Rotated Component Matrix for the “time pressure” factor (continued) 
Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
The organisation analyses long term effects and develops strategic planning for time pressure issues 0.195 0.743 0.284 0.015 
The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the future (analyse trends) for time pressure issues 0.257 0.623 0.305 0.005 
The department maintains readiness to respond to time pressure issues 0.215 0.209 0.079 0.737 
The department  systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses to time pressure issues 0.291 0.196 0.246 0.621 
The department  supports (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring of time pressure issues 0.038 0.307 0.558 0.401 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest possible for time pressure issues 0.678 0.067 0.140 -0.002 
There is a vulnerability model within the organisation clearly formulated for time pressure issues 0.143 0.262 0.424 0.272 
The department assesses absence of failures, hazards, and accidents to anticipate time pressure issues 0.275 0.580 0.229 0.165 
The department applies threshold criteria for activating a response to time pressure issues 0.144 -0.027 0.222 0.767 
The department has prepared responses to time pressure issues 0.001 0.186 0.244 0.765 
Eigenvalues  4.374 4.153 3.993 3.831 
% of variance explained 15,62 14,83 14,26 13,68 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Total % of variance explained 58,394: the four variables explain up to 58,4% of the variance  
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For this set of data, the rotation converged after 06 iterations. It can be seen from table 6.20 that 
one variable had loading values below the chosen criteria (in blue colour). This variable is “data 
collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the recommendations 
implemented throughout the organisation for time pressure issues”. On the other hand, two 
variables presented cross-loading values. The first one is “The organisation supports and trains 
staff to collect data, analyse, and learn from time pressure issues”, for which the values are 
respectively 0.607 and 0.423 for component 1 and component 2. As can be noticed, the 
difference is slightly close to 0.200. The second one (blue colour) is “The department supports 
(resources and visibility) flexible monitoring of time pressure issues” for which the values are 
respectively 0.558 and 0.401 for component 3 and 4. 
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Table 1-34 : Rotated Component Matrix for the “supervision/coordination” factor 
Rotated Component Matrix for the “supervision/coordination” factor 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of supervision/coordination issue 0.038 0.773 0.197 0.033 
Before each management review, the department assesses supervision/coordination issue -0.042 0.216 0.503 0.390 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest possible for supervision/coordination issue 0.557 -0.056 0.046 0.393 
PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for supervision/coordination issue 0.244 0.746 0.129 0.158 
There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for supervision/coordination issue 0.156 0.699 0.157 0.255 
Information exchange within the department is a continuous and spontaneous flux that constitutes a basis to locate 
signs of trouble stemming from supervision/coordination issue 
0.383 -0.001 0.233 0.412 
The department has prepared responses to supervision/coordination issue -0.034 0.041 0.784 0.140 
There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for supervision/coordination issue 0.793 0.243 0.134 0.165 
The organisation possesses tools to analyse and predict outcomes caused by supervision/coordination issue 0.209 0.246 0.165 0.623 
The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the future (analyse trends) for supervision/coordination 
issue 
0.199 0.378 -0.007 0.600 
The department applies threshold criteria for activating a response to supervision/coordination issue 0.096 0.331 0.641 -0.012 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, analyse, disseminate results, and learn from 
supervision/coordination issue 
0.737 0.030 0.078 0.289 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn from supervision/coordination issue 0.728 0.161 0.133 0.207 
There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, and lagging) related to supervision/coordination 
issue 
0.120 0.665 0.250 0.125 
The outcomes of the analyses are rapidly communicated inside and outside the organisation for 
supervision/coordination issue 
0.694 0.342 -0.061 0.082 
The organisation analyses long term effects and develops strategic planning for supervision/coordination issue 0.326 0.343 -0.049 0.679 
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Rotated Component Matrix for the “supervision/coordination” factor (continued) 
Rotated Component Matrix for the “supervision/coordination” factor 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
The department provides sufficient resources to respond to supervision/coordination issue 0.219 0.370 0.650 -0.110 
PI measurements are reliable for supervision/coordination issue 0.141 0.542 0.339 0.320 
Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the recommendations implemented 
throughout the organisation for supervision/coordination issue 
0.303 0.423 0.266 0.292 
The learning activity is a continuous process and built throughout the entire organisation for 
supervision/coordination issue 
0.782 0.214 0.099 0.012 
There is a regular diagnosis of safety/production trade-off within the organisation for supervision/coordination issue 0.349 0.163 0.245 0.557 
The department supports (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring of supervision/coordination issue 0.038 0.317 0.469 0.391 
The department assesses absence of failures, hazards, and accidents to anticipate supervision/coordination issue 0.369 0.121 0.332 0.563 
There is a vulnerability model within the organisation clearly formulated for supervision/coordination issue 0.184 0.409 0.207 0.294 
The department systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses to supervision/coordination issue 0.090 0.266 0.611 0.216 
The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety margins stemming from 
supervision/coordination issue 
0.386 -0.008 0.245 0.408 
There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is taking place for supervision/coordination issue 0.706 0.162 0.102 0.342 
The department maintains readiness to respond to supervision/coordination issue 0.253 0.066 0.648 0.154 
Eigenvalues  4.727 3.837 3.467 3.391 
% of variance explained 16,88 13,70 12,38 12,11 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
Total % of variance explained 55,079: the four variables explain up to 55,08 % of the variance  
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For the third set of data, the rotation converged after 07 iterations. Table 6.21 shows no variable 
with loading values below the chosen criterion and no variable presenting cross-loading values 
but two variables had loadings that do not match with the component (blue colour). These 
variables are “The department supports (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring of 
supervision/coordination issue” and “There is a vulnerability model within the organisation 
clearly formulated for supervision/coordination issue”. An explanation is given in the next 
section 
e. Interpretation 
This step of principle component analysis addresses the interpretation of extracted components. 
After the reduction of the 28 items to four components, the latter were investigated to 
characterise and interpret the meaning of each component. As can be seen in the following 
tables (from table 6.22 to table 6.25), there was a choice between removing completely an item 
deemed not having sufficient loading and/or having the required loading which interpretation 
asked to move the item to another component. On the other hand, instead of removing an item, 
it might be more interesting to change the wording to avoid confusion. A summary of the 
loadings for each component is given in tables 6.22, 6.23, 6.24 and 6.25 below. 
Table 1-35 : Summary of variable loadings for the first component 
Variables (items) for ability to respond component  Resources 
issues 
TP 
issues 
SC 
issues 
Before each management review, the department assesses… 0.596 0.604 0,503 
The department has prepared responses to… 0.759 0.765 0,784 
The department applies threshold criteria for activating a 
response to... 
0.553 0.767 0,641 
The department systematically evaluates and testes on site the 
responses to... 
0.417 0.621 0,611 
The department provides sufficient resources to respond to... 0.558 0.695 0,650 
The department maintains readiness to respond to … 0.655 0.737 0,648 
 
For the first component “the ability to respond”, table 6.22 shows high loadings for all of the 
items regarding the three studied factors. The six items that measured this ability were therefore 
accepted as they were designed first instance since there was no noticeable issue except for the 
fifth item that required a specification for the word resources as requested by respondents to 
avoid confusion with the studied factor. Hence, the item became “The department provides 
sufficient resources (competent personnel, time, etc.) to respond to... 
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Table 1-36 : Summary of variable loadings for the second component 
Variables (items) for ability to monitor component Resources 
issues 
TP 
issues 
SC 
issues 
The department supports (resources & visibility) flexible 
monitoring of... 
0.398 0.558 0,317 
There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of 
... 
0.523 0.771 0,773 
There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, 
and lagging) related to… 
0.667 0.768 0,665 
There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for … 0.690 0.770 0,699 
PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for... 0.648 0.706 0,746 
PI measurements are reliable for ... 0.660 0.604 0,542 
Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, 
and the recommendations implemented throughout the 
organisation for… 
0.532 in 
anticipate 
component 
Missing 
case 
under 
0.400 
0,423 
 
In the case of the component “the ability to monitor”, there were two issues (table 6.23). First, 
the item “The department supports (resources & visibility) flexible monitoring of…” showed 
insufficient loading with respect to two factors (resources and supervision/coordination) 
according to the rules defined earlier in this section. It can be explained by the fact that the item 
was not well written creating some confusion among respondents since the word “monitoring” 
has not a common utilisation among respondents. The item received a better loading (0.469) 
regarding the component “the ability to respond” and (0.423) for “the ability to anticipate”, (see 
respectively the rotated component matrices given above in tables 6.19 and 6.21). The solution 
lied may be in changing the wording of the item. Therefore, the new item became “The 
monitoring of …issues is of great importance in the maintenance department”. 
Second, the item “Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the 
recommendations implemented throughout the organisation for…” was a missing case since it 
had a loading under 0.400 for the “time pressure” factor and had a good loading 0.532 but in 
“the ability to anticipate” component regarding the resources factor. Its loading for the 
supervision/coordination factor was acceptable (0.423) though. This item was therefore moved 
to the “ability to anticipate component”.  
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Table 1-37 : Summary of variable loadings for the third component 
Variables (items) for ability to anticipate component Resources 
issues 
TP 
issues 
SC 
issues 
There is a vulnerability model within the organisation clearly 
formulated for... 
0,486 0.262 0,294 
The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the 
future (analyses trends) for... 
0.539 0.623 0,600 
The organisation possesses tools to analyse and predict outcomes 
caused by ... 
0.607 0.635 0,623 
The organisation analyses long term effects and develops 
strategic planning for ... 
0.706 0.743 0,679 
The department assesses absence of failures, hazards, and 
accidents to anticipate ... 
0.647 0.580 0,563 
Information exchange within the department is a continuous and 
spontaneous flux that constitutes a basis to locate signs of 
trouble stemming from ... 
0.666 0.525 0,412 
There is a regular diagnosis of safety/production trade-off within 
the organisation for...  
0.584 0.725 0,557 
The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on 
safety margins stemming from… 
0.535 0.649 0,408 
 
The only issue for the third component, “the ability to anticipate”, concerned the first item i.e. 
“There is a vulnerability model within the organisation clearly formulated for...” There were 
actually some difficulties to grasp the meaning of the word “vulnerability” in addition to the 
translation from English to French and vice versa. This is explained in more details in Chapter 
7. To solve this issue, an explanation of the desired meaning of this word was added. The item 
became “There is a vulnerability (fragility, weakness) model within the organisation clearly 
formulated for...”  
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Table 1-38 : Summary of variable loadings for the fourth component 
Variables (items) for ability to learn component Resources 
issues 
TP 
issues 
SC 
issues 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, 
and learn from... 
0.718 0.607 0,728 
The learning activity is a continuous process and built throughout 
the entire organisation for ... 
0.511 0.681 0,782 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, 
analyse, disseminate results, and learn from... 
0.687 0.730 0,737 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the 
shortest possible for... 
0.689 0.678 0,557 
The outcomes of these analyses are rapidly communicated inside 
and outside the organisation for... 
0.691 0.724 0,694 
There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is 
taking place for ... 
0.753 0.772 0,706 
There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for ... 0.723 0.802 0,793 
 
With respect to the fourth component “the ability to learn” (table 6.25) , there is no noticeable 
issue with the loadings. The latter are very high for all items, majority of which are above 0.600. 
For the three factors, only two items have got loading below 0.600 and above 0.500. To sum 
up, the new components are shown in table 6.26 according to the interpretation of the results. 
The statement is followed by the studied factor 
Table 1-39 : The new MASRAT items 
Measured 
ability 
Items (statements) 
A
bi
lit
y 
to
 re
sp
on
d Before each management review, the department assesses… 
The department has prepared responses to… 
The department applies threshold criteria for activating a response to... 
The department systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses to... 
The department provides sufficient resources (competent personnel, time, etc.) 
to respond to... 
The department maintains readiness to respond to … 
A
bi
lit
y 
to
 
m
on
ito
r 
The monitoring of …issues is of great importance in the maintenance department
There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of ... 
There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, and lagging) 
related to… 
There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for … 
PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for... 
PI measurements are reliable for ... 
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The new MASRAT items (continued) 
Measured 
ability 
Items (statements) 
A
bi
lit
y 
to
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
e 
There is a vulnerability (fragility, weakness) model within the organisation 
clearly formulated for... 
The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the future (analyses 
trends) for... 
The organisation possesses tools to analyse and predict outcomes caused by ... 
The organisation analyses long term effects and develops strategic planning for ... 
The department assesses absence of failures, hazards, and accidents to anticipate 
... 
Information exchange within the department is a continuous and spontaneous 
flux that constitutes a basis to locate signs of trouble stemming from ... 
There is a regular diagnosis of safety/production trade-off within the organisation 
for...  
The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety margins 
stemming from… 
Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the 
recommendations implemented throughout the organisation for… 
A
bi
lit
y 
to
 le
ar
n 
The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn 
from... 
The learning activity is a continuous process and built throughout the entire 
organisation for ... 
The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, analyse, 
disseminate results, and learn from... 
The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest 
possible for... 
The outcomes of these analyses are rapidly communicated inside and outside the 
organisation for... 
There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is taking place for ... 
There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for ... 
 
To conclude, PCA was performed to analyse the three factors (resources, time pressure, and 
supervision/coordination). The results showed the reproducibility of the instrument for the three 
factors; this means that MASRAT can be used for any of the identified factor and may be 
extended to study all the 16 factors. 
6.4.2. Reliability 
The second action consisted of a reliability measure of MASRAT to check the internal 
consistency of data collected. In order to determine its reliability, Cronbach’s alpha was used. 
This coefficient ranges from zero to one; the nearest the value to one is, the highest the internal 
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consistency of studied items. It calculates the correlation coefficient between items 
(statements). 
The data described in the above sections (distributed to two hundreds and twenty-two people) 
were used to determine the internal consistency. By means of SPSS (STATISTICA), 
Cronbach’s alpha was computed. It is very well known that a value of 0.7 is judged acceptable. 
The results of Cronbach’s alpha values per component and factor are given in table 6.27. They 
clearly show that the tool has a good internal consistency of data since the values of Cronbach’s 
alpha are higher than 0.7 as required.  
Table 1-40 : Cronbach’s alpha values per component and factor 
Component  Factor Cronbach’s alpha 
Ability to respond 
Resources 0.758 
Time pressure 0.854 
Supervision/coordination 0.802 
Ability to flexibly monitor 
Resources 0.840 
Time pressure 0.864 
Supervision/coordination 0.849 
Ability to anticipate 
Resources 0.837 
Time pressure 0.855 
Supervision/coordination 0.833 
Ability to learn 
Resources 0.871 
Time pressure 0.892 
Supervision/coordination 0.891 
 
6.5. Link to the Objectives of the Research 
In this Chapter, the main contribution of this piece of research was presented. It consisted of a 
framework that allows performing a gap analysis and define a strategy to achieve the aim of 
this thesis on the one hand. It comprised the development and validation of a tool that measures 
the resilience of the maintenance system in the oil and gas industry with respect to the most 
significant identified factors on the other hand. These represent objective 3 and objective 4, part 
1 of this study respectively the identification of a strategy based on resilience engineering and 
the contribution to the development of a tool that measures the resilience of the maintenance 
system in the oil and gas industry with respect to the most significant identified factors and 
validate the tool. 
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6.6. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter was devoted to the development and validation of the tool that allowed performing 
the gap analysis. MASRAT was developed to measure the resilience of a maintenance system.  
The development phase lasted several months. It began with the design of general questions 
dealing with resilience engineering. Then, it went through the development of a set of questions 
for each of the four aspects of resilience. It ended by changing the strategy and moving toward 
the use of a set of statements instead of questions since it has been found difficult to construct 
a comprehensive and coherent matrix that may address the four cornerstones of resilience 
engineering. Parallel to this, a scale for rating each statement was adopted. From this scale, 
maturity levels were defined. The validity and reliability of MASRAT were verified by means 
of the index of item-objective congruence and principal component analysis for content 
validity, and Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the internal consistency of data.  
To test the content validity, experts were asked to rate each statement to see whether it clearly 
measures the objective for each factor or not. The results were positive (all items were rated 
above 0.75). Expert comments were taken into account to change the wording and improve the 
elements of the instrument. 
A principal component analysis was then run. Maintenance departments of SONATRACH 
were solicited to test MASRAT and collect data in order to perform a principal component and 
reliability analysis. The tool was presented and explained to managers and engineers. They 
were asked to rate the statements and comment on. The results of the principal component 
analysis obtained by using SPSS confirmed that the 28 items might be clustered after extraction 
and interpretation into four components. The components represented the four cornerstones of 
resilience engineering (the ability of the system to respond to threats/opportunities, the ability 
to monitor its performance and the environment, the ability to anticipate developments, and the 
ability to learn from past experiences). The analysis of these results showed that three items did 
not satisfy the conditions imposed before analysis. The decision was not to remove any of these 
items but instead review the wording of the item or move it to another factor. As explained 
earlier (section 6.4), there have been some difficulties to understand words such as 
“vulnerability” and “monitoring” and the confusion between “resources” as a factor and 
“resources” as what is required to carry out an action. Therefore, the decision was to rephrase 
the two concerned items. On the other hand, an item was moved from a component to another 
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because its loading indicated a higher value with respect to the other component as well as a 
corresponding meaning (the meaning of the item matched the sense of the second component). 
Since PCA gave good results for the three studied factors i.e. resources, time pressure, and 
supervision/coordination, it could be concluded that the items of the instrument were 
reproducible for the three factors that meant that MASRAT could be used for any of the 
identified factor and might be extended to study all the 16 factors.  
Cronbach’s alpha was then computed by means of SPSS. The results were higher than what 
was required that is 0.7 value. 
The next Chapter will address the expert panel testing of MASRAT that is to achieve objective 
four, part 2. The new items were used in three ateliers of a workshop with experts from 
maintenance departments of the three branches of the Company. The three ateliers represented 
the three studied factors. 
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 THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM RESILIENCE 
ASSESSMENT TOOL, MASRAT, PANEL EXPERT TESTING: 
WORKSHOP 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the development and validation of MASRAT was addressed. As 
explained in the research method process (chapter 4), the following phase dealt with tool testing 
that is, applying the tool to measure the system’s resilience and identify strategies for 
improvement, and make recommendations to manage safety proactively in the maintenance 
system; this represented objective 4, part 2 of this research work. The testing phase included a 
panel expert testing through a workshop held in the Algerian Petroleum Institute. It was 
organised in three ateliers according to three factors (resources, time pressure, and 
coordination/supervision). Experts from maintenance departments were invited and asked to 
use MASRAT.  
This chapter presents the results of the workshop. Section 7.2 addresses the workshop design, 
its structure, and process. Workshop results and analysis are given in section 7.3. It gives the 
results of the assessment of the system resilience as well as the main recommendations, and 
eventually the results are discussed. An evaluation of the workshop is carried out in section 7.4. 
Eventually, section 7.5 summarises this chapter.   
7.2. Workshop Design 
7.2.1. Participants 
The objective of expert testing for any developed tool is to check its usability in real life. The 
experts contributed to highlight limitations and help identify areas of improvement. Besides, 
the experts that were chosen to participate in this action came from the maintenance 
departments where MASRAT was sensible to be used.  
A request was sent to the Algerian Petroleum Institute (IAP) management to hold a workshop 
gathering experts from maintenance personnel representing the three branches of activity of the 
Company (oil and gas production, pipeline transportation, and gas and refining plants) with the 
aim of making recommendations to top management of the Company. The approval was got to 
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invite 30 experts (10 persons per branch) for one day and a half workshop. Skilled and 
experienced people were invited in order to have an effect on the results of validation. Some of 
these people were located during the validation phase (chapter 6) and were proposed to 
participate in a workshop in order to carry out this testing while others were chosen by their 
respective directions.  
Actually, there have been two (02) groups of actors in the workshop: the principal actors i.e. 
the experts from maintenance departments called “the participants” in this thesis and the 
facilitators. For evaluating the workshop, three (03) actions were retained, namely an immediate 
evaluation, a questionnaire, and an interview. The first and the second actions concerned all of 
the actors whereas the third one was directed to the facilitators. The results and analysis of the 
responses are described in the evaluation section. 
7.2.2. The Workshop Structure 
After the validation process of the tool, a workshop was held in the Algerian Petroleum Institute 
(IAP) 27-28 of January 2013. Among the 30 experts from maintenance departments (oil and 
gas production and pipeline transportation, and gas and refining plants) that were invited, only 
23 persons attended the workshop, the others did not for security matters.  Among the attendees, 
04 were managers (head of maintenance department). An explanatory introduction was sent to 
the participants explaining the expectations and the objectives of the workshop (see appendix 
4). 
The objectives set for the workshop were:  
a) Communicate and study the data collected during the action of validation,  
b) Assess the resilience of the maintenance system and determine the different profiles and 
maturity levels,  
c) Identify strategies for improvement, and  
d) Make recommendations to top management. 
To achieve these objectives, the following activities were planned.  
 Invite experts from maintenance department of all branches of the Company to the 
workshop 
 Send materials to participants and facilitators to prepare the workshop 
 Hold the workshop 
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 Make an explanatory presentation about MASRAT and workshop objectives followed 
by a debate 
 Split the participants into three groups (ateliers) to study the three identified factors 
(resources, time pressure, and supervision/coordination) 
 Use MASRAT to achieve objectives 
 Find out suggestions to improve MASRAT 
The workshop consisted of two parts. First, a presentation to the participants of the new 
approach as well as the background underlying the development of MASRAT and the data 
collected during the validation process were done; this was followed by a debate that 
concentrated mainly on the new approach. Second, three (03) ateliers were set according to the 
factors that were studied i.e. resources, time pressure, and supervision/coordination.  
In the ateliers, the participants reviewed the 28 items related to the four (04) abilities (ability to 
respond, to monitor, to anticipate, and to learn) and assessed the resilience of the system. Then, 
item, factors, aspects, and department profiles were determined. Afterwards, the maturity level 
according to a scale ranging from MAL 1 to MEL (excellence) was computed. This was 
followed by the identification of strategies for improvement based on SWOT analysis. Finally, 
recommendations were made both for department and corporate level; figure 7.1 shows the 
structure of the workshop. Section 7.3 addresses the activity of each of the three ateliers. 
 
Figure 1-26 : Structure of the workshop 
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7.2.3. The Workshop Process 
In the following, the implementation process is declined. It consisted of: 
 Committing stakeholders to this action,  
 Describing the implementation process,  
 Identifying specific aspects that should be looked at,  
 Performing the workshop  
 Getting immediate feedback  
 Sending questionnaire to participants and facilitators after the workshop to comment 
on,  
 Interviewing facilitators, and  
 Eventually carrying out analysis of data collected. 
7.2.3.1. Stakeholders’ Engagement 
The process of MASRAT implementation and goals was explained to IAP managers to help get 
approval from SONATRACH managers. With respect to the field-testing (from validation to 
the expert panel testing in a workshop), a total commitment was obtained from top management. 
However, participants and facilitators deemed the time allocated and imposed to the workshop 
very short. 
7.2.3.2. Program Description 
In this workshop, experts from maintenance departments of the company met and debated about 
the prevailing situation and exchanged experiences. Particularly, the resilience of the 
maintenance system was evaluated for the first time by means of the MAintenance Resilience 
Assessment Tool (MASRAT). System profiles and maturity levels were determined. Strategies 
to improve current situation for both corporate and local level were identified. These strategies 
might be studied within each department to determine the appropriate mechanisms of 
implementation. Finally, recommendations were made for top management. 
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7.2.3.3. Specific Aspects 
i. Statement of need 
The study of human factors in the maintenance of oil and gas assets is limited in comparison to 
other industries such as aviation and nuclear as it has been shown in chapters 2 and 3. In 
response to this, the use of MASRAT was intended to remedy this limitation by studying human 
factors in the maintenance system of the Algerian National Oil and Gas Company to achieve 
safety excellence based on resilience engineering, 
ii. Expectations 
As stated earlier, the usability of MASRAT was tested in real world and suggestions to improve 
MASRAT were expected. 
iii. Activities 
In the validation phase, meetings with maintenance staffs were held. During these meetings, 
MASRAT was presented and a debate followed each presentation. Some participants were seen 
as experts that could enhance the level of the workshop if they were invited. In addition, 
managers at corporate level were solicited to propose experts from their branch. Thirty people 
from maintenance department of all branches of the Company were invited to attend the 
workshop. Materials were sent to participants and facilitators to prepare the workshop. An 
explanatory presentation about MASRAT and workshop objectives that was followed by a 
debate was carried out. The participants were then split into three groups (ateliers) to study the 
three identified factors. They were asked to use MASRAT and go through the twenty-eight (28) 
items of the tool.  
iv. Stage of development  
It concerned the MASRAT implementation phase to see what happens in the real world. 
v. Context  
MASRAT was used to achieve research objectives. 
vi. Resources  
Materials were sent to participants and facilitators to prepare the workshop. In the ateliers, 
templates were distributed with the objective to go through the 28 items in one day maximum 
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according to the deadline imposed by IAP management. Logs were prepared and given to 
participants  
vii. Benefits  
The values or benefits of this action consisted of testing the usability of MASRAT and gaining 
suggestions to improve it. Moreover, it allowed identify strategies for improvement to 
implement at both department and corporate levels as well as measure the system’s resilience. 
Besides, it entailed making recommendations to top management to improve the system of 
maintenance and beginning the continuous improvement journey.  
7.2.4. Communication about the Validation Phase 
During the first part that lasted half day, the expected activity of the workshop was presented 
to the audience. An introduction was first given where it has been shown that (1) maintenance 
activities are generally labour intensive hence accidents prone, (2) human factors are most times 
difficult to identify, and (3) research within the oil and gas industry with respect to human 
factors in maintenance management is limited. Research in safety had focused on accidents so 
far and traditional risk assessment techniques as well as accident causation models have been 
unable to handle current complex safety critical systems. Therefore, the urgent need to develop 
something different to address such systems as well as to make the shift to understand why 
things go right too were emphasised. The proposed solution lied in the use of a new approach 
based on Resilience Engineering and a way to measure the system resilience. MASRAT that 
was developed to this end was then presented. The development and validation phase were 
reviewed. The different improvements of MASRAT until the last version were then given. The 
participants and facilitators were invited to debate. As per the different visits to maintenance 
departments, the debate concentrated mainly on the new approach based on resilience 
engineering. Some participants that have contributed during the validation phase stressed on 
the fact that the meaning of some items were difficult to grasp first instance when they had to 
give a score. The answer was the activity during the atelier would surely help clarify anything 
that looks obscure. 
7.3. Results 
The study of the usability of MASRAT was the main objective of the workshop. The 
participants examined the system resilience within the three ateliers. In each atelier, the experts 
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went through the 28 items with respect to the four abilities. They established the different 
profiles for the maintenance department according to the three studied factors. An Excel 
worksheet allowed the determination of the profiles by means of a star chart as well as a 
maturity level assessment model. In the following sections, the workshop results by atelier, the 
system profiles, and maturity levels are given. 
7.3.1. Workshop Results by Atelier 
In order to determine strategies for improvement with respect to each of the three factors, the 
experts discussed the 28 items one by one according to the theme of their dedicated atelier. The 
conclusions that came up from the workshop are summarised in the following tables from table 
7.1 to table 7.12. In the ateliers, the current situation was assessed for each of the items to which 
a score was attributed. After that, an expected higher score to be achieved was devised and 
adopted and actions to achieve the adopted score were recommended.  
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Table 1-41 : Atelier resources, ability to respond 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.1 Before each 
management review, 
the department 
assesses resources 
issues 
Meetings are held to discuss 
issues encountered (weekly in 
certain regions, monthly in 
others) 
 
2 
A preparation of meetings/briefings should 
be done by the planning section first. Hold 
daily/weekly evaluation of such issues in the 
different sections of the maintenance 
department and monthly meetings at director 
and maintenance departments dedicated to 
resources issues. These meetings should be 
done according to preventive maintenance 
planning where priority should be given to 
vulnerable equipment. Contractors’ 
experience should be used to contribute to 
make these actions succeed. Systematically 
evaluate value added of these meetings. 
3 The maintenance department   
1.2 The department 
has prepared 
responses to 
resources issues 
There is no model dedicated to 
respond to resources issues. 
An important lack of spare 
parts exists in addition to a 
planning problem. Managers 
cannot conclude direct 
contracts. Besides, resources 
are not optimised with other 
departments and important 
delays exist in the conclusion 
of some contracts. 
 
2 
Allow managers to conclude direct contracts 
where suppliers have the exclusivity. Put in 
place joint ventures for spare parts and 
maintenance. Conclude O & M contracts. 
Optimise the use of the CMMS. 
 
3 
The organisation 
should encourage 
such tasks. 
 
 
 
The maintenance 
department 
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Atelier resources, ability to respond (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.3 The department 
applies threshold 
criteria for activating 
a response to 
resources issues 
Safety stocks and tracker 
sheets are taken into 
consideration 
 
2 Evaluate sheets and determine threshold criteria for every important equipment 3 
Decisions should be 
taken at corporate 
level 
  
1.4 The department 
systematically 
evaluates and testes 
on site the responses 
to resources issues 
Do not exist 1 
Search issues inherent to the obsolescence of 
spare parts as well as the disappearance of 
suppliers. To this end, make the existence of 
spare durable for a period of e.g. 15 years. Put 
in place technology watch units and internal 
audits to follow up maintenance activities 
issues for managers and engineers concerned 
by the acquisition of spare parts. Follow-up 
trends about inherent issues of spare 
obsolescence. Make procedures more flexible 
to optimise the ability to respond. Allow 
contracts flexibility with potential suppliers. 
3 
Decisions should be 
taken at corporate 
level 
  
1.5 The department 
provides sufficient 
resources 
(competent 
personnel, time, etc.) 
to respond to 
resources issues 
This is performed according to 
existing procedures. 3 Maintain the level 3    
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Atelier resources, ability to respond (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.6 The department 
maintains readiness 
to respond to 
resources issues 
To some extent, this is taken 
into account 2 
Define resources that must be exclusively 
dedicated to prepared responses as well as the 
criteria that allow a return to normal state. 
Provide training in supplier centres. Provide 
long-term specific training and refreshment. 
Establish at corporate level mutual response 
assistance plan regarding all kind of 
resources linked to maintenance activities. 
 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Decisions should be 
taken at corporate 
level 
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Table 1-42 : Atelier resources, ability to monitor 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.1 The monitoring 
of resources issues is 
of great importance 
in the maintenance 
department 
The codification is not the 
same within the organisation. 
Separation/isolation between 
teams/sections/departments 
does not allow exchanges. 
There is limited mutual 
assistance between 
departments. 
 
 
2 
A module dedicated to the exploitation of 
spare parts has been developed and added to 
the CMMS in downstream branch. A 
possibility exists through the CMMS to put in 
place a unique codification of spare that may 
be accessed by all maintenance departments 
at corporate level. Establish progressively 
within the organisation mutual response 
assistance plan regarding all kind of 
resources linked to maintenance activities. 
It is of great importance to put in place 
appropriate PI’s and support teams to 
perform the monitoring of resources issues. 
The person responsible of the operation and 
the zone planner may carry out this 
monitoring before (for preventive 
maintenance activities) and during actions 
(interventions while there is an imminent 
danger). 
3 
 
Decisions should be 
taken at corporate 
level 
 
The maintenance 
department 
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Atelier resources, ability to monitor (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.2 There are 
Performance 
Indicators (PI) 
allowing the 
monitoring of 
resources issues  
By means of the CMMS, 
standard PI’s that allow the 
monitoring of resources issues 
exist. 
 
3 
The PI’s lists have been created during the 
commissioning of the plants and updated 
when the CMMS has been put in place. The 
maintenance departments in collaboration 
with the other departments should regularly 
revise this list. It is of great importance to 
evaluate the maintenance system called G 
system and harmonise, exploit and make an 
optimum use of the CMMS. 
At department level, performance indicators 
(PI) can be added. PI’s that measure how 
many times a member of the department: 
 Was unable to find a tool or an item 
of maintenance equipment 
 Has delayed a task because a 
consumable part is missing 
 Has delayed a task because a major 
part is missing 
 Has used an unserviceable 
equipment 
 Has performed a task without the 
appropriate tool/equipment 
 Has performed a task without the 
appropriate documentation, etc. 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Decisions should be 
taken at corporate 
level 
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Atelier resources, ability to monitor (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.3 There is an 
appropriate choice 
for types of PI 
(leading, current, 
and lagging) related 
to resources issues 
PI’s are appropriate for current 
and reactive 2 
A study and review of existing PI’s and those 
proposed in this workshop is important in 
order to determine a model allowing an 
appropriate choice for the types of PI’s as 
well as their validity and reliability. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
2.4 There are PI’s for 
monitoring 
shrinking safety 
margins for 
resources issues 
There exist PI’s with reliable 
measures 2 
Due to the current spare procedure, there are 
overstocks for certain spares.  
Could be done in collaboration with spare 
parts management sections based on lessons 
learned.  
3 The maintenance department   
2.5 PI list is regularly 
updated based on 
Indicator's 
pertinence for 
resources issues 
Do not exist 1 
PI’s and safety margin should be evaluated 
continuously. Put in place annually a study 
and reflecting group of experts (internal and 
external) 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
2.6 PI measurements 
are reliable for 
resources issues 
PI’s are evaluated to some 
extent. There exist PI’s with 
reliable measures 
2 
There is a need to continuously evaluate PI’s 
and harmonise CMMS at corporate level. The 
results are integrated in a system; this is the 
reason why G system must be revised. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Table 1-43 : Atelier resources, ability to anticipate 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.1 There is a 
vulnerability 
(fragility, weakness) 
model within the 
organisation clearly 
formulated for 
resources issues 
There is no model 1 
Due to rigid procedures, spirit of initiatives is 
limited or inexistent at all. Consequently, the 
organisation should elaborate a vulnerability 
model recognised and clearly formulated. 
Improve corporate mid-term plans by 
including in the resources section these 
aspects. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.2 The organisation 
uses the necessary 
expertise to 
investigate the future 
(analyses trends) for 
resources issues 
There is no available expertise 
to investigate the future 1 
There is limited feedback regarding past 
events. Databases are either unused or do not 
exist. It is worth reviewing old maintenance 
reports to analyse trends and including in the 
new ones (future ones) a component related 
to trend analysis. It is also recommended to 
perform benchmarks in relation to these 
aspects. 
3 The maintenance department   
3.3 The organisation 
possesses tools to 
analyse and predict 
outcomes caused by 
resources issues 
CMMS is the only used tool 2 
CMMS is under exploited and only used for 
preventive maintenance. It is a database with 
respect to spare parts in order to issue work 
orders. There is experience transfer through 
retiring personnel.  
It may be done through the study of 
maintenance reports and the optimisation of 
the CMMS use. Besides, it is worth 
motivating personnel devoted to trend 
analysis with a better remuneration. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier resources, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.4 The organisation 
analyses long term 
effects and develops 
strategic planning 
for resources issues 
Do not exist 1 
Future threats as well as opportunities should be 
evaluated at least once per year in order to make 
a projection in the future of the organisation. To 
this end, experts from maintenance and 
production departments should be associated to 
elaborate strategic plans. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.5 The department 
assesses absence of 
failures, hazards, 
and accidents to 
anticipate resources 
issues 
Do not exist. The organisation 
culture does not take into 
consideration this way of 
thinking 
1 
There is no awareness regarding such a way of 
thinking in the maintenance departments; 
personnel are not sensitive to these aspects. A 
first approach to remedy is to carry out audits 
and use external expertise. The explicit 
recognition of acceptable and non-acceptable 
risks is not clearly established. The level of 
awareness of risks is merely individual efforts 
by personnel and is not a part of the culture. The 
nature of future threats is seen through the 
disappearance of spare parts suppliers and the 
obsolescence of spares. It develops through the 
non-preparation to such situations. Therefore, 
perform a monitoring to search all the factors 
that may influence the existence of these threats. 
The nature of future opportunities resides in the 
establishment of joint ventures (in maintenance 
in general and spare parts in particular); again, 
the department should perform a monitoring to 
search all the factors that may influence the 
existence of these opportunities. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier resources, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.6 Information 
exchange within the 
department is a 
continuous and 
spontaneous flux 
that constitutes a 
basis to locate signs 
of trouble stemming 
from resources 
issues 
The “silo thinking” is an 
important issue 2 
There is a limited communication and sharing 
about expectations and future events within the 
departments. This is achieved by the 
development of means of communication 
(horizontal and vertical) and the generalisation 
throughout the organisation. In addition, it is 
worth creating new ways of communication 
such as specialised forums (maintenance, etc.) 
between the different branches of the company 
to exchange information, experience, etc. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.7 There is a regular 
diagnosis of 
safety/production 
trade-off within the 
organisation for 
resources issues 
A regular diagnosis is made 
but there is limited feedback 
from management regarding 
sent reports. Production is 
generally in favour except 
when there is imminent 
danger. 
2 
This may be achieved by (1) simulating risks 
scenarios and studying the impact on 
production, (2) respecting maintenance tasks 
planning when thresholds are attained, (3) 
increasing personnel vigilance level regarding 
events that have occurred in other sites and (4) 
asking production staff to be more vigilant 
when they track parameters while there is 
additional time of production. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.8 The organisation 
assesses the impact 
of resource reduction 
on safety margins 
stemming from 
resources issues 
The evaluation is performed 
by the department 3 Maintain current level 3    
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Atelier resources, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.9 Data collected 
are immediately 
analysed, the results 
disseminated, and 
the 
recommendations 
implemented 
throughout the 
organisation for 
resources issues 
 
Do not exist.  1 
The implementation of the previous 
recommendations can remedy the situation. 
Maintenance management at corporate level 
can initiate these actions and insure their 
implementation. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Table 1-44 : Atelier resources, ability to learn 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.1 The organisation 
supports and trains 
staff to collect data, 
analyse, and learn 
from resources 
issues 
Insufficient. Besides, there is 
limited support and training 
within the organisation 
regarding analysis and 
learning. 
2 
The events are described in intervention reports. 
The data are not collected, categorised, and 
analysed. Some events are investigated because 
accidents have occurred, it is the only criterion 
used. The learning process concerns only negative 
events i.e. rare events (failures, accidents, etc.). 
There is an urgent need to learn also from positive 
events i.e. successes. Reports should be published 
within the entire organisation by means of a 
monthly bulletin. In addition, it is worth 
reactivating the one-year induction for new 
recruits. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation  
  
4.2 The learning 
activity is a 
continuous process 
and built throughout 
the entire 
organisation for 
resources issues 
Quite inexistent or the learning 
is event oriented and not a 
continuous activity. 
2 
The workload of the management does not allow 
them to benefit from training actions. The use of 
all opportunities of learning is emphasised. It is 
worth training management regarding 
empowerment and coaching. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.3 The organisation 
allocates necessary 
resources to 
investigate, analyse, 
disseminate results, 
and learn from 
resources issues 
Limited; human resources 
departments make statistics. 
There are limited resources 
allocated to the investigation, 
analysis and dissemination of 
results, and learning for 
positives situations. 
2 
Resources allocation should be reviewed to allow 
continuous improvement and give more 
importance to analysis/methods/statistics sections 
within maintenance departments. Maintenance 
reports should be harmonised at company level. 
Besides, the organisation of thematic 
workshops/studies between the different branches 
of activity of the company is desirable. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier resources, ability to learn (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.4 The delay 
between event 
reporting, analysis, 
and learning are the 
shortest possible for 
resources issues 
Production aspects are 
immediately taken into 
account by management in 
comparison to other 
aspects. 
2 
The optimisation of the use of the CMMS after 
harmonisation within the organisation is a solution 
for this issue. 
3 The maintenance department   
4.5 The outcomes of 
these analyses are 
rapidly 
communicated 
inside and outside 
the organisation for 
resources issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an important issue of “silo thinking”. No 
one is responsible for compiling experiences to 
learn from them. It is therefore worth designating a 
person by department to perform this action. 
Lessons learnt should be implemented through top 
management directives for execution, application 
notes, etc. Before any implementation, it is 
important to launch sensitising campaigns. 
3 The maintenance department    
4.6 There are means 
in place to verify that 
the intended learning 
is taking place for 
resources issues 
Do not exist 1 
Create an internal control/follow-up unit that 
performs audits annually. In addition, consider the 
reactivation of the objectives set to management 
regarding training actions. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier resources, ability to learn (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.7 There are means 
in place to maintain 
what has been 
learned for resources 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
Consider coaching the new recruits by personnel 
close to retirement to transfer the capital experience 
at least during the 5 last years of work; carry out 
sensitising campaigns to increase the level of 
knowledge within the organisation; use the 
communication means that exist within the 
company to encourage training delivered by internal 
competences to ensure transfer of capital 
experience; select pertinent information and 
associate PI’s to ensure follow-up, etc. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Table 1-45 : Atelier Time Pressure, ability to respond 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.1 Before each 
management review, 
the department 
assesses time 
pressure issues 
Management review is not 
systematic; these meetings are 
reactive according to the issue 
raised. Some kind of 
evaluation is carried out in 
some maintenance 
departments without 
informing the upper level. 
2 
Hold daily/weekly evaluation of such issues in 
the different sections of the maintenance 
department and monthly meetings at director and 
maintenance departments dedicated to time 
pressure issues. 
3 The maintenance department   
1.2 The department 
has prepared 
responses to time 
pressure issues 
Has much more to do with 
improvisation than with 
careful planning to correct 
problems 
 
2 
Can be done by effective exploitation of the 
CMMS; hold briefings to analyse the evolution 
and make reporting. 
3 The maintenance department   
1.3 The department 
applies threshold 
criteria for activating 
a response to time 
pressure issues 
Responses are generated on 
management request when the 
constraint affects the 
performance (production, 
safety, etc.). Criteria used: 
performance disturbance, 
accident.  
2 A team of experts can make recommendations to define threshold criteria. 3 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
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Atelier Time Pressure, ability to respond (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.4 The department 
systematically 
evaluates and testes 
on site the responses 
to time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 Establish a list of PI’s in relation to the use of the CMMS 3 
The maintenance 
department   
1.5 The department 
provides sufficient 
resources (competent 
personnel, time, etc.) 
to respond to time 
pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
Define the required resources (competence, 
expertise, time, material) to respond to time 
pressure issues  
2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
  
1.6 The department 
maintains readiness 
to respond to time 
pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
Assign a person from the department to track 
time pressure issues and establish a list of PI’s in 
relation to the use of the CMMS 
2 
The maintenance 
department  
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Table 1-46 : Atelier Time Pressure, ability to monitor 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.1 The monitoring of 
time pressure issues 
is of great importance 
in the maintenance 
department 
Do not exist 1 
May be achieved: assign a person responsible for 
PI’s and allocate required resources; use CMMS.
 
2 
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
 
The maintenance 
department 
  
2.2 There are 
Performance 
Indicators (PI) 
allowing the 
monitoring of time 
pressure issues  
Do not exist 1 
At department level, performance indicators (PI) 
can be added. Examples of reactive and current 
PI’s, based on a study of the maintenance 
environment, to take into consideration include 
the measurement of frequency of occurrence of: 
 Lack of time to read adequately 
documentation before starting a task 
 Rushing an inspection 
 Cut shorting a functional check 
 Signing for a task before it is completed 
 Being asked to hurry a task  
 Interrupting a task to perform a more 
urgent one, etc. 
For proactive PI, it is worth analysing the trends 
by better exploitation of the CMMS. Besides, the 
frequency for list revision should be defined and 
a responsibility assigned to a person from the 
department. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
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Atelier Time Pressure, ability to monitor (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.3 There is an 
appropriate choice 
for types of PI 
(leading, current, and 
lagging) related to 
time pressure issues 
There is no choice 1 To begin, consider the use of PI’s proposed in 2.2. Define the appropriate lag for these PI’s. 3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
 
  
2.4 There are PI’s for 
monitoring shrinking 
safety margins for 
time pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
May be achieved by a team of experts from 
CMMS and statistics to analyse the trends 
monthly. 
2 The maintenance department   
2.5 PI list is regularly 
updated based on 
Indicator's pertinence 
for time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
May be achieved: the use of the list of the 
proposed PI’s (2.2) will allow the evaluation and 
the review 
 
3 The maintenance department   
2.6 PI measurements 
are reliable for time 
pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
May be achieved by performing internal/external 
audits respectively quarterly/annually; the use of 
the list of PI’s (2.2) will allow determine their 
reliability.  
 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Table 1-47 Atelier Time Pressure, ability to anticipate 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.1 There is a vulnerability 
(fragility, weakness) model 
within the organisation 
clearly formulated for time 
pressure issues 
There is no model 1 
The organisation should elaborate a model of 
vulnerability for such issues by means of the 
quality, HSE dashboard and check-list 
 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.2 The organisation uses the 
necessary expertise to 
investigate the future 
(analyses trends) for time 
pressure issues 
There is no available 
expertise to 
investigate the future
1 
There is an absolute necessity to develop internal 
competence and use external expertise to remedy 
the situation 
 
2 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.3 The organisation 
possesses tools to analyse 
and predict outcomes caused 
by time pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 There is an absolute necessity to possess appropriate tools 2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier Time Pressure, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.4 The organisation 
analyses long term effects 
and develops strategic 
planning for time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to evaluate future 
threats/opportunities on regular basis and establish 
a projection of the organisation in the future 
2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.5 The department assesses 
absence of failures, hazards, 
and accidents to anticipate 
time pressure issues 
Do not exist.  1 
There is an absolute necessity to increase 
managers/personnel awareness to evaluate 
situations where things go right. This should be 
further embedded in the organisation culture so 
that there is an explicit recognition of acceptable 
and non-acceptable risks. 
2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.6 Information exchange 
within the department is a 
continuous and spontaneous 
flux that constitutes a basis to 
locate signs of trouble 
stemming from time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to communicate and 
share expectations regarding future events within 
the organisation through forums, intranet, etc. IT 
department should play an important role.  
2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier Time Pressure, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.7 There is a regular 
diagnosis of 
safety/production trade-off 
within the organisation for 
time pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to increase 
managers/personnel awareness to evaluate 
situations where there things go right. 
2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.8 The organisation assesses 
the impact of resource 
reduction on safety margins 
stemming from time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to identify critical 
resources and establish annually the needs taking 
into account barriers and thresholds within each 
plant 
 
2 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.9 Data collected are 
immediately analysed, the 
results disseminated, and the 
recommendations 
implemented throughout the 
organisation for time 
pressure issues 
Do not exist.  1 
This may be achieved: measurements should be 
done before each management review; 
analysis/interpretations should be carried out 
immediately after measurements and results 
communicated and used through reporting and 
discussions during management review. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Table 1-48 Atelier Time Pressure, ability to learn 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.1 The organisation 
supports and trains staff to 
collect data, analyse, and 
learn from time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to develop a model 
that describes the way data from events are 
collected and categorised. Learning process 
should stem from what is frequent (i.e. positive 
situations, successes) as well as from what is are 
(i.e. failures, accidents). Identify the required 
qualifications and profile types of participants and 
launch program training with specialised 
organisms in collaboration with human resources 
departments 
3 
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation  
  
4.2 The learning activity is a 
continuous process and built 
throughout the entire 
organisation for time 
pressure issues 
The learning process 
is not continuous and 
all opportunities are 
not used 
2 
There is an absolute necessity to make the learning 
process continuous within the organisation 
regarding time pressure issue. Provide 
management support to train specialist and 
provide coaching to remedy the situation. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.3 The organisation 
allocates necessary resources 
to investigate, analyse, 
disseminate results, and learn 
from time pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to identify and 
allocate appropriate competences and resources to 
the investigation, analysis, and results 
dissemination in collaboration with human 
resources departments 
 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier Time Pressure, ability to learn (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.4 The delay between event 
reporting, analysis, and 
learning are the shortest 
possible for time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to shorten the delay 
between reporting an event, the analysis, and 
learning 
3 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.5 The outcomes of these 
analyses are rapidly 
communicated inside and 
outside the organisation for 
time pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to communicate 
rapidly inside and outside the company the results 
of analysis. The learning process should take part 
at all levels (individual, collective, and the entire 
organisation). A person should be assigned the 
responsibility to compile experiences so that 
lessons are learnt. In every plant, results should be 
communicated to the section “communication” 
and should propose the best ways to implement 
learnt lessons (through regulations, procedures, 
standards, training, instructions, redesign, etc.) 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.6 There are means in place 
to verify that the intended 
learning is taking place for 
time pressure issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to put in place 
means to verify or confirm that learning has taken 
place. A “learning factor” should be included by 
human resources departments to appreciate 
performance of personnel 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier Time Pressure, ability to learn (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.7 There are means in place 
to maintain what has been 
learned for time pressure 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is an absolute necessity to put in place 
means to maintain what has been learnt. A 
“learning factor” should be included by human 
resources departments to appreciate performance 
of personnel 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Table 1-49 Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to respond 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.1 Before each management 
review, the department 
assesses 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Meetings are held to 
discuss raised issues. 
Comments on 
supervision/coordin
ation issues are 
limited 
 
2 
 
A preparation of meetings/briefings should be 
done by the planning section first. Hold 
daily/weekly evaluation of such issues in the 
different sections of the maintenance department 
and monthly meetings at director and maintenance 
departments dedicated to 
supervision/coordination issues. These meetings 
should be done according to preventive 
maintenance planning where priority should be 
given to vulnerable equipment. Contractors’ 
experience should be used to contribute to such 
actions. Systematically evaluate value added by 
these meetings. 
3 
 
The maintenance 
department   
1.2 The department has 
prepared responses to 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
There are limited 
responses to solve 
supervision/coordin
ation issues.  
1 
Specific training, selective recruitments, new 
recruits backing through training, coaching, etc. 
may achieve it. A personal development plan is 
required for every worker. 
2 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
  
1.3 The department applies 
threshold criteria for 
activating a response to 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
There are no 
threshold criteria 1 
It may be achieved by an adequate human 
resources policy; if a personal development plan 
(PDP) is established for every employee, threshold 
criteria can be defined from these PDP’s. The 
study of the PI’s developed in the following 
section (2.2) will be very instructive. 
2 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to respond (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
1.4 The department 
systematically evaluates and 
testes on site the responses to 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
The evaluation of training and coaching for 
instance may allow know whether the responses 
are appropriate or not. Elements to look for include 
required time that makes a response effective, the 
celerity to establish a total response, necessary time 
to maintain a response effective, the rapidity to 
reconstruct the resources. These could be 
considered as proactive PI’s 
2 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
  
1.5 The department provides 
sufficient resources 
(competent personnel, time, 
etc.) to respond to 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
To some extent 2 
It may be achieved by checking complaints during 
and after maintenance intervention, controlling 
maintenance planning and safe return back to 
service of facilities. Pi’s could be assigned to these 
controls and analysis performed on regular basis 
(e.g.  annually after equipment overhaul) 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
 
  
1.6 The department 
maintains readiness to 
respond to 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
See 1.2 above. In 
addition, there is a 
lack of appropriate 
documentation for 
supervisors, lack of 
experts, and lack of 
spare parts. 
1 
Define the resources that must be kept exclusively 
to prepared responses and the criteria that allow 
returning to normal situation. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
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Table 1-50 Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to monitor 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.1 The monitoring of 
coordination/supervision 
issues is of great importance 
in the maintenance 
department 
Each team tracks 
only its own 
personnel; there is 
limited 
communication 
between 
teams/sections/depar
tments 
2 
There is an opportunity to carry out the monitoring 
of supervision/coordination issues through the 
CMMS (statistic studies, maintenance intervention 
reports) but this is unfortunately under exploited. It 
is of great importance to put in place appropriate 
PI’s and support teams to perform the monitoring 
of supervision/coordination issues. The person 
responsible of the operation and the zone planner 
may carry out this monitoring before (for 
preventive maintenance activities) and during 
actions (interventions while there is an imminent 
danger). 
3 
 
 
The maintenance 
department 
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to monitor (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score 
Carried out 
by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.2 There are Performance 
Indicators (PI) allowing the 
monitoring of 
coordination/supervision 
issues  
There are PI’s 
devoted to the 
monitoring of 
supervision/coordin
ation issues by 
means of the CMMS 
(intervention time 
man/days, thresholds 
that mustn’t be 
exceeded, quality of 
work performed, 
discipline, 
absenteeism, 
compliance to 
procedures, 
reporting) 
2 
CMMS is underexploited. Based on the measure of 
the frequency of occurrence, examples of PI’s that 
should be taken into consideration in addition to those 
proposed in table 7.9 could be: 
 Feeling that there is some limitation of 
knowledge or experience to perform an 
assigned task 
 Correcting an error done by someone else 
without documenting what has been done 
 Feeling that a defect has not been properly 
corrected before a system or a component 
was returned to service 
 Certifying that someone’s work was correct 
without checking it 
 Starting a task while someone has already 
begun to perform it 
 Task supposed to be done but found after it 
was not the case 
 Receiving wrong information about a task, 
etc. 
In addition, the participants recommended the 
following: 
 Review regularly this list in collaboration 
with other departments 
 Appoint someone to review the list 
 Perform the measures on a regular basis 
before the management review 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
maintenance 
department  
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to monitor (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
2.3 There is an appropriate 
choice for types of PI 
(leading, current, and 
lagging) related to 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
The choice is 
appropriate for 
current and reactive 
PI’s 
2 
A study and review of existing PI’s and those 
proposed in this workshop is important in order to 
determine a model allowing an appropriate choice 
for the types of PI’s as well as their validity and 
reliability. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
 
  
2.4 There are PI’s for 
monitoring shrinking safety 
margins for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
It can be achieved by employee medical follow-
up, adequate training, compliance to work 
regulations (in terms of number of hours worked), 
mental and physical workload risk assessment on 
a regular basis and recommendations 
implemented with no delay. 
3 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
  
2.5 PI list is regularly 
updated based on Indicator's 
pertinence for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
Review and update regularly before each 
management review and Health and Safety 
Committee. Put in place focus groups to discuss 
these issues annually. 
3 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Decisions should 
be taken at 
corporate level 
  
2.6 PI measurements are 
reliable for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
They are reliable for 
the existing PI’s 2 
Optimal exploitation of the CMMS is required in 
addition to audits and systematic control on site. 3 
The maintenance 
department 
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Table 1-51 Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to anticipate 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.1 There is a vulnerability 
(fragility, weakness) model 
within the organisation 
clearly formulated for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
To some extent, 
there is a model in 
human resources 
direction (carrier 
planning) at 
corporate level but 
with limited 
implementation 
2 
It is worth noting that at department level, there 
is an assessment of the situation (retirement of 
experts, training on time to face new technology, 
resignation and transfer out, etc.); information is 
communicated but there is limited feedback. 
Implement the mid-term Company plan that 
consists of resources planning communicated by 
every facility. Accelerate the pace of selection of 
candidates and recruitments 
3    
3.2 The organisation uses the 
necessary expertise to 
investigate the future 
(analyses trends) for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
There is no available 
expertise to 
investigate the future
1 
The level of awareness regarding states where 
things go right should be increased at all levels. 
There is an absolute necessity to develop internal 
competence and use external expertise to remedy 
the situation 
3 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.3 The organisation 
possesses tools to analyse 
and predict outcomes caused 
by coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
It may be achieved by a better exploitation of the 
CMMS, maintenance intervention reports, and on 
site controls and audits 
3 The maintenance department    
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.4 The organisation 
analyses long term effects 
and develops strategic 
planning for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
Encourage the emergence of internal expertise; 
encourage the coaching of new recruits; create 
technology watch units to adapt human resources 
to new technologies. 
Future threats and opportunities should be 
evaluated at least once per year.  
The nature of supposed future threats is expressed 
through routine, drop of level of vigilance, 
overconfidence (complacency), self-satisfaction, 
fatigue, etc. These develop through absence of 
control, successive good results, and repeated 
tasks for a long period of time in the same place, 
lack of mobility intra-branches, etc. It is worth 
therefore, seeking and monitoring all these factors.
The nature of supposed future opportunities lies in 
the detection of competence and expertise, and the 
assurance to retain those recognised staff, the 
transfer of good practices and knowledge, the 
capitalisation of knowledge and know-how, etc. It 
is worth therefore, seeking and monitoring all 
these factors 
3 
The maintenance 
department 
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items  Current situation Score
 
Actions 
Expected 
score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.5 The department assesses 
absence of failures, hazards, 
and accidents to anticipate 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
There is limited awareness regarding states where 
there is absence of failures, accidents, etc. Raise 
awareness of personnel/managers to assess such 
situations. Establish within the organisational 
culture an explicit recognition of acceptable and 
non-acceptable risk; the risk awareness is not part 
of the organisational culture but remains 
individual efforts. Same as above (3.4) for the 
future opportunities/threats. 
2 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.6 Information exchange 
within the department is a 
continuous and spontaneous 
flux that constitutes a basis to 
locate signs of trouble 
stemming from 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
Communicate and share within the organisation 
expectations regarding the future throughout 
forums; this is achieved by developing means of 
horizontal and vertical communication and 
generalising the use of the CMMS. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
3.7 There is a regular 
diagnosis of 
safety/production trade-off 
within the organisation for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Production is 
favoured in 
comparison to safety 
except when there is 
an imminent danger 
2 
The trade-off safety/production might be 
addressed by: 
 Simulating near-misses risk scenarios 
along with a study of the impact on 
production 
 Respecting maintenance tasks schedules 
as planned 
 Increasing the levels of vigilance of 
workers based on company’s event logs 
 Requesting production staff to increase 
awareness and vigilance in following up 
and tracking production parameters 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to anticipate (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
3.8 The organisation assesses 
the impact of resource 
reduction on safety margins 
stemming from 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Performed by the 
maintenance 
department 
3 
The impact of resources reduction on safety 
margins might be assessed by measuring: 
 The frequency of updating the schedules, 
and staff performing urgent tasks 
 The impact of such actions on deadlines 
and quality of maintenance 
4 The maintenance department    
3.9 Data collected are 
immediately analysed, the 
results disseminated, and the 
recommendations 
implemented throughout the 
organisation for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
The implementation of the previous 
recommendations may remedy. 
 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
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Table 1-52 Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to learn 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.1 The organisation 
supports and trains staff to 
collect data, analyse, and 
learn from 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
The events are described in intervention reports. 
The data are not collected, categorised, and 
analysed. Some events are investigated because 
accidents have occurred, it is the only criterion 
used. The learning process concerns only negative 
events i.e. rare events (failures, accidents, etc.). 
There is an urgent need to learn also from positive 
events i.e. successes. Reports will be published 
within the entire organisation by means of a 
monthly bulletin. In addition, it is worth 
reactivating the one-year induction to the new 
recruits. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation  
  
4.2 The learning activity is a 
continuous process and built 
throughout the entire 
organisation for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
The learning is event 
oriented and not a 
continuous activity. 
2 
The use of all opportunities of learning is 
emphasised. It is worth training management 
regarding empowerment and coaching. Encourage 
learning from what is frequent (successes, things 
that go right) as well as what is rare (failures, things 
that go wrong) as well as rare events (things that go 
wrong) 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to learn (continued) 
Items Current situation Score Actions Expected score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.3 The organisation 
allocates necessary resources 
to investigate, analyse, 
disseminate results, and learn 
from 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Limited; human 
resources 
departments make 
statistics. There are 
limited resources 
allocated to the 
investigation, 
analysis and 
dissemination of 
results, and learning 
for positives 
situations. 
2 
A steering committee should be put in place at 
corporate level to analyse and investigate annually 
the situation 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.4 The delay between event 
reporting, analysis, and 
learning are the shortest 
possible for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
Make someone responsible to compile 
experiences 
Assign responsibility to a multidisciplinary team 
to make optimum exploitation of the CMMS 
3 
The maintenance 
department 
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Atelier coordination/supervision, ability to learn (continued) 
Items  Current situation Score
 
Actions 
Expected 
score Carried out by Debut 
End 
of 
task 
4.5 The outcomes of these 
analyses are rapidly 
communicated inside and 
outside the organisation for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Reports on negative 
situations are 
communicated to the 
different authorities 
2 
No one is responsible for compiling experiences to 
learn from them. It is therefore worth designating 
a person by department to perform this action. 
Lessons learnt should be implemented through top 
management directives for execution, application 
notes, etc. Before any implementation, it is 
important to launch sensitising campaigns. 
3 
The maintenance 
department  
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.6 There are means in place 
to verify that the intended 
learning is taking place for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 Create an audit/follow-up unit to check that learning has taken place  3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
  
4.7 There are means in place 
to maintain what has been 
learned for 
coordination/supervision 
issues 
Do not exist 1 
Create an audit/follow-up unit to verify that means 
to maintain this learning is in place. 
Consider coaching the new recruits by personnel 
close to retirement to transfer the capital 
experience at least during the 5 last years of work; 
carry out sensitising campaigns to increase the 
level of knowledge within the organisation; use 
the communication means that exist within the 
company to encourage training delivered by 
internal competences to ensure transfer of capital 
experience; select pertinent information and 
associate PI’s to ensure follow-up, etc. 
3 
Maintenance 
department 
coordination 
throughout the 
organisation 
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7.3.2. Maintenance System Abilities: Results and Analysis  
The maintenance system profiles that include the four abilities and the department profile by 
atelier are shown in the following figures from figure 7.2 to 7.15. The profiles in blue colour 
represent the system abilities before drawing any recommendation whereas those in red colour 
represent the targeted profiles after recommendations. R stands for “ability to respond”, M for 
“ability to monitor”, A for “ability to anticipate”, and L for “ability to learn”. S1, S2, etc. 
represent the respective statements for each of the four abilities. Tables 7.13 to 7.16 give the 
meaning of each statement.   
Table 1-53 The meaning of statements for the ability to respond 
Items 
(statements) 
Meaning  
Respond S1 Before each management review, the department assesses… 
Respond S2  The department has prepared responses to… 
Respond S3  The department applies threshold criteria for activating a response to... 
Respond S4  The department systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses to... 
Respond S5  The department provides sufficient resources (competent personnel, time, etc.)  
to respond to... 
Respond S6  The department maintains readiness to respond to … 
 
Table 1-54 The meaning of statements for the ability to monitor  
Items 
(statements) 
Meaning  
Mon-S1 The monitoring of …issues is of great importance in the maintenance department
Mon-S2  There are Performance Indicators (PI) allowing the monitoring of ... 
Mon-S3  There is an appropriate choice for types of PI (leading, current, and lagging) 
related to… 
Mon-S4  There are PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins for … 
Mon-S5  PI list is regularly updated based on Indicator's pertinence for... 
Mon-S6  PI measurements are reliable for ... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -- 190 -- 
 
Table 1-55 The meaning of statements for the ability to anticipate  
Items 
(statements) 
Meaning  
Ant-S1 There is a vulnerability (fragility, weakness) model within the organisation 
clearly formulated for... 
Ant-S2  The organisation uses the necessary expertise to investigate the future (analyses 
trends) for... 
Ant-S3  The organisation possesses tools to analyse and predict outcomes caused by ... 
Ant-S4  The organisation analyses long term effects and develops strategic planning for 
... 
Ant-S5  The department assesses absence of failures, hazards, and accidents to anticipate 
... 
Ant-S6  Information exchange within the department is a continuous and spontaneous 
flux that constitutes a basis to locate signs of trouble stemming from ... 
Ant-S7 There is a regular diagnosis of safety/production trade-off within the 
organisation for...  
Ant-S8 The organisation assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety margins 
stemming from… 
Ant-S9  Data collected are immediately analysed, the results disseminated, and the 
recommendations implemented throughout the organisation for… 
 
Table 1-56 : The meaning of statements for the ability to learn  
Items 
(statements) 
Meaning  
Learn S1 The organisation supports and trains staff to collect data, analyse, and learn 
from... 
Learn S2  The learning activity is a continuous process and built throughout the entire 
organisation for ... 
Learn S3  The organisation allocates necessary resources to investigate, analyse, 
disseminate results, and learn from... 
Learn S4  The delay between event reporting, analysis, and learning are the shortest 
possible for... 
Learn S5  The outcomes of these analyses are rapidly communicated inside and outside the 
organisation for... 
Learn S6  There are means in place to verify that the intended learning is taking place for 
... 
Learn S7  There are means in place to maintain what has been learned for ... 
 
In the following section, the maintenance system resilience as well as strategies for 
improvements at both department and corporate levels are discussed based on the results that 
stem from the three ateliers. The current maintenance system performance and the targeted one 
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are detailed by studying the different profiles and reviewing the corresponding items 
(statements) for each of the four abilities.  
7.3.2.1. Ability to respond 
i. Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to respond 
 
 
Figure 1-27: Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to respond 
 
From this profile, for the majority of items (statements) the score is 2 meaning that the system 
performs under performance requirements. Items S4 and S5 show respectively score 1 and 3 
which denotes that the system does not systematically evaluates and testes on site the responses 
(item S4) whereas item S5 meets minimum requirements. The targeted performance is mainly 
meeting minimum item requirements.  
ii. Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to respond 
 
Figure 1-28: Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to respond 
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Items S4, S5, and S6 are nor addressed. There is neither systematic evaluation nor responses 
testing on site as well as resources provision and readiness to respond. With regard to the 
remaining items, the system performs under minimum requirements. The targeted performance 
is to make the system meet minimum requirements for item S1, S2, and S3 while the remaining 
items should be at least addressed. 
iii. Supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to respond 
 
Figure 1-29: Supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to respond 
Majority of items are not addressed, only items S1 and S5 are tackled to some extent (meetings 
are held to discuss raised issues without any particular emphasis on supervision/coordination 
issues). The targeted performance is to address these items and meet for S1, S5, and S6 
minimum requirements. 
iv. Discussion  
Management reviews were not performed systematically. There have been neither a model to 
respond to the studied issues nor prepared responses especially for the lack of spare parts within 
maintenance departments. Responses have been generated when the constraint impacted the 
performance (for instance production and safety) or when it was required by line management. 
Criteria used have been performance disturbance and accidents. Since there have been no 
prepared responses, testing and evaluation of such responses have been missing.  Besides, “time 
pressure” and “supervision/coordination” issues were generally not addressed; therefore, 
resources to cope with these factors were not allocated. 
As a result, participants recommended holding meetings at department level monthly to discuss 
these issues to evaluate preventive maintenance, study the compliance of personnel to the 
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maintenance schedule, introduce the prioritisation of vulnerable equipment, and define the 
resources dedicated exclusively to prepared responses and criteria to return to a normal 
situation. These meetings should also: 
 Address the studied issues by analysing PI’s measurement (see list of PI’s for each issue 
in the following sections) 
 Define appropriate resources to respond to such problems 
 Establish indicators so that management can control/monitor continuously these issues 
 Establish/update a Personal Development Plan (PDP) for every worker 
 Assess training, coaching, and back to back activities to determine appropriate 
responses 
 Define resources to be exclusively allocated to prepared responses 
 Help front line managers in terms of strategy definition 
The following elements might constitute proactive PI’s. It has been found of great importance 
to search: 
 The appropriate time to trigger an effective response 
 The promptness to establish a full response ability 
 The necessary time to maintain an effective response 
 The rapidity to reconstitute the resources 
 The number of claims during or after any maintenance tasks 
At corporate level, participants highlighted the need for the harmonisation of the existing 
CMMS and the optimisation of its exploitation as well as the creation of joint ventures for spare 
parts provisions. On the other hand, the obsolescence of some spare parts and the disappearance 
of spare parts suppliers were particularly emphasised. Thus, it has been recommended to create 
technology watch units and internal audits to follow up maintenance activities issues. One of 
the most important recommendations was to establish a mutual response assistance plan at 
corporate level regarding all kind of resources linked to maintenance activities. 
In addition, at corporate level, it has been recommended to: 
 Define frequency to assess these issues 
 Define threshold criteria that allow trigger responses based on proposed PI’s 
 Develop models to assess and test responses on site 
 Establish/update the necessity to develop for every member of staff a PDP 
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Resources availability is an important issue; hence, a kind of “fear” to see the facilities stop 
working exists. Actually, this led to increase the ability to adapt to any condition but there a 
model dedicated to remedy the situation has been found still lacking. Every issue was solved in 
daily manner i.e. a day-to-day action was carried out when problems were faced. The 
vulnerability issues might be defined by the assessment of actual state. Examples include spare 
parts obsolescence, exclusive resources for safety margins, and watch monitoring centres units 
(see ability to anticipate). Many examples of positive actions to respond and adapt to changing 
conditions have been collected by means of storytelling. Engineers and other members of staff 
at the shop floor generally take these actions. To illustrate, an engineer and his team fabricated 
spares in the workshop of a facility that are not made up so far by the constructor. 
7.3.2.2. Ability monitor  
i. Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to monitor  
 
Figure 1-30: Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to monitor 
 
Items S5 and S6 are not addressed for the ability to monitor profile; this means that existing 
PI’s are not updated and their reliability is not evaluated. S2 meets the minimum requirement 
since PI’s for resources issues exist in the CMMS. For the remainder items, the system performs 
under performance requirements. The targeted performance is increasing the number of PI’s, 
updated existing ones, and evaluating their reliability.  
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ii. Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to monitor 
 
Figure 1-31: Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to monitor 
 
In this case, the profile shows that all items are not addressed. The targeted performance is to 
make the system meet at least minimum requirements 
iii. Supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to monitor  
 
Figure 1-32: supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to monitor 
In this case, the system performs under minimum requirements even though there are PI’s 
devoted to the monitoring of supervision/coordination issues by means of the CMMS.  Items 
S4 (PI’s for monitoring shrinking safety margins) and S5 (PI’s regular update based on 
Indicator's pertinence) are not tackled. The targeted performance is to address these items (S4 
and S5) and meet minimum requirements for the remaining ones. 
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iv. Discussion  
The participants highlighted that the CMMS has been used to monitor some resources and 
supervision/coordination issues such as time to perform tasks (h/days), quality of work, 
attendance of personnel, compliance to tasks and procedures. The PI’s were found appropriate 
with respect to reactive and current PI’s; unfortunately, the list of PI’s has not been updated and 
has been found underexploited.  However, this remained insufficient. The indicators have not 
been updated based on their relevance; their reliability has not been assessed, and there has been 
limited analysis of collected data to disseminate and implement recommendations. It should be 
noted that the coding system has not been unified across the Company branches of activity. 
There have been no PI’s to monitor the diminution of safety margins. Besides, support to 
monitor “time pressure” issues have been limited. Consequently, PI’s have not been allocated 
to monitor this factor (“time pressure”).  
At department level, the introduction of appropriate performance indicators (PI) has been found 
of great importance. The absolute necessity to support monitoring such problems was 
highlighted. Examples of PI’s that should be taken into consideration, based on a study of the 
maintenance environment and on the measure of the frequency of occurrence (adapted from 
Hobbs’ MEQ), are given in tables 7.17, 7.18, and 7.19. These PI’s may enhance the system’s 
ability to respond.   
Table 1-57: Table Examples of PI’s for “resources” factor 
How many times a member (or a 
team) within the department 
Was unable to find a tool or an item of maintenance equipment 
Has delayed a task because a consumable part is missing 
Has delayed a task because a major part is missing 
Has used an unserviceable equipment 
Has performed a task without the appropriate tool/equipment 
Has performed a task without the appropriate documentation, etc.
 
Table 1-58: Examples of PI’s for “time-pressure” factor 
Frequency of 
Lack of time to read adequately documentation before starting a 
task 
Rushing an inspection 
Cut shorting a functional check 
Signing for a task before it is completed 
Being asked to hurry a task  
Interrupting a task to perform a more urgent one, etc. 
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Table 1-59: Examples of PI’s for “supervision/coordination” factor  
Frequency of  
Feeling that there is some limitation of knowledge or experience 
to perform an assigned task 
Correction of an error done by someone else without 
documenting what has been done 
Feeling that a defect has not been properly corrected before a 
system or a component was returned to service 
Certification of someone’s work was correct without checking it
Starting a task while someone has already begun to perform it 
Task supposed to be done but found after it was not the case 
Receiving wrong information about a task, etc. 
 
In addition to this non-exhaustive list, it has been recommended to: 
 Perform the measures on a regular basis before the management review 
 Review regularly this list in collaboration with other departments  
 Check PI’s reliability by performing audits 
 Assign the monitoring of safety margin diminution to statistics and CMMS specialists 
 Put in place a unit for follow-up under the responsibility of the plant 
 Appoint someone to review the list 
 Analyse, interpret, communicate, and implement the results immediately through 
reporting and discussions during management review 
 Perform mental and physical workload risk assessment 
At the same time, it has been also recommended to identify and analyse actions that have been 
carried out to overcome situations characterised by lacks to achieve assigned goals. It has been 
suggested to measure how many times for instance, a member (or a team) within the department 
has overcome lack of (1) time, (2) competence, (3) knowledge, and (4) resources, particularly 
how these actions have occurred. This might allow the identification of actions that could go 
right as well as those that could go wrong. Following this research work, a study to collect such 
data is currently undergone within the Company. 
 At corporate level, it has been recommended to: 
 Evaluate the maintenance system; continuously evaluate and harmonise PI’s, and 
integrate them within the system in order to determine appropriate PI’s types (proactive, 
current, and reactive) as well as PI validity and reliability 
 Support and generalise the monitoring of the studied issues and safety margin 
diminution 
 Establish a schedule for regular inspection and audits 
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 Disseminate the results within the organisation 
 Put in place panels of experts (internal and external to the company) to reflect on, 
evaluate PI’s, and assess these issues 
The harmonisation, the use, and the full exploitation of existing CMMS was judged a great 
opportunity. A module was developed and added to one of the maintenance management 
systems that are used currently in a branch of the Company. This module allows all maintenance 
departments within this branch to have access to unused spare parts that can be found in any 
facility. It might be generalised to all branches by harmonising the CMMS 
A PI list to monitor resources issues exists but needs to be updated. In addition to what already 
exists, it has been recommended to update the PI list so that current conditions would be 
monitored in order to identify trends and develop a vulnerability model. This action should be 
based on resilience engineering approach. Besides, the need to coordinate actions between 
sections of a maintenance department, other departments within a facility, and other facilities 
has been emphasised. 
The need to evaluate PI’s is highlighted. The procedure of managing maintenance exists since 
1970’s. Its existence was considered a good thing but its periodical evaluation and update has 
been thought a crucial opportunity to allow the Company have a larger view of the maintenance 
process. 
7.3.2.3. Ability to anticipate 
i. Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to anticipate 
 
Figure 1-33: Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to anticipate 
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In this case, the profile shows that only few items are addressed. Only S8 item meets the 
minimum requirements since the impact of resource reduction on safety margins is assessed 
within the organisation (production driven culture). For three (03) items over nine (9), the 
system performs under performance requirements. The targeted performance is to make the 
system perform at least under minimum requirements. 
ii. Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to anticipate 
 
Figure 1-34: Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to anticipate 
 
The profile shows that all items are not addressed. This means that the ability to anticipate time-
pressure issues is missing. The targeted performance is to make the system meet minimum 
requirements.  
iii. Supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to anticipate 
 
Figure 1-35: supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to anticipate 
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With respect to ability to anticipate, the profile shows that majority of items are not addressed.  
However, a model of carrier planning exists at corporate level with a limited implementation 
(S1). When a diagnosis of safety/production trade-off is carried out, production is favoured 
(S7).  Besides, the maintenance department assesses the impact of resource reduction on safety 
margins stemming from supervision/coordination issues. The targeted performance is to meet 
realistic item requirements for item S8, minimum requirements for items S1, S6, and S7 and 
address the remaining ones. 
iv. Discussion  
The participants highlighted the absence of vulnerability model clearly formulated for these 
issues. It has been shown that the required expertise to investigate the future assuredly exists 
within the Company but not used as expected. Vulnerability has been dealt with solely 
throughout individual experience and expertise. There has been limited analysis of long term 
effects within the organisation and limited development of strategic plans regarding these 
issues. CMMS was found the only tool used however its limitations included the ignorance of 
the analysis of situations where things went (go) right in order to investigate the future. The 
exchange of information flux that might constitute a basis to identify signs of trouble has not 
judged spontaneous and continuous because of high departmentalisation. Production was 
generally favoured except when there was an imminent danger. There has been limited feedback 
regarding sent reports despite a regular diagnosis. Besides, it is worth noting that departments 
have regularly assessed the impact of resource reduction on safety margins regarding resources 
issues; participants judged this highly positive. 
At department level, it has been recommended to: 
 Encourage the development of internal expertise from the monitoring aforementioned 
and use external expertise to investigate the future 
 Update database to optimise exploitation  
 Review/analyse past maintenance reports to extract trends and include, in the future, 
trend analysis in the reports 
 Introduce proposed PI’s (see ability to monitor) and analyse data collected 
 Assess future threats/opportunities on a regular basis e.g. at least once per year to make 
a projection in the future at corporate level 
 Alert about retirement/leaving of key staff 
 Alert on time about training to face new technologies and process 
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 Perform a continuous training for new recruits 
 Encourage the coaching of new recruits 
The trade-off safety/production might be addressed by: 
 Simulating near-misses risk scenarios along with a study of the impact on production 
using systemic methods such as the FRAM method 
 Respecting maintenance task schedules as planned and or as adjusted 
 Increasing the vigilance levels of workers based on company’s event logs 
 Requesting production staff to increase awareness and vigilance in following up and 
tracking production parameters 
The impact of resources reduction on safety margins might be assessed by measuring: 
 The frequency of updating the schedules, and staff performing urgent tasks 
 The impact of such actions on deadlines and quality of maintenance 
At corporate level, it has been recommended to: 
 Develop a vulnerability model clearly formulated for the future  
 Develop tools to predict dangers stemming from these issues by an optimum 
exploitation of maintenance reports and CMMS tools  
 Encourage the development of analysis tools to investigate the future  
 Associate maintenance/production experts to define strategic plans 
 Clearly establish an explicit recognition of acceptable/non acceptable risks 
 Search (and monitor) factors throughout future threats; this might be expressed, 
particularly by disappearance of spare parts suppliers in order to be prepared to  
 Improve communication and share future expectations/events within the organisation 
throughout for instance forums  
 Make the nature of future threats/opportunities widely known within the organisation 
(which they are and how they develop) 
 Establish a projection in the future of the company maintenance culture and procedures 
 Raise awareness of personnel/managers to assess situations where things go right. 
 Create technology watch and monitoring units to adapt human resources to new 
technologies 
 
 -- 202 -- 
 
The nature of supposed future threats was expressed through routine, drop of level of vigilance, 
overconfidence (complacency), self-satisfaction, fatigue, etc. These might develop through 
absence of control, successive good results, and repeated tasks for a long period in the same 
place, lack of mobility intra-branches among others; therefore, these factors have been found 
worth seeking and monitoring. On the other hand, the nature of supposed future opportunities 
lied in the detection of competence and expertise and the assurance to retain those recognised 
staff, the transfer and sharing of good practices and knowledge, the capitalisation of knowledge 
and know-how, etc.; therefore, these factors have been judged worth seeking and monitoring 
too. 
As claimed by the participants, this was actually the weakest ability within the organisation. 
Many propositions have been adopted to remedy the situation. The need to elaborate a 
vulnerability model recognised and clearly formulated as well as to include trend analysis in 
future maintenance reports has been highlighted. It is worth putting a stress on the high number 
of experienced people in the maintenance departments (more than 20 years of experience). 
Taking benefit of these workers before retiring and even after (some of these persons should be 
utilised to train both new recruits and other staff) was another opportunity. 
The ateliers recommended also identifying future threats as well as opportunities through 
annual meetings to make a projection in the future of the organisation and elaborate strategic 
plans. Many stories have been told regarding things that went right. By means of storytelling 
method, a study is being carried out to remedy the lack of documented things that go right (work 
as performed) as explained above. 
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7.3.2.4. Ability to learn 
i. Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to learn 
 
Figure 1-36: Resources Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to learn 
Four (04) items over seven (07) show that the system performs under minimum requirements 
whereas the reminders are not addressed by the system.  The targeted performance is to make 
the system meet minimum requirements for the former and at least address the latter. 
ii. Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to learn 
 
Figure 1-37: Time-pressure Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to learn 
It can be seen in this profile that the system does not address the items except item S2 (the 
learning activity is a continuous process and is built throughout the entire organisation) showing 
the system performs under minimum requirements. The targeted performance is to make the 
system meet minimum requirements for item S2 and address the remaining items.  
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iii. Supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to learn  
 
Figure 1-38: supervision/coordination Factor Resilience Profile for the ability to learn 
For the ability to learn, some items are not addressed (organisation support to collect data, 
analyse, and learn from coordination/supervision issues; shortest delay between event 
reporting, analysis, and learning; means in place to verify and maintain learning). For the 
remaining items, the system performs under minimum requirements. The targeted performance 
is to meet minimum requirements for items S2, S3, and S5 and address the remaining ones. 
iv. Discussion 
The participants found the learning process quite missing or learning was event oriented and 
was not a continuous activity for the studied factors. Support and training of personnel to 
collect, analyse, and learn with respect to these issues were not totally considered within the 
organisation as well as required resources allocation to investigate, analyse, and disseminate 
results and learning inherent to such issues. The allocation of necessary resources (particularly 
when things go right) to investigate, analyse, disseminate, and learn was found limited. The 
results of analysis were not immediately communicated. The necessary means to verify and 
maintain what was learnt were not in place. There were limited plans with respect to staff carrier 
plan. 
At department level, it has been recommended to: 
 Establish/update and implement staff carrier plans 
 Encourage learning from what is frequent (successes, things that go right) as well as 
what is rare (failures, things that go wrong) 
 Use all opportunities to learn; in particular assign responsibility to a multidisciplinary 
team to make optimum exploitation of the CMMS 
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 Put in place anonymous storytelling process to collect, categorise, and analyse all data 
(what is frequent as well as what is rare); a person should be responsible for experiences 
compilation in order to extract lessons to share knowledge 
 Implement learned lessons throughout application notes, top management directives, 
etc.  
 Publish reports monthly to allow a large diffusion.  
 Mentor (coach) new recruits by experienced personnel near to retirement  
 Communicate results to “communication units” and propose the better ways to 
implement lessons learned (regulations, procedures, standards, training, instructions, 
redesign, reorganisation, etc.) 
 Introduce means to verify or confirm that learning has taken place throughout evaluation 
(formative and summative) 
 Introduce means to maintain what has been learned 
At corporate level, it has been recommended to: 
 Reactivate the one-year induction for new recruits 
 Review management training and resources allocated to allow a continuous 
improvement and give more importance to statistics/methods/analysis services 
 Harmonise maintenance reports 
 Organise workshops 
 Encourage internal training 
 Select relevant information and allocate PI’s to ensure follow-up 
 Identify competences within the organisation and allocate appropriate resources to 
investigate, analyse, and disseminate results and learning in collaboration with Human 
resources departments 
 Make learning a continuous process within the organisation through coaching, training 
of specialists, and management support 
 Include the learning factor in the new Company’s performance management system  
 Elaborate a template for event description and how to collect and categorise data 
 Communicate rapidly result analysis inside and outside the organisation 
 Create an audit/follow-up unit to check that learning has taken place and verify that 
means to maintain this learning is in place 
 Establish a return on investment model to determine learning outputs 
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7.3.2.5. Department profiles 
The following figures (7.13, 7.14, and 7.15) present the department profiles regarding the three 
studied factors.  
i. Resources Factor Department Resilience Profile 
 
Figure 1-39: Resources Factor Department Resilience Profile 
With respect to the resources factor, the maintenance department profile shows lower ability to 
anticipate and learn while ability to respond and monitor is slightly higher. In any case, the 
maturity level is MAL2 (see chapter 6, table 6.15); this implies that the system does not meet 
minimum requirements. The targeted performance is to move from MAL2 to MAL3 
ii. Time-pressure Factor Maintenance Resilience Profile 
 
Figure 1-40: Time-pressure Factor Maintenance Resilience Profile 
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With respect to time-pressure factor, the maintenance department profile shows very low ability 
to anticipate, to monitor, and to learn while the ability to respond is slightly higher. In any case, 
the maturity level is MAL1 (see chapter 6, table 6.15); this implies that the system does not 
address the items. The targeted performance is to move from MAL1 to MAL3 
iii. Supervision/coordination Factor Maintenance Resilience Profile 
 
Figure 1-41: supervision/coordination Factor Maintenance Resilience Profile 
With respect to the coordination/supervision factor, the maintenance department show low 
ability to anticipate, learn, and respond while ability to monitor is slightly higher. In any case, 
the maturity level is MAL2 (see chapter 6, table 6.15); this implies that the system does not 
meet minimum requirements. The targeted performance is to move from MAL2 to MAL3. 
7.3.2.6. The System’s Performance 
The analysis of the above results shows that current system performance is reactive with respect 
to the studied factors. As stated in chapter 3 (section 3.3) and chapter 5 (section 5.5), the four 
cornerstones of resilience engineering representing the system performance had to be 
addressed; none of them had to be left out to make the system AHRAP. In particular, the ability 
to monitor the system performance and the environment should be the centre of actions 
regarding the others during the long and endless journey that makes the system AHRAP. 
Therefore, the ability of the system to transform its performance from current to targeted one 
should be based on the enhancement of the monitoring aspect. This will assuredly increase the 
other abilities.  
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Such an approach has been taken into account in this study. For the three factors (resources, 
time-pressure, and supervision/coordination), actions that might enhance the system abilities 
were linked to developing the ability to monitor. For instance, to increase the system ability to 
respond from 1.61 to 2.67, the ability to anticipate from 1.33 to 2.33, and the ability to learn 
from 1.38 to 2.37, the system ability to monitor should be improved from 1.5 to 2.56. (figure 
7.16; in this figure, axis X stands for the four abilities that is, R for ability to respond, M for 
ability to monitor, A for ability to anticipate, and L for ability to learn; whereas Y axis stands 
for the score of each ability). This would take the system from MAL2 to MAL3 that is, from 
system performing under nominal criteria to system performance that meets minimum 
(nominal) criteria required by items. 
 
Figure 1-42: Evolution of the system’s performance. 
7.3.3. Recommendations to Top Management 
The last objective of the workshop was to make recommendations to the top management of 
the Company. In the above section related to workshop results, the latter were presented in 
terms of actions that might be implemented at department level and others that might require 
top management commitment. The results that came up from the three ateliers were synthesised 
and communicated to the audience for approval in a final presentation in presence of IAP 
managers. The audience adopted the list of recommendations in order to be sent to the top 
managers of the Company.  
The main recommendations issued from the workshop to be implemented at corporate level are 
summed up in the following: 
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 Establish at corporate level mutual response assistance plan regarding all kind of 
resources linked to maintenance activities 
 Harmonise and exploit and make an optimum use of the computerised maintenance 
management system (CMMS) 
 Update the organisation maintenance system 
 Revive and reenergise methods and statistics sections in the maintenance department to 
analyse trends in order to anticipate threats/opportunities 
 Put in place a suitable support for information exchange and/or forums between the 
different branches of the company 
 Create technology watch units and internal audits to follow up maintenance activities 
issues 
 Create joint-ventures for local manufacture of spare parts and maintenance with 
potential suppliers  
A detailed report of the workshop encompassing the results given in this section was sent to all 
participants and managers. These recommendations are presented in more details in the 
following. First, it is worth highlighting existing opportunities within the maintenance 
departments. They are characterised by a motivated personnel, but many of them are close to 
retirement; this may benefit the Company. In addition, all the departments have a computerised 
maintenance management system that is underutilised. The maintenance system that has been 
in place for years requires an evaluation and revision according to the participants. Besides, the 
participants agreed to raise the necessity to elaborate an organisation vulnerability model clearly 
formulated regarding the three studied factors. The participants required specific care to the 
investigation of the future and the development of strategic plans to anticipate any development. 
To do so, it has been advised to include trend analysis. This might create the opportunity of 
emergence of expertise within the organisation and the valorisation of work preparation and 
statistics departments in the maintenance system. A technological watch, monitor, and follow-
up of trends related to the obsolescence of spare parts and/or the disappearance of spare parts 
suppliers have been found of great importance. It has been recommended to perform audits to 
study such issues. A solution could be the creation of joint ventures particularly for spare parts 
or for the maintenance of facilities in general. 
A computerised maintenance management system (CMMS) is used within the maintenance 
departments but each branch of the Company has tailored its own system. These tools are 
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underutilised. It has been recommended to harmonise these CMMS in order to create a unique 
database (a unique codification) within the organisation and to explore the options that might 
enable its optimal and effective exploitation. This might reduce maintenance costs from 20 to 
50% according to benchmarks (Le Caz, 2005). 
The different areas of activities of the Company have mutual response assistance plan with 
respect to safety. The establishment of a mutual response assistance plan at corporate level 
regarding all kind of resources linked to maintenance has been recommended; this could begin 
with spare parts assistance between all branches of the Company. 
The limited support and training regarding data collection, analysis and learning with respect 
to the studied factors has been noted. The identification of skills and profiles in order to launch 
the related training has been recommended.  
The need to provide a forum for information exchange between all branches of activities of the 
Company has been also highlighted. This would improve the flow of information, particularly 
those stemming from expert meetings within the Company. 
It is worth noting that like most of the companies in the world (Hollnagel, 2010a), situations 
where things go right are not assessed. Their assessment would allow identify the cases where 
there could be a drift towards hazardous situations (requiring barriers) as well as those where 
things might go right (needing to be known, encouraged, and boosted). 
To sum up, experts from maintenance departments of the Company met and debated about the 
prevailing situation to determine maintenance system current performance and targeted one and 
exchanged experiences. Particularly, the resilience of the maintenance system has been 
evaluated for the first time by means of MASRAT. It resulted that the system did not meet the 
nominal criteria addressed by the specific items particularly for the ability to anticipate. 
Improvement strategies have been formulated by means of strategies that might be studied 
within each department to determine the appropriate mechanisms of implementation.  
7.4. Workshop Evaluation 
The evaluation is carried out to examine whether the intended goals of the action were achieved. 
It allows identify areas of improvement and way ahead. It consists of collecting and analysing 
feedback of the actors. Data collection was performed by: (1) getting an immediate feedback 
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from the participants just at the end of the workshop before they go back home; (2) sending 
questionnaires to the participants as well as the facilitators; and (3) performing interviews with 
facilitators after the analysis of questionnaires. These are discussed in the following 
subsections. 
7.4.1. Immediate Feedback from Participants 
At the end of the workshop, discussions have been conducted with participants to give their 
immediate comments. All were delighted to attend the workshop, to meet people from other 
departments and exchange information and opinion about their concerns. They were happy with 
the recommendations raised during the workshop. They found that the time allocated to the 
workshop was too short. The experience was very interesting since it allowed them have a better 
understanding of their working environment. The new approach was difficult to grasp at the 
beginning. Participants were not used to such a way of thinking and the relevance of the items. 
For some participants a number of items were difficult to capture first instance particularly 
regarding the ability to monitor aspect. It was also recommended to make the scoring system 
more flexible by adding “halves” for each score that is, the scale will change from 1, 2… 5 to 
1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and so forth.  To sum up, the need to train people to the use of MASRAT has been 
highlighted. 
7.4.2. Questionnaire to Participants 
A questionnaire was sent to the participants to evaluate the activity (see Appendix 6). It 
consisted of four (04) themes, for each theme a set of statements has been proposed to the 
participants. They were asked to say to what extent they agree or disagree with a particular 
statement, the scale ranged from 1 that is strongly disagree to 5 i.e. strongly agree. Theme 1 
related to the presentation of MASRAT to the audience and the following debate, four (04) 
statements. Theme 2 concerned the facilitators, three (03) statements. Theme 3 regarded the 
efficiency of the workshop, five (05) statements. Eventually, theme 4 dealt with MASRAT, 
four (04) statements. 
Theme 1, Participants Answers Regarding the Introduction 
This theme related to the presentation given by the author to introduce MASRAT and explain 
the underlying theoretical background. During this presentation, workshop objectives have 
been communicated as well as the planned activities. Table 7.20 shows the mean value, standard 
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deviation, minimum, and maximum scores ranging from 1 to 5, that have been attributed by 
respondents regarding the introduction.  
Table 1-60: Participants answers regarding the introduction 
Statements Mean SD Min Max 
A. The information was clearly given by the presenter 4.46 0.66 3 5 
B. The presenter attracted audience attention 4.16 0.80 3 5 
C. The presentation was well-structured 4.31 0.63 3 5 
D. The presenter answered appropriately to the questions 4.38 0.77 3 5 
 
As can be seen from the table given above, the participants’ answers can be summed up as 
follows. More than 90% of the participants found the information clearly given by the presenter 
(a mean value of 4.46). The presenter attracted the audience attention for 75% (a mean value of 
4.16), the presentation was well structured according to more than 90% (a mean value of 4.38), 
and the presenter answered appropriately the questions for more than 80% (a mean value of 
4.38). 
Theme 2, Participants Answers Regarding the Facilitation 
Theme 2 related to the facilitation of the workshop. It concerned the contribution of the 
facilitators to help achieve workshop objectives in time and content. Table 7.21 shows the mean 
value, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum scores ranging from 1 to 5, attributed by 
respondents regarding the facilitation of the workshop activity. 
Table 1-61: Participants answers regarding facilitators 
Statements Mean SD Min Max 
A. The information was clearly given by the facilitator 3.92 0.64 3 5 
B. The facilitator attracted audience attention 3.77 0.83 3 5 
C. The facilitator helped achieve workshop objectives 
in time and content 3.92 0.86 3 5 
 
With respect to the facilitation of the workshop, table 7.21 above shows that 75% of participants 
(a mean value of 3.92) have found the information clearly given by the facilitator but only 50% 
of them (a mean value of 3.77) said the presenter attracted the audience. For more than 50% (a 
mean value of 3.92), the facilitator helped achieve the workshop objectives in time and content. 
An interview of the facilitators was decided to analyse these values in addition to the comments 
of some participants who gave a score fewer than 4 (section 7.3.3). 
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Theme 3, Participants Answers Regarding the Workshop 
Theme 3 concerned the relevance and significance of the workshop for the participants. Table 
7.22 shows the mean value, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum scores ranging from 
1 to 5, attributed by respondents regarding this concern. 
Table 1-62: Participants answers regarding the relevance and significance of the workshop 
Statements Mean SD Min Max 
A. The workshop was relevant for me  4.16 0.89 2 5 
B. The workshop was interesting 4.38 0.65 3 5 
C. The workshop content was significant for me  4.31 0.75 3 5 
D. The workshop pushed me to reflect on my own 
actions 4.46 0.66 3 5 
E. The workshop motivated me to take actions. 4.08 1.04 2 5 
 
From table 7.22, majority of the participants found the workshop  
 Relevant for them (more than 80%, a mean value of 4.16),  
 Interesting (more than 90%, a mean value of 4.38),  
 The content significant for them (more than 80%, a mean value of 4.31),  
 Pushing them to reflect on their own actions (more than 90%, a mean value of 4.46),  
 Motivating to take actions (more than 70%, a mean value of 4.08).  
It is worth noting that 7.7% of participants did not find the workshop relevant and 7.7% not 
motivating to take actions. 
Theme 4, Participants Answers Regarding MASRAT 
The last set of questions addressed MASRAT; that is its usefulness and ease of use and 
understanding. Table 7.23 shows the mean value, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
scores ranging from 1 to 5, attributed by respondents regarding this set of questions. 
Table 1-63: Participants answers regarding MASRAT 
Statements Mean SD Min Max 
A. MASRAT was easy to understand and use and 
followed a logical order 3.46 0.97 1 5 
B. MASRAT is designed for maintenance system 3.77 0.83 2 5 
C. The use of MASRAT generated a debate among 
participants  4.15 0.69 3 5 
D. The workshop made recommendations et realistic 
actions 4.15 0.81 3 5 
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It can be noted that more than 55% of participants (a mean value of 3.46) found MASRAT easy 
to understand, use, and follow a logical order whereas 7.7% of them strongly disagree with the 
affirmation. Approximately 70% of them (a mean value of 3.77) said it is designed for the 
maintenance system. For quite 85% of them (a mean value of 4.15), the use of MASRAT 
generated a debate among participants and more than 77% (a mean value of 4.15) said the 
workshop made recommendations and realistic actions. As per facilitation theme, section 7.3.3 
addresses the low scores given by participants.  
7.4.3. Participant Comments When the Score Is Fewer than 4 
Some participants who have given a score fewer than 4 (score 4 is for agree and 5 is for strongly 
agree) commented on and made recommendations. The comments received from these 
participants are given in the following. 
7.4.3.1. Respondent one 
Theme 2, question C: “time allocated to the workshop was very short. It was not sufficient to 
become familiar with MASRAT in order to use it in the maintenance system. The situation 
necessitated long debate hence more time even though the facilitator contributed to clarify 
things”. 
Theme 3, question E: “the problem is not to take action and initiatives but to have the necessary 
resources available to perform required tasks. These resources are considered as barriers; they 
can be spare-part, documentation, diagrams, or may be to perform a more urgent task, etc. The 
inexistence of databases regarding all the maintenance tasks performed in the department 
prevents a real evaluation and analysis of the situation. It doesn’t encourage us to take initiatives 
and actions”.  
Theme 4, questions A and B: “it depends actually on the implementation of majors 
recommendations made to top management. A multi-disciplinary team (production, technique, 
maintenance, safety, etc.) may put in place recommendations at department level to achieve 
objectives of the plant”.  
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7.4.3.2. Respondent six 
Theme 2, general comments: “I think the facilitator should be more involved in the workshop. 
This is not obvious, particularly regarding time allocated. I recommend giving time for the 
facilitator to prepare the activity, understand the objectives so that he can find the best way to 
transmit them to the participants”. “The workshop was an excellent opportunity to step back 
from our daily work and analyse our situation. It allowed us to reflect on the work in a 
maintenance department. It should be held at least annually”. 
7.4.3.3. Respondent seven 
General comment: “In my point of view, a successful maintenance system necessitates 
motivating and sensitising those who are responsible directly or indirectly within the system” 
7.4.3.4. Comments 
With respect to theme 1, the presentation was acceptable and it helped both the participants and 
facilitators to achieve workshop goals and objectives. For theme 2 relating to the facilitation of 
the workshop, the scores attributed by the participants called to discuss deeply with the 
facilitators in order to understand why some scores were fewer than 4 (neither strongly agree 
nor agree). To begin with, it is worth noting that many participants gave a high score i.e. 
strongly agree (respectively quite 17% and 34% for questions B and C); this is why the mean 
value is somewhat high. According to the participants who commented on, the main issue lies 
within the time allocated to the workshop. This was not sufficient to allow facilitators do the 
facilitation as expected.  
Theme 3 dealt with the answers regarding the relevance and significance of the workshop for 
the participants. One participant disagreed with the fact that the workshop was relevant for him 
and said he is not motivated to take action. As stated earlier, their own directions chose some 
participants; therefore, the motivation could be missing. It is worth noting that the majority of 
the actors found the workshop interesting, motivating, and very significant for them.  
7.4.4. Questionnaire to Facilitators 
Each of the three facilitators directed this activity in his respective atelier. They all knew how 
easy or difficult it was to conduct the action. They were responsible for achieving the objectives 
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of the workshop in terms of time and content. Hence, their evaluation and comments were 
judged of great importance. They have been asked to evaluate (1) the preparation of the 
workshop, (2) the quality of the preliminary presentation, (3) the difficulties encountered during 
the facilitation, and (4) MASRAT usability. The questionnaire is given in appendix 7. 
With respect to the first question, that is the preparation of the workshop, they said they were 
satisfied in terms of organisational aspects whereas they found that the time allocated to this 
preparation insufficient, it was very short. The facilitators appreciated very positively the 
preliminary presentation. According to them, the information has been clearly communicated 
to the audience and the presentation attracted the participants. On the other hand, it fairly helped 
the facilitators. 
Regarding the difficulties encountered during the facilitation, the facilitators could not achieve 
easily the objectives in terms of time. As stated in the interview of facilitators in the next section, 
the approach was new; it generated therefore large debate among participants to understand 
better what each item of the tool meant. Hence, it was not easy to achieve workshop objectives 
in terms of time and content. It is worth noting that participants and facilitators did a great job 
to overcome these difficulties. 
For the usability of MASRAT, they agreed to say that the tool was designed for maintenance 
system and generated a large debate among participants. Eventually, realistic recommendations 
were made. 
7.4.4.1. Comments 
For the facilitators, the main explanation was that in general the participants were not used to 
such a new and difficult approach to grasp at the beginning, in addition to the fact that some of 
the used jargon seemed ambiguous for them. This might explain why some of the allocated time 
has been used to clarify what looked confusing. Besides, there has been a translation (from 
English to French) issue particularly for the phrase “time pressure”. The translation given first 
instance has been changed during the workshop to a more convenient and relevant one.  
7.4.5. Interview of facilitators 
The three facilitators were solicited individually to comment on the workshop by means of a 
semi-structured interview in order to better explain their responses to the questionnaire (table 
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7.24). Facilitators F1, F2, and F3 were respectively facilitating atelier 1 “resources”, atelier 2 
“time pressure”, and atelier 3 “supervision/coordination”. 
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Table 1-64: Facilitators’ interview 
Questions Facilitators answers 
Q1: How did you find the 
presentation? 
F1: in the future, it would be better if the presentation is based on a simple case study depicting MASRAT calculation and 
implementation leading to the results rather than giving the state-of-the art underlying theory of MASRAT 
F2: the presentation was precise. Underlying theory and objectives of ateliers were well explained 
F3: excellent, very clear 
Q2: Did the presenter 
communicate clearly the 
information? 
F1: yes 
F2: yes, the presentation and the program were properly linked 
F3: yes 
Q3: Did the presentation help you 
perform the facilitation? 
F1: yes 
F2: certainly. In my atelier, there was a problem of terminology regarding the translation of “time pressure” to French. 
F3: yes 
Q4: Is MASRAT easy use? 
F1: yes, but performing another case study will be helpful 
F2: yes 
F3: some items were ambiguous at the beginning for the participants. A deep discussion was engaged to clarify them and 
sometimes we were obliged to call the presenter to explain what was expected from participants. 
Q5: What difficulties did you find 
to perform the facilitation in your 
atelier? 
 
F1: there were some difficulties with respect to group background. 
F2: there were difficulties regarding to the time allocated to achieve all stated objectives. 
F3: it was difficult to distinguish between some items 
Q6: Did MASRAT help 
participants to better understand 
their environment and find ways 
to improve current situation? 
F1: yes, after several attempts 
F2: yes. Everything looked complex and difficult at the beginning. Since there is no tool to address such issues this way, 
the presentation and the use of MASRAT helped simplify the complexity. 
F3: I don’t know; they have tried to answer for the 28 items 
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Facilitators’ interview (continued) 
Questions Facilitators answers 
Q7: Was it easy to achieve 
workshop objectives in terms of 
time and content? 
F1: the work speed augmented at the end of the workshop due to deadline in order to achieve goals and go through all the 
items (28) 
F2: no. this is due to the time allocated to the workshop. Actually, it depends on the facilitator and the participants. 
F3: it was difficult due to the time allocated; some items were difficult to understand first instance; this is also may be due 
to the participants’ background 
Q8: Was MASRAT easy to 
understand and use? Does it 
follow a logical order? 
F1: yes. 
F2: easy to understand for some of the participants. It is worth noting that some efforts have been made to distinguish 
between items in order not to make confusion. This is due to the fact that it is a new way of thinking based on a novel 
approach for the participants. Much more time has been taken to ensure everyone in the atelier has understood the items 
and objectives. 
I think, after having used MASRAT a couple of times, everything will be fine. Participants are not used to such a way of 
reasoning.  
F3: no. 
Q9: Is MASRAT designed to 
maintenance system? 
F1: it will be useful if it has some links to maintenance system of the Company 
F2: yes. 
F3: yes. 
Q10: Did the use of MASRAT 
generate a debate among 
participants? 
F1: yes. 
F2: yes. Some items did more than others did. 
F3: yes. 
Q11: Did the workshop make 
realistic recommendations and 
actions? 
F1: yes. Mainly to the actual situation where a lot of works should be done 
F2: yes. 
F3: yes. 
Q12: Did MASRAT allow 
measure maintenance system 
resilience? 
F1: yes. 
F2: yes. 
F3: yes. 
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Facilitators’ interview (continued) 
Questions Facilitators answers 
Q13: Did MASRAT permit to 
collect necessary data to respond 
to the objectives of the study? 
F1: it depends on the maturity of the participants’ knowledge. 
F2: yes. 
F3: yes. 
Q14: How many persons attended 
your atelier? 
F1: 09 persons 
F2: 08 persons 
F3: 07 persons 
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7.4.5.1. Comments 
The facilitators added the following comment. With respect to items, the second aspect (ability 
to monitor) raised issues. People were generally not used to the word monitoring which was 
difficult to understand. For the third aspect (ability to anticipate), the term vulnerability was 
only linked to HSE matters. Some participants did not make the difference between strategies 
and tactics. They had also a better understanding of the word “means” than “resources” (see the 
fourth aspect i.e. ability to learn). There was nothing to say regarding the first aspect (ability to 
respond), easier to understand. 
7.4.6. Barriers 
There have been many barriers to overcome. First barrier identified was the time allocated by 
management to perform the workshop. Only one day and half were devoted including the 
presentation, the debate, and the summary of the workshop results. Second barrier identified 
was the difference regarding the backgrounds of the participants. Some participants were 
selected during the validation phase whereas others were chosen by their organisation. This 
difference led to slow down sometimes the work in the ateliers.  
7.4.7. MASRAT Improvements 
For some participants a number of items were difficult to capture first instance particularly 
regarding the ability to monitor and anticipate aspects. The item 3.5 “the department assesses 
absence of failures, hazards, and accidents to anticipate … issues” has been reworded 
accordingly and become “the department assesses situations that went (and go) right”. As a 
result, many examples of maintenance intervention to make things go right have been identified. 
It was also recommended to make the scoring system more flexible by adding “halves” for each 
score so that the scale will change from 1, 2,…, 5 to 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, etc.   
7.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter addressed the last phase of this piece of research, that is instrument testing that 
consisted of applying the tool to measure the system’s resilience, identify strategies for 
improvement, and make recommendations to manage safety proactively in the maintenance 
system so that the system becomes AHRAP, objective 4 of this research work. The testing phase 
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included a panel expert testing through a workshop held in the Algerian Petroleum Institute. It 
was organised in three ateliers according to the three factors (resources, time pressure, and 
coordination/supervision). Experts from maintenance departments were invited and asked to 
use MASRAT.  
It can be seen from what was given previously that the specific objectives hereafter recalled 
have been attained. First, the usability of MASRAT has been tested in the workshop with a 
panel of experts from maintenance departments and found usable even though all participants 
deemed the time allocated to perform such an activity very short. Second, MASRAT has been 
used to measure the resilience of the maintenance department of the Company and the maturity 
level was found MAL 2. Third, strategies that might lead the system from current level of 
maturity to excellence have been identified. Eventually, recommendations have been made to 
management to be implemented both at corporate and department levels. These 
recommendations have received a great attention from top management of the company since 
IAP has been asked to write a draft directive to implement these recommendations. 
MASRAT tool is based on resilience engineering approach. Therefore, there has been no search 
for « errors » or “failures” within the system whatsoever. Quite the contrary, the approach has 
been directed towards understanding what actually characterised the system, how work was 
actually performed by the maintenance staff rather than searching deviations from work as 
imagined. This study dealt with a novel approach that analysed actual situation with a different 
view. It looked to find out what the abilities of a system were instead of studying contributing 
factors that might lead to “errors” to be corrected and avoided. The actions were reversed. The 
elements that represented actual conditions of work were viewed differently. According to the 
first view, these elements had to be seen “dirty” necessitating clearance. For the new approach 
on which this research work was based, the view was completely different. It focused on things 
that went (go) right as well as those that went (go) wrong. The solution lied in the fact that 
increasing those that went (go) right will necessarily decrease the number of those that went 
(go) wrong. This view did not emphasise on compliance with standards, operating procedures 
and so forth, but it put a stress on adapting them to match actual conditions to achieve goals. 
When it looked at compliance to schedules, procedures, it searched to understand why 
personnel complied or used shortcuts. 
As explained hitherto, some data were not sorted out by other methods such as MEQ (chapter 
5) but might be used in complement to each other. This study highlighted the different system’s 
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abilities and identified strategies for improvement as shown in the subsections above. 
Department’s profiles for the four (04) aspects together or individually and the profilers of the 
three (03) factors together or individually as well have been determined by means of MASRAT. 
A maturity level (MAL) has also been obtained for each of the three (03) factors and the 
department. According to a scale ranging from MAL1 to 5 i.e. MEL (maturity excellence level), 
the level obtained for the maintenance department as well as for each factor was MAL2. This 
meant that the system did not meet the nominal criteria as required. From the maintenance 
department profiles, the ability of the system to anticipate has been found limited. “Time 
pressure” factor received the lowest scores in comparison to “Resources” factor. 
Based on these profiles and maturity levels, the assessment permitted identifying improvement 
strategies at both department and corporate levels (section 7.3.2). Besides, the workshop results 
witnessed that MASRAT provided a great amount of information that was very useful to 
analyse to deliver strategies for improvement and to increase system’s resilience hence system’s 
abilities. This allowed make the system as high resilient as possible, AHRAP (section 3.3).  
One of the limitations of this research work that may arise concerned the follow-up of the 
recommendations. Such an action requires a long period of time that goes beyond the objectives 
of this thesis. It can be suggested as further work or way ahead of this piece of research to 
follow-up the recommendations issued during this activity and deeply explore the monitoring 
aspect of the resilience precepts as a central aspect in relation to the other ones. In this chapter, 
the results of the workshop have been presented as well as an evaluation of this activity. The 
objectives set for the workshop were achieved. 
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 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1. Summary 
The first part of this thesis dealt with a review of the relevant literature and theoretical 
background covering the key important issues of this research work that have been tackled by 
some researchers. This addressed objective 1 of this research work. The second part, 
concentrated on the empirical study including the exploration of the maintenance working 
environment of the Company (objective 2), the design of a strategy based on resilience 
engineering to achieve safety excellence (objective 3), and the outlining, testing and validation 
of the tool that measures the resilience of Oil and Gas maintenance systems, MASRAT 
(objective 4).  These objectives are reviewed in the following. 
8.1.1. The Literature Review 
The first main objective concerned the review of the relevant literature covering the areas of 
this research. Systems have become nowadays more complex than ever; they are characterised 
by conditions where time, resources, knowledge, and competence are finite. Besides, people 
and organisations usually work under pressure to achieve corporate goals. This leads the 
elements of the system, particularly the human part, to make continuously 
adaptations/adjustments to fill in the gap between “what should be done” and “what could be 
done”.  Maintenance system consists of activities that are labour intensive, hence accidents 
prone. The impact of human factors in maintenance activities on safety within industrial 
facilities has received more or less attention from a sector to another one. In particular, the 
inherent human factors that lead to accidents are difficult to identify. A critical review of the 
relevant literature related to this area has been carried out to identify ways to address this issue. 
In the following, the main findings are summed up. 
First, the conventional approach to managing safety has been critically reviewed. 
 Definitions of key words related to this research work have been revisited. It has been 
shown that these definitions are based actually on the conventional approach to the 
management of safety (see chapter 2 for more details) 
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 A critical review of this conventional approach has shown that hazardous situations as 
well as unwanted events, their causes and consequences can be identified 
methodologically by means of techniques such as PHA, FMEA, HAZOP, etc. (called 
tabular techniques) or FTA, ETA, etc. (known as pictorial techniques). The outcomes 
of risk assessments using such techniques can be used as a means of communication to 
decision makers on the risks incurred. The techniques may complement each other. 
However, these techniques present limitations as shown in chapter 2. 
 This approach is based on a supposition that the underlying principles applied to 
equipment/component failures (failures, causes, consequences, probability of 
occurrence, and so forth) may be used to characterise the human intervention by the 
search of for instance “human errors”, a taxonomy of “human errors”, a probability of 
“human errors”. However, the human intervention is rather considered as an asset 
(chapter 3). 
With respect to the impact of maintenance activities, the main findings are given in the 
following.  
 It has been found that the maintenance activities have a tremendous impact on safety.  
 Despite the accident records, the impact of human factors in these activities on safety 
has been thoroughly studied in other industries, particularly in aviation and nuclear in 
comparison to oil and gas sector.  
 However, the works presented in chapter 2 are based on the conventional approach to 
safety management where the search for failures and/or “human errors” (critically 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3) is the leitmotiv; only lacks have been reported as if there 
have been only negative behaviours or simply positive actions are judged normal and 
taken for granted.  
Afterwards, resilience engineering concepts and precepts have been examined. The approach 
has been thoroughly studied from the different uses of the concept, followed by the evolution 
of its use, and ending by the search for relevant definitions. 
 The concept of “human error” has been discussed and found meaningless and elusive 
and hinders the examination of various conditions, pressures, conflicting goals, trade-
offs in decision making, etc. that may lead to an outcome.  
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 It has been found that most resilience definitions refer to the ability of a system to face 
some threats, changes, or unexpected situations expecting as a result a positive outcome 
(recover, regain a stable state, maintain, persist, achieve goals, etc.).  
 Performance variability has been addressed. It has been shown that systems are 
underspecified due to a combination of multiple factors (more details needed, 
incompletely known modes of operations, or tight couplings among functions, fast 
system changes, etc.) implying approximate adjustments based on trade-offs made in 
daily activities leading to system performance variability seen inevitable and necessary.  
 It has also been shown that systems can be characterised by abilities to perform daily 
work (what an organisation does) to achieve objectives that make them resilient, namely 
the ability to respond, monitor, anticipate, and to learn at which the ability to transform 
is added. Knowing and increasing these abilities will make a system more resilient.  
 Eventually, the necessity to move from following the principle of As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) to adopt the principle of As High Resilient As 
Possible (AHRAP) has been highlighted. 
Based on the resilience engineering approach,  
 Safety is seen as “a state where the performance variability produced by a system under 
conditions that are variable prevents the drift towards hazardous situation”. 
 Definitions of resilience and resilience engineering have then been proposed. They are 
respectively the “intrinsic ability of a system to successfully cope with the variability of 
its performance under expected and unexpected conditions” and “the approach that 
engineers (plan for, design, and build) practices to identify and implement strategies 
that make a system AHRAP”. 
8.1.2. Exploring the Maintenance Working Environment of the Company 
To achieve the second objective, the maintenance working environment of the Company has 
been explored by means of three methods that complement each other (see chapter 5). The main 
findings are summarised in the following. 
First, a survey of the maintenance system was carried out by means of the Maintenance 
Environment Questionnaire (MEQ). The results are as follows: 
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 This survey came up with a snapshot of daily activities and identified the human factors 
in the maintenance system of the Company and their probable impact on the system’s 
safety. 
 The conclusion of this survey showed that the three most significant factors that affect 
safety were resources, time pressure, and supervision/coordination. 
 These factors have been selected to measure the resilience of the maintenance system 
and identify strategies for improvement. 
 The limitations of the MEQ to respond alone to the framework requirements (as 
developed in chapter 6) have been highlighted.  
Then, the FRAM was used. 
 The FRAM method was used to describe the couplings of functions in the maintenance 
system and show how the elements of the system interact to illustrate the complexity of 
the system.  
 This study contributed to better understand the maintenance system. 
 The elements of the system have been found tightly coupled, hence the system complex. 
Storytelling was afterwards used to complement the two others methods. 
 As expected, the daily activities of maintenance staff and staff from other departments 
have been found plenty of stories describing the continuous adaptations of people to 
achieve assigned objectives. 
 The method allowed collect stories particularly positive actions (things that went right) 
and let people tell their experiences and share them with others 
Eventually, the need to measure the four cornerstones of resilience engineering has been shown. 
8.1.3. A Strategy Based on Resilience Engineering to Achieve Safety Excellence 
The third objective concerned the design of a strategy to achieve safety excellence. The main 
findings are summarised in the following. 
 First, a framework that consisted of performing a gap analysis using the appropriate 
tools and doing the correct assessment of current situation to identify strategies for 
improvement has been outlined.  
 This entailed carrying out a diagnosis of the situation with respect to the four aspects of 
resilience to establish a maturity level (MAL) and identify strategies that might lead a 
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system from a given level of maturity to maturity excellence level (MEL) for each of 
the three factors already identified. 
 It required the development of a management tool that would assess the resilience of 
the maintenance system.  
The developed tool, MASRAT, which consisted of 32 statements (items), has aimed at 
measuring the resilience of the maintenance system of an Oil and Gas Company through the 
measurement of the four cornerstones of resilience engineering (the ability to respond to 
threats/opportunities, the ability to monitor, the ability to anticipate developments, and the 
ability to learn from past experiences). This has been followed by a validation phase that has 
been thoroughly described in chapter 6. It concerned a content and reliability validation.  
MASRAT has been designed to carry out the analysis by measuring the resilience of the system 
i.e. measuring the four cornerstones (aspects) of resilience engineering. The measures have 
been related to the three most significant factors that have been identified by the survey (see 
chapter 5): resources availability, time pressure, and supervision/coordination. It allowed 
determining profiles of the system, in our case the maintenance system. MASRAT permitted 
determining: 
 The maintenance department profile for the four aspects i.e. the MAintenance 
Resilience Profile (MARP) 
 The maintenance department profile for the four aspects for each factor i.e. the Factor 
Resilience Profile (FRP), and 
 The maintenance department profile for each aspect and each factor i.e. the Aspect 
Resilience Profile (ARP) 
From these profiles, a MAturity Level (MAL) which ranged from MAL1 to Maturity 
Excellence Level (MEL) was then determined. A SWOT analysis of these profiles was carried 
out to identify strategies for improvement.  
8.1.4. Testing and Validating the Tool that Measures the Resilience of Oil and Gas 
Maintenance Systems 
Last step was testing the usability of MASRAT (see chapter 7 for more details). The main 
findings are given in the following. 
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 First, the usability of MASRAT has been tested in a workshop with a panel of experts 
from maintenance departments and found usable even though all participants deemed 
the time allocated to perform such an activity very short. 
 Second, MASRAT was used to measure the resilience of the maintenance department 
of the Company.  
 Third, strategies that may lead the system from current level of maturity to excellence 
have been identified.  
 Eventually, recommendations have been made to management to be implemented at 
both corporate and department levels.  
 These recommendations have received a great attention from top management of the 
company since IAP has been asked to write a draft for a directive to implement these 
recommendations. 
On the other hand, it has been noted that the follow-up of the recommendations issued from 
this workshop require a long period of time which goes beyond the objectives of this thesis. 
8.2. Conclusions 
The main conclusions that may be drawn from this research work are given in the following. 
 The traditional risk assessment techniques as well accident causation models presented 
limitations that principally lied within the fact that they could not handle systems that 
have become very complex and socio-technique. As a consequence, this kind of 
techniques could not be used to provide reliable results; hence more powerful techniques 
were required.  
 The concept of ‘human errors’ has been found meaningless. Therefore, the appropriate 
way to deal with complex socio-technical systems and understand what actually 
happened in real world was to use the concept of performance variability where 
variability was mainly due to the human intervention, considered as an asset. 
 Since systems resilience might be characterised by four (04) abilities to perform daily 
work, it has been found necessary to measure these abilities. 
With respect to the exploration of the maintenance-working environment, three methods have 
been used to survey this system. The main conclusions are summarised in the following. 
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 MEQ was found an interesting tool to collect data from the working environment but 
did not help identify strategies for improvement as sought by the framework (chapter 
6).  
 Because it focused on the identification and modification of error-shaping factors in the 
workplace in order to avoid accidents occurrence, it might look at things that went right 
but with the eye of seeking “errors”. It was actually not the case of resilience engineering 
that considered the performance variability as an asset. Hence, performance variability 
might be used rather than “human errors” 
 The FRAM was not a method used to perform a gap analysis as required by the 
framework, it was found a good one to explore a system by finding how functions were 
linked together and how they interacted to identify the variability of the outputs of these 
functions; in fine, how they might resonate.  
 Alike the other methods, storytelling was not intended to carry out a gap analysis. It was 
rather used to complement the other data collection methods since it studied things that 
went right and was appropriate for complex safety critical systems such as the oil and 
gas industry. 
 The three methods can actually complement each other to explore a studied system. 
However, they cannot be used to perform a gap analysis as required by the framework 
developed in chapter 6. 
MASRAT was developed and validated to perform the gap analysis. Regarding the validation 
of MASRAT, the index of item-objective congruence, principal component analysis, and 
Cronbach’s alpha analyses were carried out. 
 This ended with the validation of MASRAT after taking into account the results of these 
analyses.  
 The 32 items were reduced to 28 out of which 2 were reworded whereas one was moved 
from an aspect to another one (see chapter 6) 
The usability of MASRAT has been demonstrated during the workshop. An evaluation of this 
action has been carried out. It has been found that the objectives set for this workshop were 
achieved (see chapter 7). 
In addition to what was given previously, this thesis contributed to the theory and practice of 
resilience engineering precepts.  
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8.3. Original Contribution 
From the key questions stemming from the problem statement, it has been shown that the 
resilience engineering approach was the appropriate solution to managing safety in complex 
socio-technical systems. It has also been highlighted that implementing such an approach 
implied identifying ways that make a system As High Resilient As Possible (AHRAP). The 
research work that has been carried out within the Algerian Oil and Gas Company came up with 
some contributions that are given in the following. 
It highlighted the benefits of using a novel approach based on resilience engineering concepts 
along with the need to fill in the gap between resilience engineering theory and practice. For 
the first time, resilience engineering approach has been implemented in the Company. A 
framework based on a gap analysis study has been outlined; it proposed a way to implement 
resilience engineering and AHRAP concepts in practice by tackling particular issues in the 
maintenance system of oil and gas assets. This has been achieved by developing a tool, 
MASRAT, tailored to the maintenance system of oil and gas assets. MASRAT was based on 
the four cornerstones (abilities) of resilience and maturity levels. If these abilities were known 
and increased, this would make the system more resilient. MASRAT has been validated and 
tested. It allowed: 
 Measure the system resilience for the first time with respect to three most significant 
human factors within the Company 
 Engineer practices that identify strategies for improvement to increase system’s 
resilience hence system’s abilities which make the system AHRAP 
 Provide a great amount of information that is very useful to analyse and create a 
database that may serve the Company and further research 
 Moreover, MASRAT permitted the assessment of the resilience of the system, the 
identification of maturity levels and strategies for improvement. Its utilisation during the 
workshop showed its usability and particularly the opportunity to make realistic 
recommendations to management in order to manage safety proactively in the maintenance 
system. MASRAT has been tested for three factors (resources, time pressure, and 
supervision/coordination) and found reproducible; hence, it has been found flexible and might 
be extended to any of the 16 identified factors (chapter 6).  
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Besides, the research work contributed to remedy the limited research in the area of human 
factors within the maintenance systems of oil and gas industries. It has been achieved by 
exploring the maintenance working environment of the Algerian National Oil and Gas 
Company providing a better knowledge of the maintenance working environment and human 
factors impact on safety and by profiles determination and improvement strategies 
identification. This study allowed exploring the maintenance system of the Company. By means 
of the MEQ, the maintenance working environment has been surveyed. The use of the FRAM 
has showed the complexity of the maintenance system. Storytelling allowed collecting stories 
about what actually maintenance personnel do to achieve objectives under conditions 
characterised by finite resources and knowledge. 
To sum up, this research work contributed by  
 Exploring the maintenance working environment of an oil and gas company and 
studying the impact of human factors in the maintenance activities on safety,  
 Measuring the resilience of the maintenance system of the company,  
 Determining profiles and identifying strategies for improvement, and  
 Eventually contributing to the theory and practice of resilience engineering. 
8.4. Recommendations for Future Work, the Way Ahead 
This research work has highlighted the need to base the management of safety on resilience 
engineering since traditional risk assessment techniques as well as accident causation models 
have failed to handle complex socio-technical systems. It has contributed to the development 
of theory and practice of resilience engineering precepts by introducing MASRAT a 
management tool that has measured the resilience of the maintenance system of an Oil and Gas 
company.  
In spite of the practical advantages that stem from the approach used in this research work, there 
are some points that need deeper exploration and may suggest axes of research. They are 
summarised in the following. 
8.4.1. MASRAT 
To begin with, actually, each of the 28 proposed items constituting MASRAT could be a 
research topic itself. 
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 MASRAT is a management tool, therefore, the monitoring of the resilience of the 
system needs developing a web page based application. This may ease its use, 
monitoring, and decision-making and follow-up. 
 Since MASRAT is flexible enough, it is worth going beyond the maintenance system 
and exploring the organisation as a system, or the production, or any other system within 
the organisation. 
 Investigating the relationship between the four cornerstones of resilience engineering 
precepts to find how the deficiencies of one aspect may influence the others is another 
axis of research. This may be, for instance, the exploration of the monitoring aspect by 
developing performance indicators for the examined system or the development of a 
model of vulnerability. The latter is one of the important elements of the anticipation 
aspect that requires a deeper examination. 
8.4.2. Resilience Engineering 
The concepts of resilience engineering may enhance the implementation of any HSE 
management system. It is of great importance to find a way to introduce these precepts since 
companies have troubles to implement such systems. This action has already begun during 
training sessions of steering committees that will implement the Company’s HSE MS by using 
the FRAM unit (see chapter 1) to characterise recommended activities/actions (functions). 
It has been shown that traditional risk assessment techniques as well as accident causation 
models cannot handle complex socio-technical systems; it is therefore an interesting research 
axis. The use of FRAM during this research work has raised the need to the development of a 
way to measure the variability of the performance. The exploration of the use of fuzzy cognitive 
maps (MCP) could be an axis of development. 
Eventually, in this thesis, the concept of AHRAP has been introduced without any development. 
A study showing the need to make the shift from the concept of ALARP to the concept of 
AHRAP is of great importance too. 
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Appendix 1 Relevant Definitions of Resilience 
Table A-1.1 : Relevant definitions of resilience 
System feature In front of Definition Author 
Ability to absorb and 
persist 
Changes and 
disturbances 
A measure of the ability of the systems to 
absorb changes of state variables, driving 
variables, and parameters, and still persist. 
 
A measure of the persistence of systems 
and of their ability to absorb change and 
disturbance and still maintain the same 
relationships between populations or state 
variables  
Holling 
(1973) 
Speed to turn back to 
initial state (stability) 
 A measure as the speed with which a 
system returns to its original shape 
Pimm (1984) 
Ability to withstand Stress  The ability of a system to withstand 
stresses ‘environmental loading…It is a 
fundamental quality found in individuals, 
groups, organisations, and systems as a 
whole 
Horn and Orr 
(1998) in 
Vugrin et al 
(2010)  
Capacity to adapt 
resources and skills 
New situations  The capacity to adapt existing resources 
and skills to new situations and operating 
conditions 
Comfort, 
1999, in 
Vugrin et al 
(2010)  
Ability to cope with External   
stresses and 
disturbances 
Ability of groups or communities to cope 
with external stresses and disturbances as a 
result of social, political and environmental 
change  
Adger (2000) 
in Vugrin et 
al (2010)  
Ability to absorb  
 
 
 
Ability to use 
resources 
 
 
Ability to rebound 
Strain and 
adversity 
 
Ability to absorb strain and preserve or 
improve functioning despite the presence 
of adversity  
 
Continuing ability to use internal and 
external resources successfully to resolve 
issues  
 
Capacity to rebound from adversity 
strengthened and more resourceful  
Sutcliffe and 
Vogus (2003) 
 
Capacity to cope with 
Capacity to learn 
bounce back 
Unanticipated 
dangers 
Capacity to cope with unanticipated 
dangers after they have become manifest, 
learning to bounce back 
Widalvsky 
(2004)  
 
Capability to maintain  
functions and 
structures 
Changes  Capability of a system to maintain its 
functions and structure in the face of 
internal and external change  
Allenby 
(2005) in 
Vugrin et al 
(2010)  
Ability to absorb Disturbance  Ability of a system to absorb 
disturbance and still retain its basic 
function and structure  
Walker and 
Salt (2006)  
 
Ability to steer 
activities 
Close to 
dangerous areas 
Ability to steer the activities of the 
organisation so that it may sail close to the 
area where accidents will happen but 
always staying out of the dangerous area  
Hale and 
Heijer (2006) 
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Relevant definitions of resilience (continued) 
System feature In front of Definition Author 
Ability to prevent or 
adapt to  
 
Changing 
conditions 
Ability of systems to prevent or adapt to 
changing conditions in order to maintain 
(control over) a system property  
Leveson et al 
(2006) 
 
Potential abilities 
used to the utmost 
Expected and 
unexpected 
situations 
Utilisation of system’s potential abilities 
(engineered features or acquired adaptive 
abilities) to the utmost extent and in a 
controlled manner, both in expected and 
unexpected situations  
Fujita (2006)  
 
Ability to efficiently 
adjust to  
 
 
Intrinsic ability to 
react to and recover 
Harmful 
influences 
 
 
Disturbances  
Ability of an organisation to efficiently 
adjust to harmful influences rather than to 
shun or resist them  
 
Intrinsic ability of a system to react to and 
recover from disturbances at an early 
stage, with minimal effect on its dynamic 
stability 
Hollnagel 
(2006) 
 
Ability to prevent or 
recover 
Something bad Ability to prevent something bad from 
happening, from becoming worse, or to 
recover from it once it has happened  
Westrum 
(2006) 
 
Ability to keep or 
recover quickly to a 
stable state  
 
 
 
Ability to have 
appropriate levels of 
resources 
Major mishap 
or in presence 
of stress 
 
 
 
Sudden 
increasing 
challenges or 
onset of a major 
hazard 
Ability of an organisation (system) to 
keep, or recover quickly to, a stable state, 
allowing it to continue operations during 
and after a major mishap or in the presence 
of continuous significant stresses  
Ability to have appropriate levels of 
resources (particularly reserves) that can 
react to sudden increasing challenges or 
onset of a major hazard 
Wreathall 
(2006) 
 
To cope with  Complexity 
under pressure 
A paradigm for safety management that 
focuses on how to help people cope with 
complexity under pressure to achieve 
success  
Woods and 
Hollnagel 
(2006) 
 
Ability to achieve 
core objectives  
Adversity A resilient organisation is able to achieve 
its core objectives in the face of adversity. 
 
Seville et al. 
(2006) 
Ability to absorb and 
retaining basic 
functions 
Disturbance Ability of a system to absorb disturbance 
and still retain its basic function and 
structure  
Walker and 
Salt (2006)  
 
Capability to 
Recognise, adapt to, 
and cope with  
The unexpected Resilience refers to the capability of 
recognising, adapting to, and coping with 
the unexpected.  
Woods, 
(2006) 
Intrinsic ability to 
maintain or regain a 
dynamically stable 
state  
Major mishap 
or in presence 
of significant 
stress 
Intrinsic ability of an organisation (system) 
to maintain or regain a dynamically stable 
state, which allows it to continue 
operations after a major mishap or in the 
presence of continuous significant stresses  
Weick and 
Sutcliffe 
(2007)  
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Relevant definitions of resilience (continued) 
System feature In front of Definition Author 
Ability to reduce 
efficiently 
magnitude and 
duration of deviation 
Deviation The ability to efficiently reduce both the 
magnitude and duration of the deviation 
from targeted system performance levels. 
Vugrin et al 
(2010)  
 
Intrinsic ability to 
adjust functioning  
Prior to, during 
or following 
changes and 
disturbances 
The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust 
its functioning prior to, during or following 
changes and disturbances, so that it can 
sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions  
Hollnagel 
(2011) 
 
Intrinsic ability to 
adjust functioning 
Prior to, during 
or following 
events 
(changes, 
disturbances, or 
opportunities) 
A system is resilient if it can adjust its 
functioning before, during, or following 
events (changes, disturbances, or 
opportunities) and thereby sustain required 
operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions. 
Fairbanks et 
al (2014) 
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Appendix 2 FRAM of the Turbo-compressor 
Table A-2.1: Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters 
Functions 
T
y
pe 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Isolate equipment 
B  Production  Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Equipment isolated Equipment 
available 
Isolation 
procedures  
Permits to 
work and 
associated 
certificates 
issued 
HSE 
department 
Operators  01 day 
Drain equipment 
B Production, HSE, 
maintenance 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Equipment drained Equipment 
isolated 
Explosion/fire 
tests 
Permits to 
work and 
associated 
certificates 
issued 
HSE 
department 
Technicians 
operators 
01 day 
Inspect equipment 
to identify nature 
of breakdown 
B Inspection and 
technical 
department 
Inspection request  Equipment 
inspected 
Nature of 
breakdown 
identified 
Equipment 
isolated blind 
flange 
Competence 
and experience 
Inspectors  01 day 
(may 
take 
several 
days 
Request 
inspection of 
equipment 
B Production  Breakdown  Inspection of 
equipment 
requested 
 Production 
procedures  
Operators  01 day 
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Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters (continued) 
Functions 
T
y
pe 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Report  
breakdown 
B Production Recommendations 
after inspection 
Breakdown 
reported 
 Production 
procedures 
Operators  
Issue work 
demands 
B Production  Work demands 
issued 
 Production 
procedures 
Operators 01 h 
Prepare work 
orders 
B Maintenance 
preparation section  
Work demands 
 
Work orders 
prepared 
Required resources 
defined 
Required human 
resources defined 
Estimation of 
man/h defined 
Equipment 
outage 
Maintenance 
system 
procedures 
Assistants  
Technicians   
01 h 
Issue work permits 
B  Maintenance  Work orders  
 
Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates issued 
Permits  
Certificates  
Permit to work 
system 
(PTWS) 
Technicians  01 h 
Schedule activities 
B Maintenance 
planning/ 
scheduling section 
Work orders 
Permits to work and 
associated 
certificates 
 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
Performance/costs 
measured 
Attendance 
sheet 
Spares 
Tools 
Equipment  
Maintenance 
system 
procedures 
Planners 01 day 
Dismantle 
instruments, 
piping, probes, etc. 
F Maintenance crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Instruments, piping, 
probes, etc. 
dismantled  
Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  02 days 
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Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters (continued) 
Functions 
T
y
pe 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Open equipment 
F Maintenance crafts 
(logistics, 
mechanics) 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Equipment opened Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  
Tools 
Equipment  
01 day 
Clean components 
F Maintenance crafts 
(logistics, 
mechanics) 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Components 
cleaned 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  01 day 
Make 
recommendations 
B Inspection and 
technical 
department 
 Recommendation
s made after 
inspection 
 Competence/ 
experience 
Inspectors  04 h 
Repair identified 
issues 
F Maintenance 
crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics), 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Identified issues 
repaired 
Permits to 
work and 
associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  04 h 
Depend
s on 
spare 
availabi
lity 
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Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters (continued) 
Functions 
T
y
pe 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Lift components 
B Maintenance crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Components lifted   Logistics  
Tools 
Equipment 
04 h 
Overhaul auxiliary 
equipment 
F Maintenance crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Auxiliary 
equipment 
overhauled 
Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts   
Grease auxiliary 
equipment 
F Maintenance 
crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
Preventive 
maintenance 
schedule 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Auxiliary 
equipment 
greased 
Permits to 
work and 
associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  03 h 
Replace failed 
components 
(pumps, hoses, 
etc.) 
F Maintenance 
crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
 New components  
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Failed 
components 
(pumps, hoses, 
etc. replaced 
PTW and 
associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  
Spares  
Tools 
Equipment  
 
 
04 h 
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Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters (continued) 
Functions 
T
y
pe 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Lubricate 
components 
F Maintenance crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
Preventive 
maintenance 
schedule 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Components 
lubricated 
Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipmentdrain
ed Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  02 h 
Align equipment B Maintenance 
crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
 Equipment 
aligned 
 Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  
Operators  
Technicians  
 
02 h 
Mount 
instruments, 
piping, probes, 
etc. 
F Maintenance 
crafts 
(instrumentation, 
logistics, 
electricity, 
mechanics) 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Instruments, 
piping, probes, 
etc. mounted 
Permits to 
work and 
associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts   
 
2 days 
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Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters (continued) 
Functions 
T
y
p
e 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Test equipment 
B All departments 
present 
Equipment aligned 
 
Equipment tested Permits to 
work/ 
certificates 
completed and 
signed-off 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  
Operators  
Technicians 
04 h 
Complete and sign-
off permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
B Maintenance, 
production, and 
HSE 
Equipment de-
isolated 
Equipment inspected 
Components cleaned 
Identified issues 
repaired 
Auxiliary equipment 
overhauled 
Auxiliary equipment 
greased 
Failed components 
(pumps, hoses, etc. 
replaced 
Components 
lubricated 
Equipment aligned 
Instruments, piping, 
probes, etc. mounted 
Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
completed and 
signed-off 
 PTWS   
04 h 
Manage 
competence 
B   Training, 
experience 
available 
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Characterisation of the foreground and background functions by the six parameters (continued) 
Functions 
T
y
pe 
Who Input Output Preconditions Controls Resources Time 
Manage procedures B   Procedures made available 
    
Manage resources B Planning 
scheduling 
Logistics  
Maintenance 
personnel 
Spare parts 
Tools  
Equipment needs 
Required personnel 
assigned 
Required spares 
made available 
Required 
equipment tools 
made available 
 
    
Inspect opened 
equipment 
B Inspection and 
technical 
department 
Work planned and 
scheduled 
 
Opened equipment 
inspected 
Recommendations 
made 
Permits to work 
and associated 
certificates 
issued 
Equipment 
drained 
Equipment 
isolated 
Competence/ 
experience 
Inspectors  
Technicians 
 
04 h 
Start equipment B All departments 
present 
Permits to work and 
certificates 
completed and 
signed-off 
Equipment started Equipment 
aligned 
PTWS 
Manufacturer 
procedures/ 
instructions  
HSE 
department 
Competence/ 
experience 
Crafts  
Operators  
Technicians 
04 h 
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Figure A-2.1: Links for the outputs of the considered functions  
Note: the background functions are in blue colour 
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Appendix 3 Experts comments on MASRAT 
Example of messages sent to the experts 
To the attention of Professor Sydney Dekker, 
Dear professor, 
I am Said Ameziane, part-time PhD student in Robert Gordon University.  I had the honour to 
read your contributions particularly managing safety by resilience engineering. I am working 
in the area of human factors and my research deals with finding a strategy to enable the 
optimisation of human factors in maintenance and achieve safety excellence. I have already 
designed an instrument which measures the resilience of a system based on issues identified by 
means of a survey in the maintenance environment, interviews of maintenance staff, 
observations, and literature review on the one hand, and on generic probing questions proposed 
by Professor Hollnagel. 
At the beginning, 25 items were identified to be analysed at organisational level. The 
organisational assessment tool was then adapted to fit the maintenance system, object of our 
study. 16 items were identified to do so.  
Since it is quite impossible to address all the 16 items during the research project, the list was 
reduced to only 3 highlighted issues that received the most frequent rating for a situation that 
occurred at least once in six months or more frequently by maintenance staff and interviews of 
maintenance specialists: equipment i.e. resources availability, coordination/supervision, and 
time pressure (operational constraints).  
The instrument is intended to be used in an Algerian company, so there are 2 versions: English 
and French. It necessitates a validation process. As an expert in the field of resilience 
engineering, I would be very grateful if you can be among the expert panellist who will assess 
the content validity of the instrument in question. Your comments/feedback are very welcome. 
Thank you indeed. 
 I am attaching the Excel file for rating if you agree. Thank you very much 
My Very Best Regards 
Said  
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Response from Professor Sydney Dekker 
 
Sidney Dekker <s.dekker@griffith.edu.au> 
Mon 24/09/2012 05:36 
Inbox 
To: 
SAID AMEZIANE (0410925);  
You replied on 24/09/2012 14:48.  
Dear Said, 
 
Sorry for the delay. I have had a chance to look at your survey. I generally commend you for trying to 
operationalize resilience like this, and to probe an organization with it. Generally, the content is fine 
and seems to be a fair reflection of what the resilience literature has been trying to do (or at least one 
part of that literature). 
 
Your questions vary from very specific (e.g. "6. The department estimates best response duration...") 
to much more high-level and unspecific (e.g. questions 18 and 19 about the "learning process"). This 
may not be a problem, of course, but perhaps worth looking at once more. 
 
Also, it seems as if for each question, 4 answers need to be given (for all 4 resilience markers). Is that 
right? If so, I am not looking at 32 questions, but rather at 128, which may induce a bit of survey 
fatigue among your informants. Perhaps there are ways in which you can better collapse some of the 
questions, so as to end up with even fewer ones?  
 
Hope this works for you, 
Best wishes, 
Sidney Dekker 
 
Professor Sidney W. A. Dekker, PhD 
School of Humanities 
Griffith University 
Macrossan Building, N16_2.22, Nathan Campus 
QLD 4111, Australia 
+61 - (0)7 - 373 54842 
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Response from Professor Erik Hollnagel 
 
Erik Hollnagel <hollnagel.erik@gmail.com> 
Sun 19/08/2012 16:24 
Inbox 
To: 
SAID AMEZIANE (0410925);  
You replied on 24/08/2012 17:32.  
Bonjour Said 
Sorry to take so long in replying, but such is life. 
I have looked through your descriptions, and also the spreadsheet. It looks quite interesting, and I 
think that the questions are quite sensible. I am involved in a similar project but in healthcare (starting 
next year, in fact), so it would be interesting to keep track of your results. As you say, there are quite a 
number of questions to be asked, but I think that experiecne can help in finding the most informative 
ones. 
So do keep me informed about how this work develops. 
 
With kind regards, 
Erik Hollnagel 
Professor Erik Hollnagel 
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Appendix 4 Explanatory introduction to participants to the validation 
phase 
The following is the explicative note given to the survey participants during the validation phase 
of MASRAT. 
Introduction 
The following survey is a part of a PhD research to develop a tool which measures the intrinsic 
ability of a system or an organisation to its functioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected 
conditions (Hollnagel, 2010a). By means of a questionnaire, the ability of a system to respond 
(1) to threats/opportunities, to flexibly monitor (2), to anticipate (3) any development, and to 
learn (4) from past experiences is measured. The system considered is the maintenance 
department within an Oil and Gas organisation. For the 4 aspects given above, 3 items are 
examined through 28 statements in order to obtain a profile of the system in question and 
determine a level of maturity using a scale from level “1” to “excellence”. The respondents are 
asked to tick the relevant box from “1” to “M” to confirm or invalidate the statement. For 
example, “5” for “The department often assesses...resource availability” means fully agree with 
the statement i.e. the system on the whole exceeds the criteria addressed by the specific item 
that is assessment is made on a regular basis using the last available techniques, etc.  
Category assessment 
 
Table A-4.1: Scores and meanings (adapted from Hollnagel, 2010a) 
Fully agree “5” The item can be addressed and the system exceeds item requirements 
Agree “4”  The item can be addressed but the system meets realistic item requirements 
Somewhat agree “3”   
The item can be addressed but the system meets the minimum item 
requirements 
Disagree”2”                
The item can be addressed but the system performs under the minimum item 
requirements 
Fully disagree “1”       The item can be addressed but the system does not address it 
Missing “M” The system cannot address the item whatever the condition are 
 
The following are some guidelines to help understand what is meant by each of the three factors 
 
Maintenance activities are labour intensive: they are accidents prone. Human factors are most 
times difficult to identify and research in this area within the oil and gas industry is limited. 
Organisations, particularly the human part of the system make adjustments continuously to 
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adapt system resources to multiple objectives. Safety research has focused so far, on accidents 
that occurred.  There is an urgent need to develop something different that takes into account 
the interaction of the elements of a system. This may be achieved by measuring the system’s 
resilience i.e. the intrinsic ability of a system or an organisation to adjust its functioning prior 
to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel, 2010a). A resilient system is one 
which is able to: a) Respond to threats, (know what to do), b) Flexibly monitor, (know what to 
look for), c) Anticipate any developments, (know what to expect), and d) Learn from experience 
(known to learn). 
Resources  
The lack of resources is one of the most important factors influencing system performance. By 
resources it is meant any kind of resources human and material so that objectives are achieved. 
Examples of non-exhaustive points to consider: 
 Been unable to obtain a special tool or item of maintenance equipment 
 Been delayed on a task because you could not obtain a consumable part (for example, 
an ‘O’ ring) 
 Used an unserviceable piece of maintenance equipment (for example, a broke ladder) 
 Been delayed on a task because you could not obtain a major part (for example, a wheel 
or pump) 
 Done a task without the correct tools or equipment 
 Had to do a task without the appropriate documentation, etc. 
Time pressure 
Examples of non-exhaustive points to consider: 
 Not had enough time to adequately read the documentation before starting a task 
 Had to rush an inspection 
 Had to cut short a functional check 
 Been interrupted part-way through a task to perform another more urgent task. 
 Been asked to hurry a task 
 Had to skip a required functional check, etc. 
Supervision/Coordination 
Examples of non-exhaustive points to consider: 
 Felt that you did not have enough knowledge or experience to do an assigned task 
 Not been aware of maintenance activities done previously, when you needed to know. 
 Corrected an error made by someone else, without documenting what you had done 
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 Signed off a task before it was completed 
 Left out a task step because you did not know it needed to be done 
 Been given wrong information about a task 
 Assumed that work had been done by someone else, but found out later that it had not 
been done 
 Felt that a defect had not been rectified adequately before a system or component was 
returned to service 
 Certified that someone’s work was correct without checking it 
 Found that somebody else had already started a task you were about to do, etc. 
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Appendix 5 Explanatory introduction to workshop participants 
Towards a proactive management of safety in the maintenance of industrial assets 
1. Introduction  
Maintenance activities are actually labour intensive and maintenance staff often works under 
pressure to finish tasks as rapidly as possible, and sometimes lack the necessary knowledge to 
perform certain tasks as required (Ameziane et al, 2011). Thus, they are accidents prone.  
The job, the organisation, and the individual are the three interacting aspects, called human 
factors that influence human behaviour at work and can affect health and safety as defined by 
HSE (2005). Human factors inherent in such accidents are most times difficult to identify. 
Research in this area within the oil and gas industry in maintenance management is limited in 
comparison with aviation and nuclear industries. 
 
In such systems, organisations are often working under pressure. They face situations requiring 
the management of unexpected events. To achieve success, they must adapt their functioning 
and make correct adjustments. They have to rely on the capability of humans to make these 
adjustments fill in the gap between “what should be done” and “what could be done” using 
available resources, time, knowledge, and competence. Actually, these adjustments may lead 
to success or to increase risks. 
 
Instead of focussing only on why accidents happen, it is worth orienting the work toward 
understanding also why things go right within systems. The solution lies within using more 
powerful and non-linear methods/models based on systems theory and resilience engineering 
precepts. 
 
Systems have become more complex, there is an urgent need to develop something different 
that take into account the interaction of the elements of the system, more powerful than 
traditional accident causation models and risk assessment techniques that have shown their 
limits to handle such systems. Resilience engineering is the solution. In other words, measuring 
the resilience of a system i.e. its intrinsic ability to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel, 2010b). 
The main objective of this workshop is testing the usability and implementing of a tool designed 
to measure the resilience of a system, in our case the maintenance system of the Company 
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2. A management and measurement tool 
Research in safety has been recently oriented towards the use of resilience engineering 
particularly in the aviation and Aerospatiale industry whereas it is very limited in the oil and 
gas sector. To date there is no recognised tool that measures the resilience of a system,  
This study is a part of a research to develop and validate a tool to measure a system’s resilience. 
A resilient system is one which is able to respond to threats/opportunities 9know what to do), 
flexibly monitor its performance and the performance of the surrounding environment (know 
what to look for), anticipate any development (know what to expect), and learn from past 
experiences (know what to learn). 
 
This tool has been developed for the maintenance system of SONATRACH with respect to 
three factors that impact activities i.e. resources, time pressure, and supervision/coordination 
(see below meanings of each factor). This may be extended to 16 factors and adapted to other 
systems such “production” and “the organisation”, in this case 18 factors are considered. The 
tool allows identify system’s profiles and define a maturity level; it searches strategies for 
improvement that take the system from the current maturity level to excellence. The tool is 
called MAintenance System Resilience Assessment Tool (MASRAT) 
Workshop objectives 
The objectives set for this workshop are as follows:  
 Communicate and study the data collected during the action of validation,  
 Assess the resilience of the maintenance system and determine the different profiles and 
maturity levels,  
 Identify strategies for improvement, and  
 Make recommendations to top management. 
The workshop is organised in three ateliers with respect to the three studied factors.  
Theme of atelier 1: Resources  
The lack of resources is one of the most important factors influencing system performance. By 
resources it is meant any kind of resources human and material so that objectives are achieved. 
Examples of non-exhaustive points to consider: 
 Been unable to obtain a special tool or item of maintenance equipment 
 Been delayed on a task because you could not obtain a consumable part (for example, 
an ‘O’ ring) 
 Used an unserviceable piece of maintenance equipment (for example, a broke ladder) 
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 Been delayed on a task because you could not obtain a major part (for example, a wheel 
or pump) 
 Done a task without the correct tools or equipment 
 Had to do a task without the appropriate documentation, etc. 
Theme of atelier 2: Time pressure 
Examples of non-exhaustive points to consider: 
 Not had enough time to adequately read the documentation before starting a task 
 Had to rush an inspection 
 Had to cut short a functional check 
 Been interrupted part-way through a task to perform another more urgent task. 
 Been asked to hurry a task 
 Had to skip a required functional check, etc. 
Theme of atelier 3: Supervision/Coordination 
Examples of non-exhaustive points to consider: 
 Felt that you did not have enough knowledge or experience to do an assigned task 
 Not been aware of maintenance activities done previously, when you needed to know. 
 Corrected an error made by someone else, without documenting what you had done 
 Signed off a task before it was completed 
 Left out a task step because you did not know it needed to be done 
 Been given wrong information about a task 
 Assumed that work had been done by someone else, but found out later that it had not 
been done 
 Felt that a defect had not been rectified adequately before a system or component was 
returned to service 
 Certified that someone’s work was correct without checking it 
 Found that somebody else had already started a task you were about to do, etc. 
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Appendix 6 Questionnaire to participants 
Questions regarding the introduction 
 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
Table A-6.1: Questions regarding the introduction 
Theme 1 CD    CA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The information was clearly given by the presenter      
The presenter attracted audience attention      
The presentation was well-structured      
The presenter answered appropriately to the questions      
 
Questions regarding facilitators 
 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
Table A-6 2: Questions regarding the facilitators 
Theme 2 SD    SA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The information was clearly given by the facilitator      
The facilitator attracted audience attention      
The facilitator helped achieve workshop objectives in time and content      
 
Questions regarding the efficiency of the workshop  
 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
Table A-6 3: Questions regarding the efficiency of the workshop 
Theme 3 SD    SA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The workshop was relevant for me       
The workshop was interesting      
The workshop content was significant for me       
The workshop pushed me to reflect on my own actions      
The workshop motivated me to take actions.      
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Questions regarding MASRAT 
 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
 
Table A-6.4: Questions regarding MASRAT 
Theme 4 SD    SA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
MASRAT was easy to understand and use and followed a logical order      
MASRAT is designed for maintenance system      
The use of MASRAT generated a debate among participants       
The workshop made recommendations et realistic actions      
 
If you have given a score under “4”, would you please use this space to comment on. 
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Appendix 7 Questionnaire to facilitators 
Questions regarding workshop preparation 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
Table A-7.1: Questions regarding workshop preparation 
Theme 1 CD    CA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The workshop preparation (resources) was satisfactory       
The workshop preparation (time and content) was satisfactory      
 
Questions regarding the introduction 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
Table A-7.2: Questions regarding the introduction 
Theme 2 CD    CA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The information was clearly given by the presenter      
The presenter attracted audience attention      
The presentation was well-structured      
The presenter answered appropriately to the questions      
The presentation helped me facilitate the workshop      
 
Questions regarding workshop facilitation 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
Table A-7.3: Questions regarding workshop facilitation 
Theme 3 SD    SA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Participants were interested by the workshop      
Workshop objectives (content) were easily achieved      
Workshop objectives (time) were easily achieved      
There have been no difficulty to facilitate the workshop      
 
Questions regarding MASRAT 
Would you please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following 
statements 1 means you completely disagree (CD) and 5 completely agree (CA)? 
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Table A-7.4: Questions regarding MASRAT 
Theme 4 SD    SA 
 1 2 3 4 5 
MASRAT was easy to understand and use and followed a logical order      
MASRAT is designed for maintenance system      
The use of MASRAT generated a debate among participants       
The workshop made recommendations et realistic actions      
 
If you have given a score under “4”, would you please use this space to comment on. 
 
 
 
 
